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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 – Introduction 
 
A fundamental question in the field of strategic management, both from a 
researcher and a practitioner point of view, is how firms achieve and sustain 
competitive advantage. In order to be successful over time, firms in a dynamic 
environment are challenged to both explore new possibilities to achieve 
congruence with the changing business environment and to exploit old certainties 
to secure efficiency benefits (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). As 
Levinthal and March (1993: 105) put it: ‘the basic problem confronting an 
organization is to engage in sufficient exploitation to ensure its current viability 
and, at the same time, to devote enough energy to exploration to ensure its future 
viability’. An exclusive focus on either exploration or exploitation may cause a 
threat to a firm’s competitive advantage over time; Levinthal and March (1993: 
105) for instance argue that ‘an organization that engages exclusively in 
exploration will ordinarily suffer from the fact that it never gains the returns of its 
knowledge. An organization that engages exclusively in exploitation will 
ordinarily suffer from obsolescence’. Recent empirical studies (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 2004) seem to confirm that there is a relationship 
between exploration and exploitation and a firm’s success. They show that firms 
or business units which have high levels of both exploration and exploitation 
outperform those firms or units which have not.  
Firms however face difficulties to both explore and exploit; they often 
make ‘explicit and implicit choices between the two’ (March, 1991: 71). The 
explicit choices can be found in calculated decisions about alternative investments; 
both exploration and exploitation compete for scarce resources and the returns 
from the two differ with respect to certainty and proximity in time and space 
(Lewin et al., 1999; March, 1991). The implicit choices, March (1991: 71) argues, 
are revealed in ‘many features of organizational forms and customs’. The implicit 
and explicit choices firms make between exploration and exploitation bring about 
a tendency for exploration and exploitation to be self-reinforcing, leading over 
time to excessive exploration or excessive exploitation within the firm (Levinthal 
& March, 1993). 
12
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Due to the importance for firms in dynamic environments to explore and 
exploit and difficulties they face doing so, notions on exploration and exploitation 
are a recurring underlying theme in various management literatures like 
organization design (e.g. Adler et al., 1999; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; 
Sheremata, 2000; Volberda, 1996), organizational learning (e.g. Crossan & 
Berdrow, 2003; Holmqvist, 2004; Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991), 
strategy research (e.g. Burgelman, 1991; 2002; Floyd & Lane, 2000; McGrath, 
2001; Volberda et al., 2001), technological innovation (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 
2002; 2003; Duncan, 1976; Nerkar, 2003; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996) and 
knowledge literature (e.g. Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; 
Van den Bosch et al., 1999; Zack, 1999). To increase understanding about 
‘choices’ (cf. March, 1991) firms make between exploration and exploitation, 
studies particularly investigate how organizational factors impact upon firm or unit 
level exploration and exploitation processes or outcomes (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 
2002; 2003; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Jansen et al, 2005a; Levinthal & March, 1993; Sheremata, 2000). Notwithstanding 
these valuable contributions, both researchers and managers still struggle to 
understand how firms may manage and organize exploration and exploitation and 
how they may combine the two. The literature review in chapter two indicates not 
only that empirical research is lagging behind, but also that current literature 
seems to lack a theoretical rational on which and how organizational factors 
impact upon exploration and exploitation. Hence, current literature and 
management practice could benefit from increased understanding, both 
conceptually and empirically validated, about what and how organizational factors 
affect exploration and exploitation and the relationship between these two (cf. 
Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005a; 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). 
To increase this understanding, this study focuses at the individual level of 
analysis. Issues on exploration and exploitation are typically studied at the firm-
level (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993) or 
at the business unit-level (e.g. Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005a). 
There is a lack, however, of understanding about exploration and exploitation at 
the individual level of analysis and about how organization members’ exploration 
and exploitation activities may be influenced. This is quite surprising as several 
studies in management fields, such as organizational learning (Crossan et al., 
1999; Vera & Crossan, 2004), strategy research (Burgelman, 1983b, 1991; 
13
  3 
Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996; Rosenbloom, 2000; Trispsas & Gavetti, 2000) and 
technological innovation (Duncan, 1976; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005; Tushman 
& O’Reilly, 1996) indicate that firm or unit level exploration and exploitation to a 
large extent originate in the exploration and exploitation activities of their 
organization members; especially their managers (Duncan, 1976; Floyd & Lane, 
2000; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). These studies indicate that understanding how 
to influence managers’ exploration and exploitation activities benefits our 
understanding on how to build exploration and exploitation within a business-unit 
or firm. 
 
 
1.2 – Research Aim, Questions, and Conceptual Model  
 
This study departs from the need to increase insight into how firms may manage 
and organize exploration and exploitation and from the lack of understanding on 
the individual level of analysis; i.e. managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities. More specifically, the purpose of this study is to enhance conceptually 
and empirically validated understanding about how organizational factors and 
managers’ intra-organizational knowledge inflows, influence managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities. To this end, this study first develops, based 
on the literature, a conceptual model and corresponding hypotheses indicating the 
causal relationships between the constructs. Subsequently we test the hypotheses 
with survey data for managers of large multi-unit knowledge intense firms 
operating in dynamic environments, controlling for hierarchical level, functional 
background, and organization unit. Qualitative data is used to support the 
development of the conceptual model, hypotheses, and survey, and to help 
interpret the quantitative results. Below, a short discussion follows on the study’s 
central constructs, and on why we investigate the impact of organizational factors 
as common features of combinative capabilities and of managers’ intra-
organizational knowledge inflows  on managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities.  
We depart from March (1991) to conceptualize exploration and 
exploitation at the manager level. March considers the relation between 
exploration, which includes ‘things captured by terms such as search, variation, 
risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation’, and 
exploitation, which includes ‘such things as refinement, choice, production, 
14
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efficiency, selection, implementation, execution’ in organizational learning 
(March, 1991: 71). Studies on organizational learning indicate that the essence of 
managers’ exploration activities is creating variety in experience (Bontis et al., 
2002; Holmqvist, 2004; Levinthal & March, 1993; McGrath, 2001) which is 
associated with broadening a manager’s existing knowledge base (cf. Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993; Sidhu et al., 2004). Examples in the 
literature of such exploration activities of managers include searching for new 
organizational norms, routines, structures, and systems (Crossan et al., 1999; 
Nooteboom, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002), experimenting with new approaches 
towards technologies, business processes, or markets (McGrath, 2001), innovating 
and adopting a long-term orientation (Duncan, 1976; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), 
and reconsidering existing beliefs and decisions (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Ghemawat 
& Ricart I Costa, 1993; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). Studies on organizational 
learning indicate that the essence of managers’ exploitation activities is creating 
reliability in experience (Bontis et al., 2002; Holmqvist, 2004; Levinthal & March, 
1993) which is associated with deepening a manager’s existing knowledge base 
(cf. Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993). Examples in the literature of 
such exploitation activities of managers include using and refining their existing 
knowledge (Levinthal & March, 1993), activities related to applying, improving, 
and extending existing competences, technologies, processes and products (March, 
1991), focusing on production and adopting a rather short-term orientation 
(Duncan, 1976; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), and elaborating upon existing beliefs 
and decisions (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Rivkin & 
Siggelkow, 2003). Section 2.3 further elaborates on managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. 
To further increase insight into managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities, and into how these activities can be influenced, this study joins with the 
greater part of current studies by examining how organizational factors impact 
upon managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Studies suggest a variety 
of organizational factors, such as, routinization and formalization of managers’ 
tasks (Adler et al., 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2002; Duncan, 1976; Jansen et al., 
2005a; Nonaka & Toyama, 2002), (de)-centralization or participation in decision 
making (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Duncan, 1976; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 
1993; Jansen et al., 2005a; Levinthal & March, 1993; McGrath, 2001; Rivkin & 
Siggelkow, 2003; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), socialization practices (Levinthal 
& March, 1993; March, 1993), connectedness to other organization members 
15
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(Jansen et al., 2005a; Sheremata, 2000), differential reward systems such as long- 
versus short-term rewards or individual versus group based rewards (Ghemawat & 
Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Nonaka & Toyama, 2002; 
Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), and aspects related to values and norms (Benner & 
Tushman, 2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Nonaka & Toyama, 2002; Tushman 
& O’Reilly, 1996), such as tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or 
superiors (Volberda, 1998). 
To structure the investigation in this study, and to decide upon which 
organizational factors to consider, this study refers to the dynamic capabilities 
literature (e.g. Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). The dynamic 
capabilities literature stresses the importance of capabilities by which firms 
explore and/or exploit, or as Elfring and Volberda (2001: 257) express it: ‘The key 
issues in the dynamic capabilities approach are firms’ (…) abilities to use current 
resources, to create new resources and to device new ways of using current or new 
resources’. These capabilities are referred to in the literature, covering a similar 
meaning (cf. De Boer et al., 1999; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Van den Bosch et 
al., 1999), as ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 
1997), ‘combinative capabilities’ (De Boer et al., 1999; Jansen et al., 2005b; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992; Van den Bosch et al., 1999), and ‘architectural 
competence’ (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994). Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1105) 
argue that ‘although dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details and path 
dependent in their emergence, they have significant commonalities across firms’. 
The literature argues that these commonalities involve organizational factors 
(Henderson & Cockburn, 1994: 66; Jansen et al., 2005b: 1000; Verona, 1999: 
137). We will further refer to the capabilities by which firms explore new 
possibilities and exploit old certainties in terms of combinative capabilities. The 
reason for this is that studies on combinative capabilities have explicitly addressed 
the impact of organizational factors on exploration and exploitation (Jansen, 2005; 
Van Den Bosch et al., 1999), and because they indicate the importance of the 
individual level (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Organizational factors as 
common features of combinative capabilities, conceptualized by Kogut & Zander 
(1992: 383) as the capability to ‘synthesize and apply current and acquired 
knowledge’, refer to a firm’s ability to explore new possibilities and/ or exploit old 
certainties, while stressing the integration (Grant, 1996), exchange (Jansen et al., 
2005b), or transfer (Kogut & Zander, 1992) of knowledge within the firm. In other 
words, this study discusses organizational factors as common features of 
16
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combinative capabilities to structure the investigation about what organizational 
factors may affect managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Section 2.4 
further elaborates on organizational factors. 
Besides investigating the influence of “traditional” organizational factors 
as suggested by the “main stream” literature, this study will particularly focus on 
how a manager’s acquisition of knowledge from other persons and/or units in the 
same organization, influence this manager’s exploration and exploitation 
activities. On the basis of studies on intra-organizational knowledge flows (Gupta 
& Govindarajan, 2000; Schulz, 2001; 2003), we will conceptualize and 
operationalize knowledge acquisition by a manager in terms of a manager’s 
knowledge inflows. On the basis of Schulz’ (2003) and Gupta and Govindarajan’s 
(2000) definitions of knowledge inflows, we define knowledge inflows of a 
manager as the ‘aggregate volume’ (Schulz, 2003: 444) of tacit and explicit 
knowledge, pertaining to several domains such as technology, products, processes, 
strategies, and markets, which a manager receives or gathers per unit of time, from 
other persons and/or units in the same organization. We do not intend to 
investigate inflows of operational or financial data or the taking of orders. This 
notion of knowledge inflows allows this study to examine a broad range of 
managers; i.e. managers pertaining to several hierarchical levels, functional areas, 
or organization units. Section 2.5 further elaborates on managers’ knowledge 
inflows.  
Previous research indicates that knowledge acquisition is an important 
explanatory factor for exploration as well as exploitation related activities within a 
firm. Studies in the field of organizational learning, for instance, indicate that the 
acquisition of knowledge is a primary mechanism by which firms, units, or 
organization members learn from each other (Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988). 
Such learning through the acquisition of knowledge may be either exploratory 
(e.g. Inkpen, 1996; Nonaka, 1994; Tsai, 2001), reflected in an increase of the 
variety and broadness of the knowledge recipient’s knowledge base, and/or 
exploitative (Adler et al., 1999; Levin, 2000), reflected in an increase of the 
reliability and deepness of the knowledge recipient’s knowledge base. In the area 
of technological innovation, scholars (e.g. Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Nerkar, 2003; 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) have examined the impact of knowledge acquisition 
by firms, as reflected in citation patterns within patent applications, in terms of the 
extent to which innovations tend to be incremental or radical. With respect to 
managers, several conceptual investigations and case studies in the field of 
17
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strategy process research indicate that exploration and exploitation related 
activities of managers are facilitated by vertical flows of knowledge within the 
firm, i.e. by managers’ top-down and/ or bottom-up knowledge inflows 
(Burgelman, 1983b; 1991; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Van 
Cauwenbergh & Cool, 1982). A manager’s top-down knowledge inflows are 
associated with knowledge coming from persons or units at higher hierarchical 
levels than the knowledge recipient manager, whereas bottom-up knowledge 
inflows are associated with knowledge coming from persons or units at lower 
hierarchical levels. Whereas the focus of these studies is on vertical knowledge 
flows, studies belonging to the knowledge literature indicate the importance of 
examining horizontal knowledge inflows as well for understanding managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities (e.g. Grant, 1996; Gupta & Govindarajan, 
1991; Hedlund, 1994; Kogut & Zander, 1996). We will therefore not only 
distinguish top-down and bottom-up knowledge inflows of managers, but 
horizontal knowledge inflows as well. Horizontal knowledge inflows do not 
follow the traditional lines of hierarchy; they are associated with knowledge 
coming from peers in the same organization unit, or coming from other 
departments or units at the same hierarchical level.  
Based on the discussion above, the following main research question can 
be formulated: 
 
How do organizational factors and  knowledge inflows of managers 
influence managers’ exploration activities and exploitation activities? 
 
We formulate sub-research questions which guide the conceptual and 
empirical research of this study. Regarding the organizational factors, most studies 
in the literature (e.g. Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005a; Rivkin & 
Sigellkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000) suggest that these factors directly impact upon 
managers’ exploration and/ or exploitation activities. In line with these studies, we 
formulate as a first sub-research question: 
 
1. How do organizational factors directly affect managers’ exploration 
activities and exploitation activities? 
 
As argued above, to structure the investigation in this study about what 
organizational factors affect managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, this 
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study discusses, on the basis of De Boer et al. (1999), Jansen et al. (2005b), and 
Van Den Bosch et al. (1999), organizational factors as common features of a 
firm’s combinative capabilities. Studies on combinative capabilities not only stress 
the importance of the individual level, but argue, moreover, that the raison d’être 
of firms is ‘the sharing and transfer of the knowledge of individuals and groups 
within organizations’ (Kogut & Zander, 1992: 383), triggered by organizational 
factors, to enable the firm to explore and/ or exploit (De Boer et al., 1999). In 
other words: ‘the central competitive dimension of what firms know how to do is 
to create and transfer knowledge efficiently within an organizational context’ 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992: 384). Accordingly, studies pertaining to the knowledge 
literature indicate that the acquisition of knowledge (Lyles & Salk, 1996) and 
knowledge flows within an organization are not exogenous (e.g. Boone, 1997; 
Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Mom et al., 2002; Szulanski, 1996; Von Krogh & 
Köhne, 1998); rather they originate from, take place within, and are enabled or 
hindered by organizational factors, i.e. by the ‘organizing principles by which 
people cooperate within organizations’ (Kogut & Zander, 1992: 383). 
Hence, based on studies on combinative capabilities and the knowledge 
literature, we will not only investigate the direct impact of organizational factors 
on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, but also their indirect impact. 
That is, we investigate how organizational factors influence managers’ exploration 
and exploitation activities through their influence on managers’ knowledge 
inflows. In other words, we will investigate how and to what extent knowledge 
inflows mediate the relationship between organizational factors and managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities. To examine these mediation effects, the 
following two sub-research questions will guide the research: 
 
2. How do organizational factors affect knowledge inflows of managers? 
3. How knowledge inflows of managers affect managers’ exploration 
activities and exploitation activities? 
 
The conceptual framework (figure 1.1) graphically represents the study’s 
main constructs and the relationships which will be investigated, corresponding to 
the three sub-research questions; the direct impact of organizational factors and 
knowledge inflows on managers’ exploration activities and exploitation activities, 
and the mediating role of knowledge inflows. 
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Figure 1.1 – Conceptual Framework 
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1.3 – Contributions  
 
The literature indicates that firms face difficulties to manage concurrently 
exploration and exploitation (March, 1991; Levinthal & March, 1993). Previous 
research illustrates how various organizational factors impact upon firm or unit 
level exploration and exploitation processes or outcomes (e.g. Adler et al., 1999; 
Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al, 2005a; Leana & Barry, 2000; Levinthal & March, 
1993; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000). There is, however, a lack of 
conceptually and empirically validated understanding about exploration and 
exploitation at the manager level of analysis, about how organizational factors 
influence managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, and about the role of 
intra-organizational knowledge flows. This study aims to deliver a contribution. 
Box 1.1 summarizes this study’s major contributions. 
This study delivers a contribution to the current literature  on exploration 
and exploitation (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
March, 1991; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), which lacks conceptually and 
empirically validated understanding about exploration and exploitation at the level 
of the manager, by investigating managers’ exploration and exploitation activities 
and by investigating how these activities  may be influenced. Related to this, a 
contribution of this study to current literature is the development of scales which 
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assess a manager’s level of exploration and exploitation as such scales were not 
available yet. 
 
Box 1.1 – Summary of Major Contributions to Literature and Management Practice 
• Investigating exploration and exploitation at the manager level of analysis 
contributes to current studies in the literature, which merely focus on firm and unit 
level exploration and exploitation (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; March, 1991; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Also contribution in 
this respect by development of scales which measure managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. 
 
• Conceptual and empirical contribution to studies of related management fields which 
examine how various organizational factors impact upon exploration, exploitation, 
and the relation between these two (e.g. Adler et al., 1999; Benner & Tushman, 
2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005a; McGrath, 2001; Rivkin & 
Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000). 
 
• Contribution to studies on combinative capabilities and intra-organizational 
knowledge flows by inquiring into how managers’ intra-organizational knowledge 
inflows mediate the relationship between organizational factors and their exploration 
and exploitation activities (e.g. Grant, 1996; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Schulz, 2003; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999).   
 
• Contribution to management practice about how firms may manage and organize to 
combine exploration and exploitation by illustrating how configurations of 
organizational factors and knowledge inflows enable or inhibit managers to respond 
to particular ways by which firms may combine exploration and exploitation (Jansen, 
2005; Volberda, 1998). 
 
This study particularly contributes to studies which illustrate how 
organizational factors impact upon exploration and exploitation (e.g. Adler et al., 
1999; Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gibson 
& Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005a; Leana & Barry, 2000; McGrath, 2001; 
Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000), by investigating how organizational 
factors influence managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. 
Notwithstanding these existing studies, current literature and management practice 
could still benefit from understanding how organizational factors affect 
exploration and exploitation and the relationship between these two (cf. Benner & 
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Tushman, 2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). 
Existing studies suggest a variety of organizational factors and quite differ among 
each other with respect to specific organizational factors they consider (see 
Appendix A). Hence, we not only deliver an empirical contribution, but also a 
conceptual one by proving a theoretical argument, based on studies on 
combinative capabilities, about what factors to include in an analysis about the 
impact of organizational factors on exploration and exploitation. Moreover, this 
study highlights the importance of knowledge flow configurations in the literature 
on the impact of organizational factors upon exploration and exploitation by 
developing and testing hypotheses which contribute to our understanding of how 
knowledge inflows of managers influence their exploration and exploitation 
activities. 
The study also delivers a contribution to studies on combinative 
capabilities and intra-organizational knowledge flows (Grant, 1996; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Schulz, 2001; 2003; Szulanski, 1996; 
Van Den Bosch et al., 1999). Studies on combinative capabilities (Grant, 1996; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999) suggest that the raison d’être 
of firms is ‘the sharing and transfer of the knowledge of individuals and groups 
within organizations’ (Kogut & Zander, 1992: 383), triggered by organizational 
factors, to enable exploration and exploitation. This study illustrates this line of 
reasoning by conceptually and empirically examining how and to what extent 
managers’ intra-organizational knowledge inflows mediate the relationship 
between organizational factors as common features of combinative capabilities 
and managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. In other words, this research 
contributes to studies pertaining to the knowledge literature by illustrating the 
importance of ‘the sharing and transfer’ (cf. Kogut & Zander, 1992) of knowledge 
within a firm -in terms of managers’ knowledge inflows- for understanding 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Moreover, whereas studies tend 
to focus on illustrating how organizational factors impact upon intra-
organizational knowledge flows (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 1996), 
this study also illustrates the impact, or outcomes, of such knowledge flows in 
terms of managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. 
 Finally, we may particularly contribute to the literature and to 
management practice regarding the issue of how firms may manage and organize 
to combine exploration and exploitation (e.g. Duncan, 1976; Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005; Levinthal & March, 1993; Tushman & 
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O’Reilly, 1996). That is; our findings illustrate how configurations of 
organizational factors and knowledge inflows enable or inhibit managers to 
respond to particular ways by which firms may combine exploration and 
exploitation (Jansen, 2005; Volberda, 1998). Section 6.3 further elaborates on this 
study’s contributions and implications. 
 
 
1.4 – Research Design 
 
This section illustrates how the research of this study is designed and why. To do 
so, we clarify how the research approach, the research purpose and questions, the 
empirical setting, methods employed, and research activities conducted, make up 
the parts of an integrated whole (cf. Arbnor & Bjerke, 1997; Creswell, 2003). The 
reason to combine a quantitative and qualitative research approach in a study is 
that they should complement each other. This study’s purpose to collect and 
analyze both quantitative and qualitative data corresponds to what Greene at al. 
(1989: 261) label a ‘developmentally’ purpose, and Morse (1991: 120) refers to as 
‘sequential triangulation’, i.e. quantitative and qualitative methods are used 
sequentially to help inform each other. More specifically, in this study, first 
qualitative data has been used to create better understanding about the study’s 
constructs (Miles & Huberman, 1994), to further enhance the rationale of their 
relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989), and to help build the managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities scales (Jick, 1979). Subsequently, quantitative data has been 
gathered and analyzed to test the hypothesized relationships between the 
constructs and to contribute to the generalizability of the results (Creswell, 1994). 
Finally, the study uses qualitative data to assist in explaining and interpreting the 
quantitative results (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Although we combined a 
quantitative and qualitative research approach in this study, the emphasis clearly is 
on the collection and analysis of quantitative data; the qualitative data serves to 
support the quantitative approach. Creswell (1994: 177) refers to this as a 
‘dominant-less dominant’ research design. The reasons to focus in this study on 
the collection and analysis of quantitative data are related to the study’s purpose 
statement and associated research questions. As we aim at assessing what and how 
factors influence an outcome and aim at generalizing to a population, i.e. managers 
within large multi-unit knowledge intense firms in dynamic environments, 
collecting quantitative data by means of a survey and statistically analyzing the 
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data seems to be the most suited approach (Creswell, 2003; Hussey & Hussey, 
1997; Jankowicz, 1995). 
To achieve this study’s goal and address the research questions, we 
conducted empirical research within three large multi-unit firms operating in the 
financial services sector (Rabobank), electronics industry (Philips), and the 
accountancy and financial advisory sector (Deloitte). Regarding the selection 
logic, the goal of this study compels us to ensure that enough variation exists in 
our empirical data with respect to managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities. Therefore, we decided to examine managers whose firms are confronted 
with pressures to explore and with pressures to exploit. The literature indicates that 
several challenges within all three firms’ industries make them an interesting 
context to investigate managers’ abilities to conduct exploration and exploitation 
activities. Changes regarding technologies, competition, regulation, and customer 
demands, force managers of firms in the financial services, electronics, and the 
accountancy and financial advisory industries, to explore (Banker et al., 2005; 
Flier et al., 2001; Greenwood et al., 2005; Henisz & Macher, 2004; Sarvary, 
1999). At the same time, an increased pressure to focus on efficiency and cutting 
costs, increasing importance of economies of scale, and short-term competitive 
pressures, force managers of firms in these industries to conduct exploitation 
activities (Banker et al., 2005; Flier et al., 2001; Greenwood et al., 2005; Henisz & 
Macher, 2004; Sarvary, 1999). Furthermore, regarding the selection logic, the 
knowledge literature indicates the value of examining firms whose members 
posses high levels of specialized knowledge (Grant, 1996) when investigating the 
role of knowledge flows within a firm with respect to organization members’ 
exploration and exploitation activities. Technology firms like Philips are often 
used examples of such firms (cf. Smith et al., 2005). The greater part of empirical 
studies on exploration and exploitation also take technology firms as an empirical 
setting (see Appendix A). Therefore, to increase variety in our empirical dataset, 
we decided to do empirical research within knowledge intense service firms as 
well. The professional advisory sector in which Deloitte is active, and the financial 
services sector in which Rabobank is active, are cited examples of industries of 
which the firms’ members posses high levels of specialized knowledge (Lievens & 
Moenaert, 2000; Van Den Bosch et al., 2005; Van Wijk, 2003). 
In each company, data has been gathered by means of in-depth interviews, 
company documents, and a survey. In each company the same survey has been 
conducted. The literature suggests the importance of administering the survey to 
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managers pertaining to various hierarchical levels, functional backgrounds, and 
organization units, as levels of managers’ exploration and exploitation activities 
may differ along these dimensions (e.g. De Leede et al., 2002; Floyd & Lane, 
2000; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). We therefore decided to survey managers of 
all levels, functions, and units of the three firms. Due to the labor-intensiveness of 
this approach, we were forced to limit the number of firms within which we 
gathered data. This may not have posed too severe restrictions on the 
generalizability of these study’s findings, as our goal is to generalize findings to 
the manager level of analysis. Moreover, we created separate datasets, one 
pertaining to each firm and separately analyzed the data as to be able to compare 
results between firms. We also conducted interviews after we analyzed the 
quantitative data, among others to establish the impact of firm or industry level 
influences on the results. 
The following research activities have been conducted: first, we conducted 
desk research; we examined studies on organizational learning (e.g. Holmqvist, 
2004; Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991), organization design (e.g. Adler et 
al., 1999; Jansen et al., 2005b; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000; 
Volberda, 1996), strategic management (e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; 
Burgelman, 1983; Floyd & Lane, 2000; McGrath, 2001; Van Cauwenberg & Cool, 
1982), innovation (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; 
Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), and knowledge (e.g. Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000; Hedlund, 1994; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nonaka, 1994; Schulz, 2001; Tsai, 
2001; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999). Based on this literature review, we formulated 
the research problem, purpose and questions, constructed the conceptual 
framework which specifies the main constructs under study, and obtained insight 
into the main relationships between the constructs. Second, we examined company 
documents and conducted in-depth interviews with managers pertaining to several 
hierarchical levels, functional backgrounds, and organization units to assess 
practitioners’ relevance with respect to the formulated research problem and 
questions, to more accurately describe the constructs under study, and to assess 
justification, from practitioners’ point of view, to include or exclude constructs 
into or out off the conceptual framework. Third, we developed hypotheses based 
on the literature. The interviews also served to increase understanding about causal 
mechanisms between the constructs. Fourth, after having developed the 
hypotheses, we constructed the survey. To this end, we selected relevant existing 
measures from the literature. Regarding managers’ exploration and exploitation 
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activities, we developed the scales’ items ourselves based on conceptualizations in 
the literature and in-depth interviews held to enhance the scales’ reliability and 
validity. After having conducted a pilot survey, we further enhanced the phrasing 
of the items based on the pilot study, resulting into the final version of the survey. 
Fifth, we collected quantitative data by the survey, and subsequently analyzed the 
data for each firm using regression analyses. After having compared the results of 
the three datasets, we merged the data into one integrated dataset and subsequently 
analyzed this combined data. We used this integrated dataset to test the 
hypotheses. We furthermore used structural equation modeling to assess the 
goodness of fit of our research model and to compare the model with competing 
models. Finally, we evaluated the quantitative findings based on the literature and 
interviews. To increase understanding and interpret the quantitative results, several 
feedback sessions were held within each company. During these feedback sessions 
with managers, the empirical results of the study were discussed, as well as the 
interpretation of these results and managerial implications. 
 
 
1.5 – Outline of the Study 
 
This book contains six chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 constitute the theoretical part, 
chapters 4 and 5 constitute the empirical part (see also figure 1.2). After having 
introduced the study in chapter 1, chapter 2 delves into the literature to position 
this study by reviewing related existing studies on exploration and exploitation, to 
enhance understanding about the study’s main constructs, and to indicate the 
relevance of these constructs’ inclusion into the study. This literature review 
results in the introduction of a conceptual research framework which will serve for 
further hypotheses development in chapter 3 explicating how organizational 
factors and intra-organizational knowledge inflows of managers impact upon their 
exploration and exploitation activities. Chapter 4 further explains the study’s 
methodology elaborating on the empirical setting, sampling and data collection 
procedures, and the development and validation of the survey’s scales. Chapter 5 
successively presents the analysis and results of the data collected at Rabobank, 
Philips, and Deloitte. After comparing the results of the three datasets, we merge 
the data into one integrated dataset and subsequently analyze this combined data 
(section 5.6). Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the findings of this study, 
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theoretical and managerial implications, limitations of the study and future 
research issues. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 – Outline of the Study 
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CHAPTER 2 – THEORETICAL BACKGROUNDS AND CONCEPTUAL 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
 
2.1 – Introduction 
 
The literature review as presented in this chapter aims at positioning this study, 
establishing the importance of the study, enhancing our understanding about its 
central constructs, and providing a rational for the construct’s inclusion into this 
research. It also serves to provide a first rationale concerning the relationships 
between the constructs. This chapter results in a research framework which guides 
the hypotheses development in the next chapter. 
Section 2.2 gives a brief overview of literatures, based on studies of 
several related management fields, in which issues on exploration and exploitation 
can be found. The section illustrates various related distinctions and associated 
tensions between exploration and exploitation. Furthermore, based on these same 
literatures, the section provides a short overview of main organizational responses 
for combining exploration and exploitation. The section concludes by positioning 
this study. The following section, section 2.3, will focus on exploration and 
exploitation at the manager level of analysis and will provide suitable 
conceptualizations based on the literature and qualitative data derived from in-
depth interviews. The section also illustrates which different demands the main 
organizational responses for combining exploration and exploitation, as identified 
in section 2.2, place on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Section 
2.4 gives a short overview of studies which illustrate which and how 
organizational factors impact upon exploration and exploitation within an 
organization. The section identifies organizational factors as common features of 
combinative capabilities to create further understanding in this study about which 
and how organizational factors impact upon managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. Subsequently, section 2.5 conceptualizes and illustrates the 
role of managers’ knowledge inflows as antecedents of managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities and briefly elaborates on the mediating role of managers’ 
knowledge inflows between organizational factors and managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. Finally, section 2.6 concludes with the conceptual research 
framework which serves for further hypotheses development in chapter 3. 
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2.2 – Exploration and Exploitation: Insights from Related Management 
Fields and Positioning this Study 
 
Chapter one’s first section illustrates that this study departs from the need to 
increase insight into how firms may manage and organize exploration and 
exploitation. To position this study and establish its importance, section 2.2 
illustrates what existing studies have focused upon regarding managing and 
organizing exploration and exploitation. To this end, we delve into various related 
distinctions between exploration and exploitation as put forward in studies 
pertaining to different management fields, into tensions and relations between 
exploration and exploitation, and into current insights about how organizations 
may manage and organize to combine exploration and exploitation. Although this 
study’s level of analysis is the individual level, section 2.2 will not focus on the 
individual level as most existing studies on exploration and exploitation focus on 
the firm or unit-level. Section 2.2 ends with illustrating gaps in the literature and 
with identifying valuable roads for future research which increase our insight 
regarding exploration and exploitation in organizational life. 
 
Issues on exploration and exploitation can, explicitly or implicitly, be 
found in studies pertaining to several management fields. Overviews of studies 
dealing with exploration and exploitation, grouped by management field, can, for 
instance, be found in Adler et al. (1999: 44), Ghemawat and Ricart I Costa (1993: 
59-61), Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004: 210-11), He and Wong (2004: 482); Jansen 
(2005: 19-24), March (1991: 72), and Volberda (1996: 359-60). Based on these 
overviews and the aim of this study, the focus in the remainder of this section will 
be on studies pertaining to organizational learning, organization design, strategic 
management, and innovation. Since March (1991) related exploration and 
exploitation to organizational learning, not only studies on organizational learning 
but also those pertaining to other fields tend to refer to issues on exploration and 
exploitation as brought forward in his work. Several studies on organizational 
design address the impact of organization design elements on exploration and 
exploitation related activities or processes within the firm, which is particularly 
valuable for this study as these studies generate insight into how and why 
organizational factors impact upon exploration and exploitation and into how 
management may organize to deal with exploration and exploitation and tensions 
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between the two. Exploration and exploitation is furthermore an issue of strategic 
management as they are directly related to a firm’s competitive advantage (cf. 
Lewin et al., 1999) and a firm’s (He & Wong, 2004) or unit’s performance 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen, 2005). Furthermore, studies on strategy 
research point to the importance of understanding managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities for understanding exploration and exploitation at the firm or 
unit level (Burgelman, 1983b, 1991; Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996; Rosenbloom, 
2000; Trispsas & Gavetti, 2000). Finally, this study reviews research on 
innovation, as this management field has witnessed a rich body of studies on 
exploration and exploitation related issues within organizations. 
 
Distinctions between Exploration and Exploitation 
March (1991) considers the relation between exploration and exploitation 
in organizational learning. He argues that exploration includes ‘things captured by 
terms such as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, 
discovery, innovation’, whereas exploitation includes ‘such things as refinement, 
choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution’ (March: 71). 
Studies on organizational learning indicate that the essence of exploration is 
creating variety in experience (Bontis et al., 2002; Holmqvist, 2004; Levinthal & 
March, 1993; McGrath, 2001) characterized by activities such as searching for 
new organizational norms, routines, structures, and systems (Crossan et al., 1999; 
Nooteboom, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002), experimenting with new approaches 
towards technologies, business processes, or markets (March 1991; McGrath, 
2001), and developing new knowledge (Levinthal & March, 1993). The essence of 
exploitation in studies on organizational learning is creating reliability in 
experience (Bontis et al., 2002; Holmqvist, 2004; Levinthal & March, 1993) 
characterized by such activities as applying, improving, and extending existing 
competences, technologies, processes and products (March, 1991) and using and 
refining existing knowledge (Levinthal & March, 1993). 
 Studies on organization design illustrate distinctions between exploration 
and exploitation in organizational life by distinguishing between organizational 
design elements which are conducive to exploration related activities, processes 
and outcomes and organizational design elements which are conducive to 
exploitation related activities, processes and outcomes. Burns and Stalker (1961), 
for instance, distinguish between two forms of management systems; the 
mechanistic form and the organic form. The mechanistic form, characterized by 
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high levels of differentiation of functional tasks and a hierarchical structure of 
control, authority and communication, is appropriate to stable conditions. The 
organic form, characterized by high levels of integration of individuals’ 
specialized knowledge and a network structure of control, authority and 
communication, is appropriate to changing conditions. Recently, studies on 
organizational design investigate how organizational design elements stimulate or 
hinder a firm to simultaneously pursue exploration and exploitation related tasks 
(Adler et al., 1999; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; 
Sheremata, 2000; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999; Volberda, 1996). Adler et al. 
(1999), for instance, investigate how organizational factors enable a manufacturing 
firm to simultaneously conduct routine-tasks, and non-routine-task. Gibson & 
Birkinshaw (2004) illustrate that an organization design, characterized by a 
combination of ‘hard’ (discipline and stretch) and ‘soft (support and trust) design 
elements (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004: 213) fosters both high levels of 
exploitation oriented actions, i.e. geared toward alignment, and exploration 
oriented actions, i.e. geared toward adaptability. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) 
examine interdependencies among elements of organizational design and illustrate 
how organizational design elements may be combined to encourage both broad 
search and stability within the organization. Similarly, Sheremata (2000) identifies 
organizational structural elements which stimulate creative action by increasing 
the quantity and quality of ideas, knowledge, and information, an organization can 
access (Sheremata, 2000: 390), i.e. centrifugal forces. He furthermore identifies 
organizational structural elements which stimulate collective action by integrating 
dispersed ideas, knowledge, and information (Sheremata, 2000: 390), i.e. 
centripetal forces.  
 Studies on strategic management consider distinctions between 
exploration and exploitation as well. Burgelman (1983c), for instance, argues that 
‘firms need both diversity and order in their strategic activities to maintain their 
viability’ (Burgelman, 1983c: 1349). This diversity results primarily from 
‘autonomous strategic activities’, whereas order results from an ‘induced concept 
of strategy’ (Burgelman, 1983c). Autonomous strategic activities are related to the 
concept of exploration: ‘autonomous strategy exploits initiatives that emerge 
through exploration outside of the scope of the current strategy and that provide 
the basis for entering into new product-market environments’ (Burgelman, 2002: 
327). Induced strategic activities are related to the concept of exploitation as they 
are ‘within the scope of a company's current strategy and (…) extend it further in 
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its current product-market environment’ (Burgelman, 2002: 327). Studies on 
competence based strategic management (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990; Sanchez et al., 1996) consider a similar distinction between exploration, in 
terms of competence building (Sanchez et al., 1996) or competence definition 
(Floyd & lane, 200), and exploitation, in terms of competence leveraging (Sanchez 
et al., 1996) of competence deployment (Floyd & Lane, 2000). One of the key-
premises of competence based strategic management is that building new 
competences and leveraging current competences both determine whether the firm 
will gain sustainable competitive advantage or not (Hamel & Heene, 1994: 4). 
Competence building is associated with achieving ‘qualitative changes in (…) 
existing stocks of assets and capabilities, including new abilities to co-ordinate and 
deploy new or existing assets and capabilities in ways that help a firm achieve its 
goals’ (Sanchez et al., 1996: 8). Competence building aims at changing the status 
quo to cope with forces demanding change by creating new strategic options for 
future action (Sanchez & Thomas, 1996). Competence leveraging is associated 
with applying existing assets and capabilities to current or new markets. It may 
require quantitative changes in stocks of like-kind assets similar to those the firm 
already uses (Sanchez et al., 1996: 8). Competence leveraging aims at preserving 
the status quo to deal with current competitive forces (Sanchez & Thomas, 1996). 
By considering the firm as an information processing entity, Ghemawat & Ricart I 
Costa (1993) consider the trade-off between two efficiency oriented search 
processes in strategic management; dynamic efficiency and static efficiency. 
Dynamic efficiency involves the continuous reconsideration of initial conditions 
geared to the development of new products, processes or capabilities, whereas 
static efficiency involves the continuous search for improvements within a fixed 
set of initial conditions aimed at refining existing products, processes or 
capabilities (Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993:  59). 
 Considerations about exploration and exploitation can also be found, 
explicitly or implicitly, in studies on technological or product innovation. Some 
authors classify innovations in terms of exploration and exploitation. Benner & 
Tushman (2002) and Jansen (2005), for instance, distinguish between ‘exploitative 
innovations’, i.e. innovations which involve ‘improvements in existing 
components and architectures and build on the existing technological trajectory’ 
(Benner & Tushman, 2002: 679) and ‘exploratory innovations’, i.e. innovations 
which involve ‘a shift to a different technological trajectory’ (Benner & Tushman, 
2002: 679). Besides classifying innovations along a technology dimension, they 
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can also be classified along a customer/ market dimension (Abernathy & Clark, 
1985; Danneels, 2002). Focusing on this dimension, He and Wong (2004) refer to 
an ‘explorative innovation strategy’ to denote ‘technological innovation activities 
aimed at entering new product market domains’ (He & Wong, 2004: 483-4), 
whereas they refer to an ‘exploitative innovation strategy’ to denote ‘technological 
innovation activities aimed at improving existing product-market positions’ (He & 
Wong, 2004: 484). Other studies on innovation indicate linkages between the 
concepts of exploration and exploitation, and the concepts of radical and 
incremental innovations. These studies illustrate that radical innovations draw 
upon exploration activities such as distant search for knowledge, developing new 
knowledge, and increasing variety of the firm’s knowledge base (Katila & Ahuja, 
2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), whereas 
incremental innovations draw upon exploitation activities such as local search for 
knowledge, refining and using existing knowledge, and deepening the firm’s 
knowledge base (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Subramaniam 
& Youndt, 2005). Finally, by distinguishing two successive stages in the 
innovation process, some authors (e.g. Cheng & Van De Ven, 1996; Duncan, 
1976) illustrate that the first stage is characterized by exploration activities such as 
risk taking, searching for alternatives (Duncan, 1976), and discovery (Cheng & 
Van De Ven, 1996), whereas the second stage is characterized by exploitation 
activities such as testing (Cheng & Van De Ven, 1996), and refining and 
implementing (Duncan, 1976) the innovation. 
 
Tensions and Relations between Exploration and Exploitation 
The previous section shows that related distinctions between exploration 
and exploitation can be found in studies pertaining to various management fields. 
Most of these studies implicitly or explicitly make the argument that it is 
beneficial for firms to combine, somehow, exploration and exploitation. Studies 
indicate that forces in the business environment influencing firms’ short-term 
profitability, compel managers to, for instance, use and refine their existing 
knowledge (Levinthal & March, 1993), leverage competences (Sanchez et al., 
1996), and pursue incremental innovations (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996) and 
efficiency (Volberda, 1996). Firms in turbulent environments face also growing 
prominence of powerful forces towards change, compelling managers to develop 
new knowledge (Levinthal & March, 1993), build competences (Sanchez et al., 
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1996), and pursue radical innovations (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996) and flexibility 
(Volberda, 1996). 
There are however tensions between exploration and exploitation; it is 
difficult not to explore or exploit at the expense of the other (Levinthal & March, 
1993). Studies indicate several related reasons for these tensions. One of the 
reasons that there are tensions between exploration and exploitation are 
complications in allocating resources between the two as both exploration and 
exploitation have to compete for scarce resources (Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Garcia et al., 2003). Furthermore, the distribution of costs and benefits differ 
between exploration and exploitation across time and space (Lewin et al., 1999; 
March, 1991). March (1991: 73) puts it this way: ‘compared to returns from 
exploitation, returns from exploration are systematically less certain, more remote 
in time and organizationally more distant from the locus of action and adaptation’. 
Because of managers’ preference for more certain and more proximate returns 
over less certain and distant returns, organizations typically improve exploitation 
more rapidly than exploration (Lewin et al., 1999: 538; March, 1991: 73). 
Furthermore, in incumbent firms, the allocation of resources is usually shaped by 
the demands of existing customers providing impetus for innovations known to be 
demanded by current customers in existing markets (Christensen & Bower, 1996). 
These firms, however, risk starving efforts to commercialize new technologies for 
remote or emerging markets. Christensen and Bower (1996) argue that effectively 
developing technologies for new or emerging markets should take place outside of 
the mainstream organizational and strategic context to circumvent incentive and 
resources allocation processes designed to nourish sustaining innovations that 
address current customers’ needs (Christensen & Bower, 1996: 215-6). 
Another main reason for tensions between exploration and exploitation is 
that exploration and exploitation are associated with specific organizational 
structures, systems or processes, which either increasingly stimulate exploration or 
exploitation within the organization (Adler et al., 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2002; 
2003; Duncan, 1976; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 
2003; Sheremata, 2000; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999; Volberda, 1996). Levinthal 
and March (1993), for instance, conceptually examine how two organizational 
practices that facilitate learning –simplification and specialization- contribute to 
three learning imperfections; overlooking distant times, distant places, and 
failures. These learning imperfections lead either to dynamics of accelerating 
exploration; a ‘failure trap’ (Levinthal & March, 1993: 105), or to dynamics of 
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accelerating exploitation; a ‘success trap’ (Levinthal & March, 1993: 106). The 
computer simulation models in March’s (1991) study show how several aspects of 
the social context of organizational learning impact upon the relation between 
exploration and exploitation; faster mutual learning between members of an 
organization and an organizational code, which is stimulated by high levels of 
socialization and low levels of turn-over, increase exploitation and decrease 
exploration. Studies, in other fields than organizational learning, also indicate 
tensions between exploration and exploitation because of incompatible structures, 
systems, or processes. Benner and Tushman (2003), for instance, argue that 
routinization triggered by process management techniques stimulates local search 
and inhibits distant search. The results of their empirical study (Benner & 
Tushman, 2002) show that the greater the extent of process management activities 
in a firm, the larger the number of exploitative innovations and the smaller the 
number of exploratory innovations. Hansen et al. (2001) investigate how the type 
of a team’s tasks (i.e. explorative versus exploitative tasks) mediates the effect of a 
team’s network position on its performance. The study shows that network 
structures which have a positive effect on teams engaging in exploration tasks, 
have a negative effect on teams engaging in exploitation tasks, and vice versa. 
More specifically, the empirical findings indicate that exploratory teams benefit 
from a network structure characterized by many strong and non-redundant ties, 
whereas exploitative teams benefit from a network structure characterized by 
weakly tied contacts that are moderately interconnected. Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
(2001) show that when organizational and technological boundary spanning search 
increases, the firm’s ability to explore, i.e. the ability to create new knowledge 
through recombining knowledge, increases. Local search on the other hand, i.e. 
search for solutions in the neighborhood of the firm’s current expertise, increases 
the level of exploitation within the firm, i.e. the creation of incremental 
innovations. 
 Tensions between exploration and exploitation, caused by several reasons 
as outline above, have triggered some authors to formulate the relation between 
exploration and exploitation as a trade-off, i.e. they argue that exploration and 
exploitation can not be combined at the same place and time. This view implies 
that an increase in exploration within, for instance, a business unit is associated 
with a decrease in exploitation within that same business unit, and vice versa (e.g. 
Benner & Tushman, 2003; Christensen & Bower, 1996; O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2004). A second perspective on the relation between exploration and exploitation 
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which can be found in the literature stresses the time dimension, arguing that 
exploration and exploitation engender and/or follow each other over time (e.g. 
Cheng & Van de Ven, 1996; Garcia et al., 2003; Nooteboom, 2000; Winter & 
Szulanski, 2001). They see the relationship between exploration and exploitation 
as oscillating. Others adopt a more combinatorial view on the relation between 
exploration and exploitation, arguing that the two can be combined or synthesized 
within space and time. This view implies that an increase in exploration within, for 
instance, a business unit may go with an increase in exploitation within that same 
unit, or the other way around (e.g. Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Nerkar, 2003; 
Nonaka & Toyama, 2002; Rivkin & Sigelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000). 
   
Combing Exploration and Exploitation within Organizations 
Distinguishing various tensions between exploration and exploitation, and 
various perspectives on the relation between exploration and exploitation, as 
outlined above, helps understanding various ways in which organizations may 
manage and organize to combine exploration and exploitation (Jansen, 2005; 
Volberda, 1998). Although various literatures indicate the importance for firms to 
combine exploration and exploitation and indicate difficulties firms face doing so, 
less research has been devoted to understanding how firms may manage tensions 
between exploration and exploitation. Duncan (1976) introduced the term 
‘ambidextrous organization’ to denote organizations which deal with conflicting 
demands between the initiation and implementation stage of the innovation 
process by using different organization structures. More recently, authors use the 
term ambidexterity in a more general way to indicate high levels of both 
exploration and exploitation, i.e. an ambidextrous organization (He & Wong, 
2004) or business unit (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al, 2005a) is an 
organization or unit with high levels of both exploration and exploitation. In this 
section, three main organizational responses for combining exploration and 
exploitation will be identified: spatial separation, temporal separation, and 
synthesis. The classification of  these organizational responses is based on the 
different perspectives on the relation between exploration and exploitation as 
outline above, namely the trade-off, oscillating, and combinatorial perspective, 
Poole and Van De Ven’s (1989) suggestions about how a firm may deal with 
paradoxes, and Jansen’s (2005) and Volberda’s (1998) identification of corporate 
responses to achieve ambidexterity, respectively flexibility. Classifying 
organizational responses for managing tensions between exploration and 
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exploitation makes sense in this study, as each of these responses places different 
demands on managers’ exploration activities and exploitation activities, as will be 
outlined in this chapter’s section 2.3. 
The essence of spatial separation is simultaneously developing explorative 
and exploitative modes in different places in the organization. This organizational 
response for combining exploration and exploitation is based on the trade-off view 
on the relation between exploration and exploitation. In the case of spatial 
separation, ‘one horn of the paradox is assumed to operate in one physical or 
social locus, while the other operates in a different locus’ (Poole & Van De Ven, 
1989: 566). Spatial separation can occur by level, function, and/ or location 
(Volberda, 1998). Separation by level is related to hierarchy (e.g. top-, versus 
middle-, versus front-line-managers). Separation by function is related to 
distinctive functions performed, processes applied, or knowledge used (e.g. 
marketing, production, and engineering). Separation by location is influenced by 
geography and distinct business units (cf. Volberda, 1998: 270). Examples of 
separation by level can be found in studies on strategic management (Burgelman, 
1983a; 1983b; Floyd & lane, 2000; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Traditionally, the 
exploration of capabilities and the development of strategy are assumed to take 
place at the top or corporate level, whereas the exploitation of these capabilities 
and the execution of strategy take place at lower levels (Chandler, 1962; Prahalad 
& Hamel, 1990). Others suggest that the best place to explore new opportunities, 
build capabilities and develop strategy is at the lowest hierarchical levels 
(Burgelman, 1983b; Kimberly, 1979; Quinn, 1985), whereas the role of top 
management is to evaluate and ratify initiatives that emerge from across the 
organization (Floyd & Lane, 2000). Examples of separation by function can be 
found in nearly all large multi-unit firms. Typically, production-units are strongly 
geared towards exploitation by focusing on operational efficiency. R&D-units and 
marketing-units are more oriented towards exploration by engaging in 
unpredictable research projects, developing new products, and searching for and 
experimenting with new approaches to markets and customers (Volberda, 1998). 
Separation of exploration and exploitation by location can be found in studies on 
‘structural ambidexterity’ (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2003; O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2004). According to proponents of structural ambidexterity (cf. Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004), ambidextrous organizational forms are ‘composed of highly 
differentiated but weakly integrated subunits’ (Benner & Tushman, 2003: 247). 
While the exploration units are small and decentralized, with loose cultures and 
37
 27 
processes, the exploitation units are larger and more centralized, with tight cultures 
and processes (Benner & Tushman, 2003: 247). Integration takes place at the 
senior team level. Another way of separating exploration and exploitation by 
location can be found in studies on inter-firm networks or alliances (Beckman et 
al., 2004; Mitchell & Lewin, 1998). In the case of alliances between firms, 
exploration and exploitation are not combined within one firm but the exploitation 
of existing capabilities or the exploration of new opportunities is rather out-
sourced to (a) network partner(s) (Baden-Fuller & Volberda, 1997; Mitchell & 
Lewin, 1998).  
Studies on technological innovation and strategic renewal indicate that 
firms may deal with tensions between exploration and exploitation by temporally 
separating the two (Audia et al., 2000; Shepard, 1967; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986; Volberda et al., 2001). This organizational response for combining 
exploration and exploitation is based on the oscillating view on the relation 
between exploration and exploitation. By taking the role of time into consideration 
in this approach, ‘one horn of the paradox is assumed to hold during one time 
period, and the other during a different time period’ (Poole & Van De Ven, 1989: 
566). Based on computer simulations of innovation processes, Cheng and Van De 
Ven (1996), for instance, illustrate that in the innovation process exploration and 
exploitation follow each other sequentially. Whereas the actions and outcomes 
experienced by innovation teams exhibit a chaotic pattern, characterized by an 
expanding and diverging process of discovery, during the initial period of 
innovation development, the final period of the process exhibits more stable 
conditions, characterized by a narrowing and converging process of testing (cf. 
Cheng & Van De Ven, 1996: 593). Similarly, Duncan (1976) presents a model for 
designing organizations for initiating and implementing innovations. The initiation 
stage of the innovation process is facilitated by an organizational structure 
characterized by a high degree of complexity, low formalization, and low 
centralization. The implementation stage of the innovation process, however, is 
facilitated by an organizational structure characterized by a low degree of 
complexity, high formalization, and higher centralization. As initiation and 
implementation follow each other sequentially, Duncan (1976) suggests that 
organizations correspondingly should change their organization structure over 
time to match the changes in tasks. Winter & Szulanski (2001) apply the concepts 
of exploration and exploitation to replication strategies by conceptualizing 
replication strategy as a process  that involves a regime of exploration in which the 
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business model is created and refined, followed by a phase of exploitation in 
which the business model is stabilized and leveraged through large-scale 
replication (Winter & Szulanski, 2001: 730). The sequential exploration and 
exploitation phases in replication strategy demand changes in the direction of 
knowledge transfer between the central organization and the outlets over time. 
Whereas initially in the exploration phase transfers of knowledge from the outlets 
to the central organization are needed, in the exploitation phase, knowledge 
transfers from the central organization to the outlets will prevail (Winter & 
Szulanski, 2001: 734). Some studies on technological innovations illustrate that 
technological change is characterized by periods of incremental change, 
punctuated by discontinuities (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). During periods of 
incremental change, competition and environmental uncertainty is lower than 
during periods of discontinuity, i.e. rates of competition and levels of uncertainty 
within the technological environment change cyclically (Tushman & Anderson, 
1986). Consequently, these studies argue, firms should alternate between pursuing 
incremental innovations during times of incremental change and pursuing radical 
innovations during periods of discontinuities (Audia et al., 2000; Garcia et al., 
2003). The hypotheses, supported by computer simulations, as developed by 
Garcia et al. (2003), for instance, illustrate that a focus on technology exploration 
over exploitation within a firm is favorable in times when competition is high, 
whereas a focus on technology exploitation over exploration is favorable in times 
when competition is low. 
The third identified organizational response for pursuing both exploration 
and exploitation is by synthesizing them (Nonaka & Toyama, 2002; Poole & Van 
de Ven, 1989: 567); that is by ‘balancing’ them in both time and space (Levinthal 
& March, 1993). This organizational response for combining exploration and 
exploitation is based on the combinatorial view on the relation between 
exploration and exploitation. Proponents of this view typically argue that spatial or 
temporal separation of exploration and exploitation risk that the effects of an 
action at a certain place and at a certain time on other places in the organization 
and on the future are being ignored (cf. Levinthal & March, 1993: 97). In line with 
this view, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004: 209) develop the concept of ‘contextual 
ambidexterity’ which they define as ‘the behavioral capacity to simultaneously 
demonstrate alignment and adaptability across an entire business unit’. Proponents 
of a combinatorial view typically argue that an organizational unit may combine 
contradictory demands at the same place and time by combining seemingly 
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contradictory organizational design elements. Gibson and Birksinshaw (2004), for 
instance, argue that a context characterized by a combination of stretch, discipline, 
support, and trust facilitates contextual ambidexterity. Similarly, Adler et al. 
(1999) identify organizational mechanisms, i.e. meta-routines, job-enrichment, 
switching, and partitioning, which help an organization to combine routine and 
non-routine tasks. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) illustrate how an organization 
may balance search and stability by combining organization design elements 
which push the firm towards broad search with design elements that pulls it 
towards stability. Sheremata (2000) analyzes the difficulty for firms to be 
ambidextrous in terms of two opposing forces, centrifugal and centripetal forces. 
He defines centrifugal forces in this context as ‘structural elements and processes 
that increase the quantity and quality of ideas, knowledge, and information an 
organization can access’ (Sheremata, 2000: 390). Centripetal forces are ‘structural 
elements and processes that integrate dispersed ideas, knowledge, and information 
into collective action’ (Sheremata, 2000: 390). Sheremata (2000: 401-2) argues 
that centrifugal and centripetal forces must coexist to balance exploration and 
exploitation; there is a positive interaction effect between the two. Finally, 
McDonough and Leifer’s (1983) findings illustrate that a unit that performs 
different kinds of tasks and deals with certain and uncertain environments uses 
different structural arrangements simultaneously. 
Besides the already mentioned tensions between exploration and 
exploitation, another reason against synthesizing them can be found in the 
literature. That is; synthesizing exploration and exploitation may lead to 
ineffective compromise solutions. Related to this, Volberda (1998: 61) quotes 
Weick (1979: 220), who argues that ‘The crucial point is that, in effecting the 
compromise solution, important adaptive responses have been selected against and 
nonadaptive, moderate responses have been preserved’. 
 
Conclusion and the Positioning of this Study 
Several conclusions can be drawn form this section’s literature review and 
its derived table as shown in Appendix A. First, as also illustrated by column 3 of 
Appendix A, related distinctions between exploration and exploitation are 
implicitly or explicitly present in various management literatures such as 
organizational learning, organization design, strategic management, and 
innovation. These distinctions will help us conceptualizing managers’ exploration 
and exploitation activities in the next section. 
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Second, as also illustrated by column 4 of Appendix A, different 
interpretations can be found in studies about the relation between exploration and 
exploitation, i.e. the relation is seen as a trade-off, oscillating, or combinatorial. 
Moreover, associated with these different perspectives on the relation between 
exploration and exploitation, different arguments are made for firms about how to 
combine exploration and exploitation, i.e. by spatial separation, temporal 
separation, or by synthesis. In the next section we illustrate how these three 
responses for combining exploration and exploitation place different demands on 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. 
Third, the literature review indicates that, as also illustrated by column 2 
of Appendix A, current studies focus on exploration and exploitation at the firm or 
unit level. Studies addressing the individual level are nearly absent. Consequently, 
there is a lack of understanding about how exploration and exploitation can be 
conceptualized at the manager level, how they relate to each other at the manager 
level, how exploration and exploitation at the manager level can be measured, and 
about how organizational factors encourage or discourage managers to explore 
and/ or exploit. Hence, an un-walked road for research, the value of which will be 
elaborated upon in the next section, is one that conceptually and empirically 
investigates exploration and exploitation at the manager level. 
Fourth, there seems not to be a tradition of systematic research and 
cumulative theory building on managing and organizing exploration and 
exploitation (also cf. Sidhu et al., 2004: 913). The literature review illustrates that 
current literature could still considerably benefit from increased understanding 
about how to manage and organize exploration, exploitation, and the relation 
between these two. Although column 5 of Appendix A illustrates that almost all 
studies indicate organizational factors which may impact upon exploration and 
exploitation, studies explicitly dealing with these issues are scarce (cf. Benner & 
Tushman, 2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Only a 
few studies explicitly address the question about how organizational factors affect 
exploration, exploitation, and the relation between these two (Adler et al., 1999; 
Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 
2005a; Sheremata, 2000). Moreover, column 5 of Appendix A illustrates that 
studies quite differ among each other with respect to specific organizational 
factors they consider. This indicates that the literature could considerably benefit 
from a theoretical argument about what factors to include or exclude in an analysis 
about the impact of organizational factors on exploration and exploitation. 
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Fifth, column 2 of Appendix A illustrates that most studies are conceptual 
of which some are supported by case evidence or computer simulations;  
especially quantitative empirical research seems to be lagging behind. Most 
quantitative studies are found in research on innovation. More specifically, a 
valuable road for research is one which provides a general theoretical rational 
which increases our understanding about what and how organizational factors 
impact upon exploration and exploitation, and which consecutively provides 
empirical validation. Section 2.4 will illustrate how this study’s contributes to this 
gap in the literature.  
Finally, as also illustrated by column 2 of Appendix A, studies using 
empirical data tend to focus on technology intense and/ or production firms. Only 
Jansen et al. (2005a) focus explicitly on a service firm, whereas only Gibson and 
Birkinshaw (2004), McGrath (2001), and Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) 
include both production and service firms in their sample. Our empirical data is 
collected in a technology firm and two knowledge intense service firms. 
 
 
2.3 – Exploration and Exploitation at the Manager Level 
 
Relevance of Manger Level Exploration and Exploitation Activities 
The section above illustrated, among others, that studies at the individual 
level, addressing exploration and exploitation, are nearly absent. To contribute at 
narrowing this gap in the literature, this study focuses at the individual level of 
analysis, that is, at managers’ exploration activities and exploitation activities. The 
main reason for focusing at the individual level in this study, or more precisely at 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, is the assumption that 
understanding about how to influence managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities benefits our understanding about how to build exploration and 
exploitation within a business-unit or firm. Although several levels of analysis are 
found to be relevant in management studies, e.g. the industry, firm, unit, group, 
and individual level (Klein et at., 1994), the most elementary unit of analysis in 
any social system is the individual behavioral act (Morgeson & Hofman, 1999). 
That is to say that the structure and actions of an organization or unit can be 
viewed as series of behavioral acts of organization members and the interactions 
between these individuals. Consequently several authors argue that, to understand 
how collective structure emerges, one must first understand the components of 
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collective action (Brass et al., 2004; Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). Some authors 
(Felin & Foss, 2004; Hofstede et al., 1993; Klein et al., 1999) even go so far as to 
argue that disappointing theoretical and empirical progress within studies on 
organizations and management are a result of the focus on collective level 
constructs at the expense of individual level considerations. 
Although current studies on exploration and exploitation do not explicitly 
address individual level exploration and exploitation, references in these studies 
can be found suggesting that examining managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities is fundamental to understanding how to manage organizational level 
exploration, exploitation, and the relation between these two. Studies in the field 
of organizational learning illustrate that managers’ activities impact upon firm- or 
unit-level learning processes and outcomes (e.g. Bontis et al. 2002; Crossan & 
Berdrow, 2003; Vera & Crossan, 2004). In the field of organization design, Adler 
et al. (1999) discuss an organization’s inclination toward efficiency and/or 
flexibility in terms of the extent to which managers engage in routine or non-
routine activities. Sheremata (2000) discusses a firm’s ability to build both 
exploration and exploitation within a firm in terms of managers’ creative and 
collective actions. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) investigate a firm’s ability to 
balance search and stability in terms of the impact of organization design elements 
on managers’ decision making. Studies in the field of strategic management show 
that managers’ activities are critical to strategic and organizational change (e.g. 
Adner & Helfat, 2003; Burgelman, 1983b, 1991; Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996; 
Rosenbloom, 2000; Trispsas & Gavetti, 2000). The knowledge literature also 
indicates the fundamental role of managers of various levels, especially middle 
managers, regarding the creation of new knowledge (e.g. McFadyen & Cannella, 
2004; Nonaka, 1994) but also regarding the transfer, acquisition, and utilization of 
existing knowledge (e.g. Zander & Kogut, 1995). 
 The relevance of understanding how to influence managers’ exploration 
activities, their exploitation activities, or both at the same time, is also illustrated 
by the three main organizational responses for combining exploration and 
exploitation, as the literature indicates that each of these responses place different 
demands on manager’s exploration activities and exploitation activities; see table 
2.1. In section 2.2, three main organizational responses for combining exploration 
and exploitation, were identified: spatial separation, temporal separation, and
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synthesis. According to proponents of spatial separation, managers pertaining to a 
certain hierarchical level (e.g. Floyd & Lane, 2000; Prahald & Hamel, 1990), 
function (e.g. De Leede at al., 2002), unit (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2003; 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), or firm (e.g. Baden-Fuller & Volberda, 1997; 
Mitchel & Lewin, 1998) should focus either on exploration activities or on 
exploitation activities, depending on the focus of their hierarchical level, function, 
unit, or firm which is either on exploration or on exploitation. Generally, these 
studies would argue furthermore that top- or corporate managers should engage in 
both exploration and exploitation activities to ensure the firm’s appropriate 
balancing of exploration and exploitation. O’Reilly and Tushman (2004: 74) put it 
this way: ‘general managers and corporate executives (….) must constantly look 
backward, attending to the products and processes of the past, while also gazing 
forward, preparing for the innovations that will define the future.’ Studies on 
technological innovation and change (e.g. Shepard, 1967; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986) indicate that firms may deal with tensions between exploration and 
exploitation by temporally separating the two. This would imply for managers at 
all levels and units to shift their focus over time from pursuing exploration 
activities to pursuing exploitation activities or vice versa. The third identified 
organizational response for combining exploration and exploitation is by 
synthesizing them; that is by creating organizational units in which the tensions 
between exploration and exploitation are being reconciled (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000). This implies that managers, 
at all levels and functions, of these units should be encouraged to conduct both 
exploration and exploitation related activities. Table 2.1 illustrates how managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities are associated with specific organizational 
responses for combing exploration and exploitation. 
 
Conceptualizing Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities 
Empirical studies assessing a firm’s or unit’s level of exploration and/or 
exploitation indicate that this can be done in roughly two ways. The first way is by 
looking at activities or processes within the firm or unit, like for instance learning 
activities (Holmvqist, 2004), management systems (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), 
or the acquisition of information (Sidhu et al., 2004). The second way is by 
looking at outcomes, like for instance the number of exploratory and exploitative 
innovations within a firm (Benner & Tushman, 2002) or the extent of newness 
manifested in a project (McGrath, 2001). As illustrated above, studies on 
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exploration and exploitation which also make notions on managers, all refer to 
managers’ activities, rather than the possible outcomes of such activities (e.g. 
Adler et al., 1999; Burgelman, 1983b; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 
2003; Sheremata, 2000). Therefore, in this study, we will look at managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities. 
This study departs from March (1991) to conceptualize, and later on in the 
study to operationalize, exploration and exploitation at the manager level as most 
current studies refer to his work when conceptualizing exploration and 
exploitation. March characterizes exploration as ‘things captured by terms such as 
search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, 
innovation’. He characterizes exploitation as ‘such things as refinement, choice, 
production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution’ in organizational 
learning (March, 1991: 71). He specifically considers the relation between 
exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Studies on organizational 
learning indicate that the essence of exploration activities is creating variety in 
experience (Bontis et al., 2002; Holmqvist, 2004; Levinthal & March, 1993; 
McGrath, 2001) which is associated with broadening a manager’s existing 
knowledge base (cf. Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993; Sidhu et al., 
2004). Such exploration activities of managers include searching for new 
organizational norms, routines, structures, and systems (Crossan et al., 1999; 
Nooteboom, 2000; Zollo & Winter, 2002), experimenting with new approaches 
towards technologies, business processes, or markets (McGrath, 2001), innovating 
and adopting a long-term orientation (Duncan, 1976; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), 
and reconsidering existing beliefs and decisions (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Ghemawat 
& Ricart I Costa, 1993; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). Studies on organizational 
learning indicate that the essence of exploitation activities is creating reliability in 
experience (Bontis et al., 2002; Holmqvist, 2004; Levinthal & March, 1993) which 
is associated with deepening a manager’s existing knowledge base (cf. Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993). Such exploitation activities of managers 
include using and refining their existing knowledge (Levinthal & March, 1993), 
applying, improving, and extending existing competences, technologies, processes 
and products (March, 1991), focusing on production and adopting a rather short-
term orientation (Duncan, 1976; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), and elaborating on 
existing beliefs and decisions (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 
1993; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). 
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Interviews at Rabobank, Philips, and Deloitte, indicate that managers 
conduct exploration activities such as developing new technologies, products, or 
product combinations; renewing internal processes and systems; searching for, 
learning about, and experimenting with new technologies; experimenting with new 
distribution channels; searching for new opportunities in existing, new, or 
emerging markets; discovering changing customer preferences; discovering, and 
experimenting with new business models, products, and services in both existing 
and previously un-served markets. Examples of exploitation activities include 
specializing in and improving and refining in-depth knowledge pertaining to 
existing market segments, products, technologies, or processes; activities related to 
fine tuning and standardizing processes, procedures, and tasks; increasing 
efficiency and economies of scale; consolidating, extending, and/ or divesting 
activities; and activities related to improving internal operations.  
 
 
2.4 – Organizational Factors and Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation 
Activities 
 
Relevance of Organizational Factors 
The sections above illustrated the need and relevance of increasing both 
conceptually and empirically validated insight into managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities and into how these activities can be influenced. As a next 
step in this study’s literature review, it needs to be decided upon which important 
antecedents of managers’ exploration and exploitation activities are. To increase 
our understanding about how managers’ exploration and exploitation activities can 
be influenced, this study joins with the greater part of current studies by examining 
how organizational factors influence managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities. Regarding this issue, studies on exploration and exploitation (i.e. those 
mentioned in section 2.2 and summarized in Appendix A) give a valuable first 
insight. Although these studies rarely explicitly address manager level exploration 
and/or exploitation, they more than once refer to it to create understanding about 
exploration and exploitation at the unit or firm level; for instance in terms of 
managers’ learning activities (Bontis et al., 2002; McGrath, 2001), managers 
engaging in routine versus non-routine tasks (Adler et al., 1999; Benner & 
Tushman, 2002; 2003), managers reconsidering versus improving existing beliefs 
or decisions (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa; Rivkin & 
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Siggelkow, 2003), their creative versus collective actions (Sheremata, 2000), and 
managers’ short-term versus long-term orientations (Duncan, 1976; Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996). These studies also give insight into organizational factors which 
relate to exploration and/or exploitation processes or outcomes of firms or units 
through their impact upon managers’ behavior or activities (cf. Ghoshal & Bartlett, 
1994; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Examples of such organizational factors 
include routinization of tasks (Adler et al., 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2002; 
Nonaka & Toyama, 2002), formalization of tasks (Duncan, 1976; Jansen et al., 
2005a), (de)-centralization or participation in decision making (Benner & 
Tushman, 2003; Duncan, 1976; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Jansen et al., 
2005a; Levinthal & March, 1993; McGrath, 2001; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), socialization practices (Levinthal & March, 1993; 
March, 1993), connectedness (Jansen et al., 2005a; Sheremata, 2000), differential 
reward systems such as long- versus short-term rewards, or individual versus 
group based rewards (Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004; Nonaka & Toyama, 2002; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), and aspects related 
to values and norms (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Nonaka & Toyama, 2002; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), such as tolerance for 
ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors (Volberda, 1998). 
 
Specifying Organizational Factors 
The studies mentioned above suggest a variety of organizational factors 
which may impact upon managers’ exploration activities and exploitation 
activities. The fact, however, that studies quite differ among each other with 
respect to specific organizational factors they consider, indicates that the literature 
could considerably benefit from a theoretical argument about what factors to 
include or exclude in an analysis about the impact of organizational factors on 
manager’s exploration and exploitation activities. In other words, we need to 
decide upon which are important organizational factors influencing managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities.  
This study refers to the dynamic capabilities literature to provide such a 
theoretical argument as studies adhering a dynamic capabilities approach (cf. 
Teece et al., 1997) stress the importance of organizational capabilities by which 
firms explore and/or exploit, or as Elfring and Volberda (2001: 257) express it: 
‘The key issues in the dynamic capabilities approach are firms’ (…) abilities to use 
current resources, to create new resources and to device new ways of using current 
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or new resources’. These organizational capabilities are referred to in the 
literature, covering a similar meaning (cf. De Boer et al., 1999; Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Van den Bosch et al., 1999), as ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Eisenhardt 
& Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997), ‘combinative capabilities’ (De Boer et al., 
1999; Jansen et al., 2005b; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Van den Bosch et al., 1999), 
and ‘architectural competence’ (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994). 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000: 1105) argue that ‘although dynamic 
capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details and path dependent in their 
emergence, they have significant commonalities across firms’. The literature 
argues that these commonalities involve organizational factors; Jansen et al. 
(2005b: 1000), for instance, argue that ‘these commonalities involve 
organizational mechanisms, such as cross-functional teams and participation in 
decision making. Henderson and Cockburn (1994: 66) include in their definition 
of architectural competence ‘organizational characteristics (…): the control 
systems and the ‘culture’ or dominant values of the organization’, whereas Verona 
(1999) argues that a firm’s internal integrative capabilities ‘are strictly linked to 
the dimensions of processes, systems, and structures’, such as ‘control processes’, 
‘incentive and reward systems’, and ‘social values’ (Verona, 1999: 137).  
This study will further refer to capabilities by which firms ‘use current 
resources, (…) create new resources and (…) device new ways of using current or 
new resources’ (cf. Elfring & Volberda, 2001: 257) in terms of combinative 
capabilities. The reason for this is that studies on combinative capabilities have 
explicitly addressed the impact of organizational factors on exploration and 
exploitation (Jansen, 2005; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999), and because they indicate 
the importance of the individual level (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). The 
essence of organizational factors of combinative capabilities, conceptualized by 
Kogut & Zander (1992: 383) as the capability to ‘synthesize and apply current and 
acquired knowledge’, is that they integrate (cf. Grant, 1996) or transfer (cf Kogut 
and Zander, 1992) knowledge of individuals within the firm, to trigger exploration 
and/ or exploitation. In other words, this study discusses organizational factors as 
common features of combinative capabilities to structure the investigation about 
what, and how, organizational factors affect managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities, and their knowledge acquisition activities. Section 2.5 will 
elaborate upon managers’ knowledge acquisition activities. 
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Table 2.2 – Combinative Capabilities: Description of Three different Types (cf. De Boer et 
al., 1999; Jansen et al., 2005b; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999) 
Type of combinative 
capabilities  
 
Description 
Coordination Capabilities ‘Refer to methods of coordination’ (Van Den Bosch et al., 
1999: 556). Associated organizational factors influence 
managers’ activities by fostering ‘interactions and relations 
across disciplinary and hierarchical boundaries’ (Jansen et 
al., 2005b: 1000) 
 
Systems Capabilities ‘Reflect the degree to which rules, procedures, instructions, 
and communications are laid down in written documents or 
formal systems’ (Van Den Bosch et al., 1999: 556). 
Associated organizational factors influence managers’ 
activities as they ‘program behaviors in advance of their 
execution and provide memory for handling routine 
situations’ (Jansen et al., 2005b: 1002) 
 
Socialization Capabilities ‘Contribute to common codes of communication and 
dominant vales’ (Jansen et al., 2005b: 1003). Associated 
organizational factors influence managers’ activities by 
specifying broad, tacitly understood rules for appropriate 
action (Camerer & Vepsalainen, 1988; Jansen et al., 2005b; 
Van Den Bosch et al., 1999). 
Source: De Boer et al. (1999); Jansen et al. (2005b); Van Den Bosch et al. (1999) 
 
This study follows De Boer et al. (1999: 386-7), Jansen et al. (2005b: 
1000) and Van den Bosch et al. (1999: 556) by discussing three types of 
combinative capabilities; coordination capabilities, systems capabilities, and 
socialization capabilities (see also table 2.2). Based on the argument that 
combinative capabilities are idiosyncratic in their details and path dependent in 
their emergence, but however have significant commonalities across firms 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000: 1105) Jansen et al. (2005b) and Van den Bosch et al. 
(1999) submit specific organizational factors as common features of combinative 
capabilities. These include classical organizational factors such as centralization 
and formalization (cf. Jansen et al., 200b), but also, for instance, aspects of 
performance management and the social context such as reward systems and 
values (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Verona, 1999). 
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Coordination capabilities refer to lateral and vertical ways of 
coordination. Associated organizational factors influence managers’ activities by 
fostering relationships across disciplinary, unit, and/or hierarchical boundaries 
(Jansen et al., 2005b; Teece et al., 1997; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999). They bring 
together different sources of expertise and increase interactions between managers. 
They may be explicitly designed, or result more implicitly from processes of 
interaction (De Leeuw & Volberda, 1996). Based on Jansen et al. (2005b) and Van 
Den Bosch et al. (1999), we will examine in this study a manager’s participation 
in decision making and participation in cross-functional interfaces as 
organizational factors as common features of coordination capabilities. Moreover, 
studies have suggested as directions for future research investigating aspects of 
reward systems as an organizational factor of coordination capabilities (e.g. Jansen 
et al., 2005b; McGrath, 2001). Several studies indicate that for understanding 
manager’s exploration, exploitation and knowledge acquisition activities the 
distinction between reward systems which tie a manager’s rewards to overall firm 
performance and systems which reward them based on individual performance, is 
of special relevance (Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). Accordingly, this study investigates the impact 
of the extent to which a manager’s rewards are based on overall firm 
performance (versus individual performance). 
Systems capabilities reflect the degree to which rules, procedures, 
instructions, and communications are laid down in written documents or formal 
systems (De Boer et al., 1999; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999). Associated 
organizational factors influence managers’ activities by programming behaviors in 
advance of their execution, establishing patterns of action, and by providing 
memory for handling routine situations (Galbraith, 1973; Jansen et al., 2005b; Van 
Den Bosch et al., 1999). Systems capabilities exhibit common features, i.e. 
formalization and routinization (Jansen et al., 2005). Accordingly, we examine the 
impact of formalization of a manager’s tasks on this manager’s exploration and 
exploitation activities. Regarding routinization, today organizations increasingly 
use IT-systems to support or employ routine tasks (Garrity & Sanders, 1998; 
Pinsonneault & Rivard, 1998). Notwithstanding writings in the popular press, the 
literature indicates that IT-systems are less suited to facilitate non-routine tasks, 
but are well suited to facilitate routine task (e.g. Goodhue & Thompson, 1995; 
Lim & Benbasat, 2000). Therefore, in this study, we will examine a manager’s use 
of IT-systems to conduct tasks, as a measure of the extent to which this manager 
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conducts routine tasks. We do not intent to capture electronic ways of 
communication such as through email or web-based discussion forums.  
Socialization capabilities contribute to a shared ideology within the firm, 
codes of communication, and the creation of dominant values (Camerer & 
Vepsalainen, 1988; Jansen et al., 2005b; Volberda, 1998). Associated 
organizational factors influence managers’ activities by specifying broad, tacitly 
understood rules for appropriate action (Camerer & Vepsalainen, 1988; Jansen et 
al., 2005b; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999). Jansen et al. (2005b) investigate two 
organizational factors as common features of socialization capabilities; 
connectedness and socialization tactics. Socialization tactics are concerned with 
newcomers, as firms use them to establish congruence among the firm’s and 
newcomers’ values, norms, and beliefs (Chao et al., 1994; Fisher, 1986). As this 
study’s focus is not on newcomers, we will investigate the more generally 
applicable construct of tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or 
superiors, which refers to the extent to which peers and/ or superiors allow a 
manager to have and/ or express new ideas, different opinions, and deviant 
behavior, norms, or values (Volberda, 1998: 178). Besides tolerance for ambiguity 
of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors, we will investigate connectedness (cf, 
Jansen et al., 2005b) as an organizational factor of socialization capabilities, which 
refers to the degree, or density, of direct contacts among organization members 
within and across organization units (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). 
 
Table 2.3 – Organizational Factors as Common Features of Combinative Capabilities 
Organizational factors as common features of combinative 
capabilities 
Types of combinative 
capabilities 
 
• Participation in decision making 
 
Coordination Capabilities 
• Participation in cross-functional interfaces  
• Rewards based on overall firm performance  
  
• Formalization of tasks Systems Capabilities 
• Use of IT-systems to conduct tasks  
  
• Connectedness to other organization members Socialization Capabilities 
• Tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or 
superiors 
 
Source: based on Jansen et al. (2005b), Van den Bosch et al. (1999), and others (see this 
section) 
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Table 2.3 shows the organizational factors which will be investigated in 
this study, and their association with the three types of combinative capabilities. 
Summarizing, in this study, several organizational factors as common features of 
combinative capabilities will be considered which can be examined at the manager 
level of analysis; i.e. a manager’s participation in decision making, a manager’s 
participation in cross-functional interfaces, extent of a manager’s rewards based on 
overall firm performance, formalization of a manager’s tasks, a manager’s use of 
IT-systems to conduct tasks, a manager’s connectedness to other organization 
members, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors.  
The quotes below, derived from interviews, may anecdotically illustrate 
some of the organizational factors that we investigate in this study, and their 
relation with managers’ knowledge acquisition and/ or exploration and 
exploitation activities. 
 
• Rewards based on company-wide performance 
We understand that, if we do not act as an organization as a whole, we 
will get into trouble. Our pay system reflects this. People receive a 
bonus if we are doing well as an organization. Now there is a culture of 
sharing; I understand that being one company is important. So, if 
someone wants to learn from me, I say ‘that is fine’. People are also 
more proud to tell what they learned from others; the not-invented-here 
syndrome seems to be less. 
Interview, February 2004, Middle level manager front-office; Rabobank 
 
• IT-systems 
With the increasing development of our IT-systems we aim at proving 
people a personalized offer of information. I would call them [the IT-
systems] successful if people stop making calls to each other, if they 
don’t visit each other any more, if the systems provide them, in a 
personalized and specialized way, with all knowledge they need. I really 
think that using the systems increases people’s efficiency in doing their 
job; it improves their specialized knowledge.  
Interview, December 2004, Central & Support unit manager; Deloitte 
 
• (In)-tolerance for ambiguity of manager’s peers and/ or superiors 
Since about a year, we have a new general director; [name]. (….) He 
clearly communicated his vision for the future to the managers and 
employees; behavior which deviates [from this vision] is actually not 
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tolerated any more. For me, that is OK; I know exactly what I am 
expected to do. But it gets more difficult to get something new through; 
you know, something which does not neatly fits into the vision. Tricky 
problems keep untouched. I don’t want to get my fingers burned by 
proposing things which deviate from his vision. 
Interview, February 2004, Front level manager back office; Rabobank 
 
 
2.5 – Knowledge Inflows and Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation 
Activities 
 
The previous section illustrated the relevance of examining organizational factors 
as common features of combinative capabilities as explanatory factors of 
managers’ exploration and/or exploitation activities. To further increase our 
insight into managers’ exploration and exploitation activities and into how these 
activities can be influenced, this section argues why we focus on how knowledge 
inflows of a manager influence this manager’s exploration and/ or exploitation 
activities. Furthermore, this section indicates what we mean by managers’ 
knowledge inflows, and it illustrates the mediating role of knowledge inflows, i.e. 
how organizational factors influence managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities through their influence on managers’ knowledge inflows. 
 
Relevance of Knowledge Inflows 
The argument that the acquisition of knowledge by a firm, unit, or 
manager is a critical antecedent or requirement for exploration and exploitation 
activities, is present in several studies pertaining to various management fields 
(e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Garcia et al., 2003; Hansen 
et al., 2001; Jansen, 2005;  Katlia & Ahuja, 2002; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2003; Sheremata, 2000; Sidhu et al., 2004; Subramaniam & 
Youndt, 2005; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999). For instance, Adler (1990) shows that 
sharing knowledge across the development/ manufacturing interface and between 
manufacturing plants triggers productivity learning resulting in higher levels of 
manufacturing efficiency. Winter and Szulanski (2001) illustrate that the 
exploration phase of a replication strategy characterized by discovering and 
developing a business model, is facilitated by the acquisition of knowledge by the 
central organization from its outlets. The exploitation phase of a replication 
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strategy characterized by stabilizing and leveraging the business model, is 
facilitated by the acquisition of knowledge by the outlets from the central 
organization. 
Scholars on the field of technological innovation (Benner & Tushman, 
2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Nerkar, 2003; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) have 
examined the impact of knowledge acquisition by a firm, as reflected in citation 
patterns within patent applications, in terms of the extent to which innovations 
tend to be exploratory or exploitative. These studies indicate that the acquisition of 
distant, new knowledge (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002), old 
knowledge (Nerkar, 2003), or knowledge acquired across technological or 
organizational boundaries (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) stimulates exploration, 
whereas the acquisition of local, related knowledge (Benner & Tushman, 2002; 
Katila & Ahuja, 2002), recent knowledge (Nerkar, 2003), or knowledge acquired 
within technological or organizational boundaries (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) 
stimulates exploitation. 
In the field of organizational learning, studies indicate that the acquisition 
of knowledge is a primary mechanism by which firms, units, or organization 
members learn from each other (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Levitt & 
March, 1988). Such learning through the acquisition of knowledge may be either 
exploratory reflected in an increase of the variety and broadness of the knowledge 
recipient’s knowledge base (e.g. Inkpen, 1996; McGrath, 2001; Nonaka, 1994; 
Tsai, 2001), and/or exploitative reflected in an increase of the reliability and depth 
of the knowledge recipient’s knowledge base (Adler et al., 1999; Levin, 2000). For 
instance, Tsai (2001) showed that a position of an organizational unit within the 
organization that increases the unit’s ability to access information and knowledge 
from other units is positively related to the creation of new knowledge and to 
innovative activities of that unit. 
Studies on absorptive capacity also illustrate the value of examining the 
acquisition of knowledge for understanding firm or unit level exploration and 
exploitation. Van Den Bosch et al. (1999) argue that a firm’s scope and flexibility 
of knowledge absorption positively relate to a firm’s exploration adaptations, 
whereas efficiency of knowledge absorption positively relates to exploitation 
adaptations. Jansen (2005) shows that a unit’s realized absorptive capacity (i.e. 
transformation and exploitation of acquired knowledge) positively relates to its 
exploitative innovations, whereas potential absorptive capacity (acquisition of 
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knowledge and its assimilation) positively moderates the relationship between 
realized absorptive capacity and exploratory innovations.  
With respect to managers, several conceptual investigations and case 
studies in the field of strategic management indicate that top-down and bottom-up 
knowledge inflows facilitate managers’ exploration and exploitation activities 
(Burgelman, 1983b; 1991; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Van 
Cauwenbergh & Cool, 1982). Floyd and Lane (2000), for instance, identify 
various roles, associated with exploration and/or exploitation activities, which 
managers at all hierarchical levels may fulfill. A central characteristic of these 
roles is that they are linked and triggered across levels through the exchange of 
knowledge (Floyd & Lane, 2000). 
Studies belonging to the knowledge literature also indicate the importance 
of examining knowledge, which a manager acquires from other persons and/ or 
units in the same organization, for understanding managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities (e.g. Grant, 1996; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; Hedlund, 
1994; Kogut & Zander, 1996). As Grant (1996: 385) argues: ‘the fundamental role 
of the firm is the integration of individuals’ specialized knowledge’, not only to 
trigger the exploration of new knowledge but also to stimulate the exploitation of 
existing knowledge. 
Studies on social capital indicate the role of intra-organizational 
knowledge acquisition and exchange between managers, in terms of pursuing 
exploration and exploitation tasks as well. Social capital can be described as the 
knowledge embedded within, available through, and utilized by interactions 
among individuals, and their network of interrelationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998; Subramanian & Youndt, 2005). The study of Hansen et al. (2001) shows 
that teams pursuing exploration tasks benefit from members receiving knowledge 
through many strong, non-redundant ties, whereas teams pursuing exploitation 
tasks benefit from team members receiving knowledge by weakly tied and 
moderately interconnected contacts. The findings of Sumbramaniam and Youndt’s 
(2005) study show that the exchange of knowledge between organization members 
positively influences both a firm’s radical and incremental innovative capabilities. 
Concluding with respect to managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities, the literature illustrates the relevance of examining the acquisition of 
knowledge, residing in various places in the organization, by managers as a critical 
requirement for triggering their exploration and/or exploitation activities. 
Regarding exploration, the acquisition of knowledge by a manager may broaden 
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the manager’s knowledge base and increase variety in experience (Bontis et al., 
2002; Levinthal & March, 1993; Holmqvist, 2004; McGrath, 2001), lead to a 
reconsideration of existing beliefs and former decisions (Floyd & Lane, 2000; 
Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), and/or transform 
this manager’s prevailing knowledge (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). For 
instance, by acquiring knowledge pertaining to products, markets, and 
technologies which is new to a manager, the manager may discover and 
experiment with new approaches to technologies, businesses, processes, or 
products (cf. McGrath, 2001). By acquiring and recombining aspects of 
organization members’ specialized knowledge, a manager may develop new skills 
(Grant, 1996; Van Den Bosch & Van Wijk, 2001), and create new ideas and 
opportunities for innovation (Leonard-Barton, 1995). Regarding exploitation, the 
acquisition of knowledge by a manager may increase reliability in experience 
(Bontis et al., 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993; Holmqvist, 2004), lead to decisions 
which elaborate on existing beliefs and decisions (Floyd & Lane, 2000; Ghemawat 
& Ricart I Costa, 1993; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), and/or reinforce the 
manager’s prevailing knowledge (Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). The internal 
transfer of best practices, for instance, may result in a refinement or improvement 
of a manager’s existing knowledge base and skills, increasing the manager’s 
reliability and efficiency in conducting routine tasks (Benner & Tushman, 2003; 
Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993). The acquisition of knowledge pertaining to 
existing products, markets, technologies, and strategies may improve, refine, or 
reinforce a manager’s existing knowledge base (Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 
1993; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), typically leading to exploitative decisions 
and activities (Burgelman, 1991; Floyd & Lane, 2000) such as increasing or 
decreasing production (Sanchez et al., 1996), increasingly implementing and 
executing induced strategic decisions (Burgelman, 1983), or pursuing increased 
efficiency in existing tasks (Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993). 
The examples mentioned below, derived from interviews, may 
anecdotically illustrate how knowledge inflows of managers impact upon their 
exploration and exploitation activities. 
 
About every three months, we [senior account managers] get from our 
business unit manager a kind of market study giving insight into what 
the other large banks are doing in the Rotterdam harbor, but also 
about what Rabo Amsterdam is doing or our partner in Antwerp. The 
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study gives, let’s say, an overview of developments, opportunities, and 
threats in our market. Because of this study, I can make better 
decisions. Subsequently, I make a selection [among the products]; 
about some products I know that they are OK; just sell the stuff. About 
other products I know that they first need to be improved. In that case I 
talk, for instance, with the controller here to see to what extent I can 
adapt the price, or I talk to insurance when the insurance package 
needs to be improved. 
Interview, January  2003. Senior account manager; Rabobank 
 
Discussions with product line managers [front-line] are indispensable 
in my job. We talk to each other about technological developments, 
about customers and about business. They come up with many new 
ideas, but I have to evaluate the long term implications. The whole 
process, from concept to production, before you see revenues typically 
is seven years. I work on the things that do not exist; my job is to make 
them exist. 
Interview, April 2004. Business Development manager; Philips 
 
Acquiring knowledge from different service lines [units specialized in 
certain products and/ or markets] is absolutely necessary if we have to 
build a new tailor made piece of software for a new client. Before we 
really start developing, I first have to find out which different 
possibilities various programming languages offer, regarding the 
client’s demand. I also try to find out whether in this organization we 
did something similar for another client. Subsequently I put together a 
team composed of people from different service lines and evaluate with 
them different options I made.  
Interview, December 2004. Project manager Consultancy; Deloitte 
 
Conceptualizing Managers’ Knowledge inflows 
Knowledge acquisition by a manager will be conceptualized, and later on 
in this study operationalized, in terms of knowledge inflows of a manager. 
Concepts such as knowledge sharing, knowledge exchange, and knowledge flows 
are sometimes used interchangeably in studies (cf. Schulz, 2001). However, 
whereas knowledge sharing and knowledge exchange imply a reciprocal 
relationship in terms of transfers of knowledge between managers, the concept of 
knowledge flows allows more precision about the directionality of the knowledge 
being transferred. That is, knowledge outflows are associated with a donor 
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providing a recipient with knowledge, where the knowledge donor is the focal unit 
of analysis (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Schulz, 2001). Knowledge inflows are 
associated with a recipient receiving or gathering knowledge from a donor, where 
the knowledge recipient is the focal unit of analysis (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; 
Schulz, 2003). As this study tries to understand how knowledge, which a manager 
acquires or gathers from other persons and/ or units in the organization, impacts 
upon his or her exploration and exploitation activities, the study’s focus will be 
limited to a manager’s knowledge inflows only. Both the knowledge donor and/ or 
recipient may be the initiator of such knowledge inflows. 
Notions on knowledge flows vary somewhat in the literature (cf. Schulz, 
2001: 662; Van Wijk, 2003). Whereas some authors focus on certain types of 
knowledge such as the transfer of skills and technology (Tsai, 2002), the transfer 
of business practices (Szulanski, 1996), or the transfer of tacit knowledge (Kogut 
& Zander, 1993; Subramaniam & Venkatraman, 2001), we follow Gupta and 
Govindarajan (2000) and Schulz (2001; 2003) by adopting a broader notion on 
knowledge flows in this study. That is, based on Schulz’ (2003) and Gupta and 
Govindarajan’s (2000) definitions of knowledge flows, we define the knowledge 
inflows of a manager as the ‘aggregate volume’ (Schulz, 2003: 4442) of tacit and 
explicit knowledge pertaining to several domains such as technologies, products, 
processes, strategies, and markets, which a manager receives or gathers per unit of 
time, from other persons and units within the organization. We do not intend to 
capture inflows of operational or financial data or the taking of orders. 
Considering several knowledge domains allows this study to examine a broad 
range of managers; i.e. managers pertaining to several hierarchical levels, 
functional backgrounds, or organization units. Furthermore, considering both tacit 
and explicit knowledge allows examining different channels by which managers 
receive or gather knowledge (cf. Schulz, 2001), for instance, by telephone, e-mail, 
regular mail, through formal meetings, informal face-to-face contacts, and by 
using shared technologies such as the company’s intranet.  
Whereas studies in the field of strategic management indicate that top-
down and bottom-up knowledge inflows facilitate managers’ exploration and 
exploitation related activities (Burgelman, 1983b; 1991; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Van 
Cauwenbergh & Cool, 1982), others point to the important role of horizontal 
knowledge flows within an organization with regard to understanding exploration 
and exploitation related activities (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; Hansen et al., 
2001; Nonaka, 1994; Sumbramaniam & Youndt, 2005). Therefore, following 
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studies on intra-organizational knowledge flows (e.g. Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000; Schulz, 2001; 2003), this study distinguishes vertical and horizontal 
knowledge inflows to better understand how knowledge inflows of a manger 
impact upon the manager’s exploration and exploitation activities. Vertical 
knowledge inflows proceed along the hierarchy. They may be either top-down or 
bottom-up. In this study, top-down knowledge inflows of a manager are associated 
with knowledge coming from persons and units at higher hierarchical levels than 
the manager. Bottom-up knowledge inflows of a manager are associated with 
knowledge coming from persons and units at lower hierarchical levels than the 
manager. Horizontal knowledge inflows do not follow the traditional lines of 
hierarchy. Horizontal knowledge inflows of a manager are associated with 
knowledge coming from peer managers in the same organizational unit, or coming 
from other units at the same hierarchical level. 
 
The Mediating Role of Knowledge Inflows 
 The previous section, section 2.4, and this section indicate the relevance of 
studying how organizational factors as common features of combinative 
capabilities and how managers’ knowledge inflows influence managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities. Studies on combinative capabilities argue 
that the raison d’être of firms is ‘the sharing and transfer of the knowledge of 
individuals and groups within organizations’ (Kogut & Zander, 1992: 383), 
triggered by organizational factors, to enable the firm to adapt in exploratory and/ 
or exploitative ways (De Boer et al., 1999).  In other words: ‘the central 
competitive dimension of what firms know how to do is to create and transfer 
knowledge efficiently within an organizational context’ (Kogut & Zander, 1992: 
384). Accordingly, studies pertaining to the knowledge literature indicate that the 
acquisition of knowledge (Lyles & Salk, 1996) and knowledge flows within an 
organization are not exogenous (e.g. Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 
1996); rather they originate from, take place within, and are enabled or hindered 
by organizational factors, i.e. by the ‘organizing principles by which people 
cooperate within organizations’ (Kogut & Zander, 1992: 383). Similarly, Grant 
(1996) proposes that the ‘fundamental role of the firm is the integration of 
individuals’ specialized knowledge’ (Grant, 1996: 385) which makes an ‘analysis 
of the mechanisms through which knowledge is integrated within firms’ central to 
the knowledge based literature (Grant, 1996: 375). To address this issue, about the 
“role of the firm” with regard to managing and organizing for the sharing and 
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transfer of knowledge throughout the organization (cf. Grant, 1996; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992), this study will also examine how organizational factors affect 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities through affecting their 
knowledge inflows. 
Hence, we argue in this study that organizational factors not only directly 
impact on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, but also, in line with 
studies on combinative capabilities and knowledge, exert an indirect influence 
through their impact on managers’ knowledge inflows. In other words, to more 
comprehensibly understand how a firm could manage and organize to deal with 
exploration and exploitation at the manager level, we should not only investigate 
how and why organizational factors and knowledge inflows impact directly upon 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, but also on how the these 
organizational factors impact upon managers’ knowledge inflows. 
Some studies in other literatures also argue, but not empirically show, that 
the acquisition of knowledge by a firm, unit, or manager, as a critical antecedent or 
requirement for exploration and exploitation activities, is facilitated or inhibited by 
organizational factors (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; Hansen et al., 2001; 
Sheremata, 2000; Sidhu et al., 2004; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). Benner and 
Tushman (2002), for instance, show that routinization, triggered by process 
management techniques, increases a firm’s exploitative innovations at the extent 
of exploratory innovations, as, so they argue, routinization stimulates the search 
for and acquisition of local knowledge at the expense of distant knowledge 
(Benner & Tushmanm 2002: 681). Hansen et al. (2001), for instance, show that 
exploration and exploitation tasks require different structural characteristics of an 
organization member’s intra-organizational social network. The reason for this, 
they argue (Hansen et al., 2001: 27-29), is that different structural characteristics 
allow for the acquisition of different kinds and quantities of knowledge. Sheremata 
(2000: 391) argues that centrifugal forces, such as decentralization and reach, 
stimulate organization members’ gathering of knowledge and consequently 
‘creative action’, i.e. exploration. Centripetal forces, such as connectedness and 
temporal pacing, he argues, stimulate the integration of knowledge, and 
consequently organization members’ collective action, i.e. exploitation. Sidhu et 
al. (2004) conceptualize a firm’s exploration orientation in terms of scope of 
knowledge acquisition. They subsequently show how organizational elements such 
as the organization mission, strategic orientation, technology and slack resources, 
impact upon a firm’s knowledge acquisition scope. 
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2.6 – Conclusion – Conceptual Research Framework 
 
Based on a review of studies on organizational learning, organization design, 
strategic management, and innovation, this chapter illustrated related distinctions 
between exploration and exploitation in the literature, different interpretations 
about tensions and relations between the two, and different arguments about how 
firms may manage and organize both exploration and exploitation and associated 
implications for managers. 
The literature review indicates however that there is a lack of systematic 
research, cumulative theory building, and a related set of empirical findings on 
these issues. Current literature and management practice could considerably 
benefit from increased conceptually and empirically validated understanding about 
what and how organizational factors impact upon exploration and exploitation, and 
the relation between these two, since studies explicitly dealing with these issues 
are scarce. Moreover, studies quite differ among each other with respect to 
specific organizational factors they consider, and empirical research seems to be 
lagging behind. The literature review indicates furthermore that current studies 
focus on exploration and exploitation at the firm or unit level. Studies addressing 
the manager level are nearly absent. Consequently, there is a lack of understanding 
about how exploration and exploitation can be conceptualized at the manager 
level, how they relate to each other at the manager level, how exploration and 
exploitation at the manager level can be measured, and about how organizational 
factors encourage or discourage managers to explore and/ or exploit. 
 This chapter illustrates that this study can deliver a contribution to the 
literature and management practice by investigating managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. To further increase our understanding about how managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities can be influenced, section 2.4 argues to 
examine how organizational factors impact upon managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. The literature suggests a variety of such factors. We 
indicated the relevance of referring to the concept of combinative capabilities for 
providing a theoretical argument about what factors to include or exclude in an 
analysis about the impact of factors on managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities. This leads to the identification of several organizational factors (see 
table 2.3) as common features of combinative capabilities as antecedents of 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Section 2.5 furthermore 
illustrates the relevance of investigating how knowledge inflows of a manager 
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influence this manager’s exploration and/ or exploitation activities. The literature 
indicates that to more comprehensibly understand how a firm could manage and 
organize dealing with exploration and exploitation at the manager level, we should 
not only investigate how organizational factors and knowledge inflows impact 
directly upon managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, but also on how 
the organizational factors impact upon managers’ knowledge inflows, i.e. we will 
investigate how and to what extent knowledge inflows mediate the relationship 
between organizational factors and managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the conceptual research framework which results 
from this chapter’s discussion. As figure 2.1 shows, this study focuses on the 
impact of organizational factors as common features of combinative capabilities 
on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, and the mediating role of 
managers’ knowledge inflows. Accordingly, in the next chapter, we develop 
hypotheses (1) on the direct impact of the organizational factors on managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities, (2) on the impact of the organizational 
factors on managers’ knowledge inflows, and (3) on the impact of managers’ 
knowledge inflows on their exploration and exploitation activities. These last two 
groups of hypotheses enable us to investigate the indirect impact of organizational 
factors as well, i.e. how they influence managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities through their influence on managers’ knowledge inflows.  
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CHAPTER 3 – HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
3.1 – Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the hypotheses are developed. In line with the study’s research 
framework (see figure 2.1, section 2.6) and research questions (see section 1.2), 
first, hypotheses are developed on the direct impact of the organizational factors 
on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Section 2.4 provided a 
rational for the selection of the organizational factors. Second, hypotheses are 
developed on the impact of the organizational factors on managers’ knowledge 
inflows. Third, hypotheses are developed on the impact of managers’ knowledge 
inflows on their exploration and exploitation activities. 
 
 
3.2 – The Direct Impact of Organizational Factors on Managers’ Exploration 
and Exploitation Activities 
 
Organizational Factors as Common Features of Coordination Capabilities 
Participation in decision making, or decentralization (Aiken & Hage, 
1966: 497), refers to the extent to which managers participate in decisions 
pertaining to the distribution of resources or policy formulation (Dewar et al., 
1980; Hage & Aiken, 1967). The literature indicates that participation in decision 
making triggers managers to develop a variety of perspectives (Hage & Aiken, 
1967; McGrath, 2001) and, consequently, enables them to better cope with 
uncertainty (Duncan, 1976). Moreover, it reduces the likelihood that change, or 
new and deviating perspectives will be vetoed by superiors (Thompson, 1967). 
Moreover, participation in decision making generates a greater involvement and 
commitment of managers in their job (Amabile, 1993; Damanpour, 1991) and 
consequently contributes to their ability and willingness to experiment, search for 
innovative solutions to problems, and take risk in order to increase performance on 
their job (McGrath, 2001; Pierce & Delbecq, 1977; Sheremata, 2000). Briefly, the 
literature argues that a manager’s participation in decision making increases this 
manager’s variety in experience (cf. Pierce & Delbecq, 1977: 30). However, as 
participation in decision making implies that more people with possibly different 
opinions are involved in the decision process, it reduces the speed and increases 
66
 56 
the costs of problem solving (Sheremata, 2000), and it reduces possibilities of fast 
and efficient implementation (Duncan, 1976). Accordingly, centralization, i.e. low 
participation in decision making, is traditionally associated with stability, 
efficiency and reliability in actions and results (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Hage, 
1965). Briefly, the literature indicates that decentralization, or participation in 
decision making, negatively relates to reliability in experience (cf. Pierce & 
Delbecq, 1977: 30). These arguments suggest the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Participation in decision making by a manager is positively 
related to the extent to which this manager engages in exploration 
activities 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Participation in decision making by a manager is negatively 
related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploitation activities 
 
Cross functional interfaces encompass formal integration mechanism such 
as liaison personnel, task forces, and teams (Galbraith, 1973; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000). They typically allow for immediate feedback, and dense, 
reciprocal, and personal interactions between managers of different functions, 
units, and hierarchical levels (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Egelhoff, 1991; Galbraith, 
1973). These characteristics of cross-functional interfaces increase managers’ 
variety in experience by enabling them to enter into debate with other people with 
different backgrounds, and to learn from each other’s judgment and experience 
regarding new tasks. Moreover, by increasing managers’ ability to deal with 
multiple or even conflicting interpretations about a situation, and to clarify and 
better define ambiguous problems, participation in cross-functional interfaces may 
reduce uncertainty and equivocality surrounding tasks, problems, and situations 
managers encounter (Daft & Lengel, 1986). As explorative tasks rather than 
exploitative tasks demand from a manager to deal with uncertainty and to interpret 
equivocal situations (Egelhoff, 1991; Holmqvist, 2003; Levinthal & March, 1993), 
the literature would argue that participation of a manager in cross-functional 
interfaces positively relates to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploration activities. However, in the case of exploitative tasks, cross-functional 
interfaces easily lead to an “overload” of, for instance, different opinions, ideas, 
interpretations,  and discussions,  stifling  the  efficient  and  effective execution of 
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exploitative tasks (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Egelhoff, 1991). Consequently, we 
suggest the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Participation in cross-functional interfaces by a manager is 
positively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploration activities 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Participation in cross-functional interfaces by a manager is 
negatively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploitation activities 
 
Several studies indicate that for understanding manager’s exploration, 
exploitation and knowledge acquisition activities, the distinction between reward 
systems which tie a manager’s rewards to overall firm performance and systems 
which reward them based on individual performance is of special relevance 
(Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Rivkin & 
Siggelkow, 2003). Rewards based on overall firm performance and individual 
performance, are seen as the extremes of the same dimension (Lawler, 1986; 
Salter, 1973). The returns from exploration are typically distant from the locus of 
action (Lewin et al., 1999; March, 1991), consequently, one of the reasons that 
managers may be reluctant to conduct exploration activities when their rewards are 
based on individual performance, is that they do not reap the benefits of these 
exploration activities. On the other hand, rewards tied to overall firm performance 
trigger interdependent behavior, mutual adjustment and cooperation between 
managers of different functional areas, organizational units, and hierarchical 
levels, as it is generally to everyone’s advantage that an individual work 
effectively, because all share in the financial fruits of higher performance (Collins 
& Clark, 2003; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986; 
Lawler, 1986). Consequently, rewards tied to overall firm performance may 
reduce managers’ reluctance towards conducting exploration activities as they will 
share in the fruits of these exploration activities, even if these fruits are reaped in 
other parts in the organization. Correspondingly authors argue that rewards based 
on firm performance positively influence exploration related activities such as 
innovating (Thompson, 1967), differentiating (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), and the 
development of new products and processes (Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993). 
However, incentive systems tied to individual performance inhibit risk taking and 
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foster a short-term egocentric focus (Kerr & Slocum, 1987), triggering a manager 
to conduct exploitation activities as the returns from exploitation are more certain, 
close in time, and privilege the near neighborhood of action (Lewin et al., 1999; 
March, 1991).  
 
Hypothesis 3a: A manager’s rewards based on overall firm performance is 
positively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploration activities 
 
Hypothesis 3b: A manager’s rewards based on overall firm performance is 
negatively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploitation activities 
 
Organizational Factors as Common Features of Systems Capabilities 
 Formalization is the degree to which rules and codes describe a particular 
task, provide guides for decision making, provide guides for conveying decisions, 
instructions, and information, and the degree to which managers have to conform 
to the task description (Hage, 1965; Pugh et al., 1963). High formalization of tasks 
results in the development of expertise in a limited area (Hage, 1965) and 
therefore, within this area, it results in greater efficiency, higher production, less 
failures being made, and uniformity of behavior over time (Hall et al., 1967). 
Consequently, formalization of tasks increases the depth of managers’ existing 
knowledge and their reliability in experience with respect to conducting the 
formalized tasks. However, by ex-ante describing and prescribing tasks and 
decision making, formalization reduces not only the ability to address unexpected 
situations or to conduct new tasks, but it also restricts the amount of deviation 
allowed from established standards (Aiken & Hage, 1966); i.e. formalization 
decreases a manager’s ability to create variety in experience. These arguments 
lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Formalization of a manager’s tasks is negatively related to the 
extent to which this manager engages in exploration activities 
 
Hypothesis 4b: Formalization of a manager’s tasks is positively related to the 
extent to which this manager engages in exploitation activities 
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 Routinization reflects both the degree of variety in a task, i.e. the number 
of exceptions or the frequency of unexpected and novel events that occur, and the 
analyzability of a task, i.e. the extent to which a manager can follow an objective, 
well known procedure to solve problems (Perrow, 1967; Withey et al., 1983). 
Today, organizations increasingly use IT-systems to support or employ routine 
tasks (Pinsonneault & Rivard, 1998). Notwithstanding writings in the popular 
press, the literature indicates that IT-systems are less suited to facilitate non-
routine tasks, but are well suited to facilitate routine task (e.g. Goodhue & 
Thompson, 1995; Lim & Benbasat, 2000). Therefore, in this study, the use of IT-
systems by a manager to conduct work related tasks will be used as a measure of 
the extent to which this manager conducts routine tasks, i.e. tasks with low 
variability and complexity, high predictability and uniformity, and well known 
cause-effect relationships. These characteristics of routine tasks and the main 
reasons to employ IT-systems to conduct routine tasks, i.e. increased speed, 
reliability, and uniformity, and lower costs (Devaraj & Kohli, 2002; Garrity & 
Sanders, 1998), indicates that the use of IT-systems to conduct tasks negatively 
relates to the extent to which a manager conducts new tasks and the manager’s 
ability to deal with unexpected or difficult to analyze problems, but positively 
relates to the extent to which a manager conducts familiar tasks and encounters 
well-known, easy to analyze problems, suggesting the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Use of IT-systems by a manager to conduct tasks is negatively 
related to the extent to which this manager engages in exploration 
activities 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Use of IT-systems by a manager to conduct tasks is positively 
related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploitation activities 
 
Organizational Factors as Common Features of Socialization Capabilities 
Connectedness refers to the frequency of contacts a manager has with 
other organization members within and across organization units, and the density 
of this network of contacts (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). Connectedness is associated 
with trust, shared norms, cooperation and knowledge exchange among 
organization members (Coleman, 1988; Rowley et al., 2000). Frequent contacts 
and a dense network; i.e. a high level of connectedness, promotes trust among 
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network members and facilitates the rapid diffusion of norms (Coleman, 1998; 
Rowley, 1997). As a result, managers embedded in highly interconnected 
networks develop shared behavioral expectations based on established norms. 
Moreover, deviant behavior becomes less accepted and will be sanctioned 
(Coleman, 1998). Consequently, the more managers are connected to other 
organization members, the more they are likely to respond to the network’s 
expectations and norms in a concerted and similar fashion (Jaworski & Kohli, 
1993), decreasing variation, experimentation, and the creation and diffusion of 
new ideas and insights (Hansen et al., 2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005). Accordingly, connectedness will be negatively 
related to a manager’s variety in experience and the broadness of the manager’s 
knowledge base. On the other hand, because a high level of connectedness among 
organization members stimulates the development and circulation of similar 
norms, perspectives, and interpretations (Coleman, 1998; Hansen et al., 2001; 
Uzzi, 1997), dense networks provide a means for improving, refining, and 
increasing reliability in experience and the depth of knowledge acquired from 
other network members (Hansen et al., 2001; Rowley et al., 2000). Accordingly, 
we expect connectedness to be negatively related to managers’ exploration 
activities, and to be positively related to managers’ exploitation activities. 
 
Hypothesis 6a: A manager’s connectedness to other organization members is 
negatively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploration activities 
 
Hypothesis 6b: A manager’s connectedness to other organization members is 
positively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploitation activities 
 
 Tolerance for ambiguity is in this study not seen as a personal 
characteristic of managers, but rather reflects the extent that peer or superior 
managers allow a manager to have and/or express new ideas, different opinions, 
and deviant behavior, norms or values (Volberda, 1998: 178). It increases 
managers’ openness to new opinions and diversity (Camerer & Vepsalainen, 
1988). Accordingly, tolerance for ambiguity of managers’ peers and/ or superiors 
increases managers’ ability and/ or willigness to increase variety in experience. 
Moreover, effective decision making in situations involving risk or uncertainty, 
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both characteristics of exploration (cf. March, 1991; Levinthal & March, 1993), 
requires tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s contacts as the outcomes of these 
decision making situations have higher probability of deviating from established 
norms and practices than situations involving low risk or certainty (Gimpl & 
Dakin, 1984; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984). For these reasons, we expect 
tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors to positively affect 
managers’ exploration activities. Instead, intolerance for ambiguity of peers and/ 
or superiors causes managers to focus on only the least ambiguous problems and 
the most reliable answers (Dollinger, 1984) and to prefer well defined, stable, 
unchanging rules and behavior (Volberda, 1998).Therefore, we expect tolerance 
for ambiguity of peers and/ or superiors to be negatively related to managers’ 
exploitation activities. 
 
Hypothesis 7a: Tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors is 
positively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploration activities 
 
Hypothesis 7b: Tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors is 
negatively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploitation activities 
  
 
3.3 – The Impact of Organizational Factors on Managers’ Knowledge Inflows 
 
Organizational Factors as Common Features of Coordination Capabilities 
Participation in decision making impels managers to acquire knowledge to 
determine what decisions to make, what important factors are in decision making, 
and how and when decisions should be made (Athuahene-Gima, 2003; Sheremata, 
2000). Participation in decision making not only increases the quantity of 
knowledge needed by a manager to reduce uncertainty and to develop a variety of 
perspectives (Hage & Aiken, 1967; McGrath, 2001), but also makes demands on 
the quality of knowledge to be acquired. That is, accurate and timely knowledge is 
required to increase understanding and interpret situations correctly (Sheremata, 
2000). Studies on organizational design indicate that accurate and timely 
knowledge can often be retrieved and interpreted best only by those located at its 
source (Quinn, 1980; Sheremata, 2000; Van De Ven 1980;), i.e. by those at lower 
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or front-line levels in the organization (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Consequently, 
managers participating in decision making typically need bottom-up knowledge 
inflows; they need to acquire their subordinates’ ideas, expertise, insights, and 
opinions for more accurate and faster decision making (Ghemewat & Ricart I 
Costa, 1993). Furthermore, as participation in decision making compels managers 
to develop a variety of perspectives (Hage & Aiken, 1967; McGrath, 2001), it is 
likely to increase a broad search for and acquisition of knowledge (Duncan, 1967; 
Janssen et al., 2005b). Consequently, as the scope of horizontal knowledge inflows 
is likely to be broad (Winter & Szulanski, 2001), i.e. distant or unrelated to the 
recipient manager’s existing knowledge base, participation in decision making is 
likely to increase a manager’s horizontal knowledge inflows. Finally, as a main 
reason to decentralize decision making within large complex organizations is that 
it creates a demand for knowledge processing that exceeds top-management’s 
capacity (Simon, 1957), it seems unlikely that managers who participate in 
decision making benefit from their superiors’ knowledge (Ghemawat & Ricart I 
Costa, 1993). Consequently, we expect participation in decision making to be 
negatively related to a manager’s top-down knowledge inflows not only because 
top-level managers are more distant from the source of knowledge, but also 
because top-down knowledge inflows are of narrow scope (Winter & Szulanski, 
2001). These arguments suggest the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 8a: Participation in decision making by a manager is negatively 
related to this manager’s top-down knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 8b: Participation in decision making by a manager is positively 
related to this manager’s bottom-up knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 8c: Participation in decision making by a manager is positively 
related to this manager’s horizontal knowledge inflows 
 
Cross functional interfaces encompass formal integration mechanism such 
as liaison personnel, task forces, and teams (Galbraith, 1973; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000). They typically allow for frequent communication, immediate 
feedback, and dense, reciprocal, and personal interactions between managers of 
different functions, units, and hierarchical levels; i.e. cross functional interfaces 
increase the communication interface between functional and unit boundaries and 
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across hierarchical levels and hence serve as channels through which knowledge is 
being transferred (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Egelhoff, 1991; Galbraith, 1973; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000). Consequently, as Galbraith (1973) argues and as Ghoshal 
and Bartlett (1988) and Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) empirically demonstrate, 
cross functional interfaces increase the extent of horizontal knowledge flows 
within an organization. Moreover, as Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) hypothesize 
and empirically demonstrate, cross functional interfaces increase vertical flows of 
knowledge as well as task forces, committees, and teams typically are composed 
of managers belonging to various hierarchical levels. Consequently, based on the 
literature, we would argue that the more a manager participates in cross-functional 
interfaces, the more such a manager is able to acquire top-down, bottom-up, and 
horizontal knowledge flows. 
 
Hypothesis 9a: Participation in cross-functional interfaces by a manager is 
positively related to this manager’s top-down knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 9b: Participation in cross-functional interfaces by a manager is 
positively related to this manager’s bottom-up knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 9c: Participation in cross-functional interfaces by a manager is 
positively related to this manager’s horizontal knowledge inflows 
 
Rewards tied to total organizational performance rather than to individual 
performance increase a manager’s willingness to understand the impact of his or 
her activities on other parts in the organization, and vice versa, the impact of what 
happens in other parts of the organization on his or her unit. In other words, 
different alternatives are not only evaluated from a manager’s own perspective, 
but also from the perspective of the unit as a whole and of other units within the 
firm. As a result of this, rewards tied to overall firm performance trigger 
interdependent behavior, mutual adjustment and cooperation between managers of 
different functional areas, organizational units, and hierarchical levels, as it is 
generally to everyone’s advantage that an individual work effectively, because all 
share in the financial fruits of higher performance (Collins & Clark, 2003; 
Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986; Lawler, 1986). 
Consequently, the literature indicates that through this interdependent behavior, 
mutual adjustment, and cooperation between managers, rewards based on 
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company-wide performance positively affect a manager’s awareness about 
knowledge acquisition opportunities (Subramaniam & Youndt, 1998; Tsai & 
Ghoshal, 1998) and increase understanding of cause-effect relationships pertaining 
to the knowledge which resides in different places in the firm (Coleman, 1988; 
Rowley et al., 2000). Hence, we assume that a manager’s rewards based on overall 
firm performance increase the acquisition of knowledge from all directions. 
 
Hypothesis 10a: A manager’s rewards based on overall firm performance is 
positively related to this manager’s top-down knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 10b: A manager’s rewards based on overall firm performance is 
positively related to this manager’s bottom-up knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 10c: A manager’s rewards based on overall firm performance is 
positively related to this manager’s horizontal knowledge inflows 
 
Organizational Factors as Common Features of Systems Capabilities 
Formalization is the degree to which rules and codes describe a particular 
task, provide guides for decision making, provide guides for conveying decisions, 
instructions, and information, and the degree to which managers have to conform 
to the task description (Hage, 1965; Pugh et al., 1963). Typically, formalization 
aims at integrating and using knowledge of the firm while reducing the need for 
organization members to acquire knowledge other than that provided by the 
system; they limit both the intensity and scope of knowledge acquisition by 
managers’ own initiative or authority (Weick, 1979). Furthermore, formalization 
of tasks limits reciprocal knowledge interactions between managers and hinders 
managers to acquire knowledge which is unrelated to the tasks to be conducted 
(Jansen et al., 2005; Lim & Benbasat, 2000). Consequently, as both bottom-up and 
horizontal knowledge inflows are often initiated by the knowledge recipient (Aoki, 
1986; Van Den Bosch & Van Wijk, 1999), typically come about through dense 
personal reciprocal interactions, (Burgelman, 1983b; Subramanian & Youndt, 
2005), and are distant, unrelated, or new to the recipient’s existing knowledge base 
(Brady & Davies, 2004; Winter & Szulanski, 2001), we argue that formalization of 
tasks inhibits a manager to acquire bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows. 
Instead, formalization of tasks supports the acquisition of related, unambiguous 
knowledge for which the cause and effect relationships are known to allow 
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managers to respond to problems in known ways (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Galunic & 
Rodan, 1998). As top-down inflows of knowledge are typically of narrow scope 
and related to the recipient’s field of expertise (Winter & Szulanski, 2001), as their 
relevance, i.e. the cause-effect relationships, is normally known (Schulz, 2003), 
and as they usually are uni-directional, and often initiated by the knowledge donor 
(Aoki, 1986; Van Den Bosch & Van Wijk, 1999), we argue that formalization of 
tasks positively relate to a manager’s top-down knowledge inflows.  
 
Hypothesis 11a: Formalization of a manager’s tasks is positively related to this 
manager’s top-down knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 11b: Formalization of a manager’s tasks is negatively related to this 
manager’s bottom-up knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 11c: Formalization of a manager’s tasks is negatively related to this 
manager’s horizontal knowledge inflows 
 
The second organizational factor as a common feature of systems 
capabilities as investigated in this study is the use of IT-systems by a manager to 
conduct tasks. In this case, we do not mean to investigate the use of IT by a 
manager as a communication device, as, for instance, is the case when using email 
or discussion boards on the company’s intranet. We rather investigate the use of 
IT-systems by a manager to conduct routine tasks, i.e. tasks with low variability 
and complexity, high predictability and uniformity, and well known cause-effect 
relationships. Examples of these tasks include making internal reports, making 
presentations or offers for customers or internal use, or tasks related to HRM. The 
use of IT-systems to conduct such routine tasks aims at increasing speed, 
reliability, and uniformity, and at lowering costs associated with these tasks 
(Devaraj & Kohli, 2002; Garrity & Sanders, 1998). Moreover, as indicated by 
managers from the companies’ IT-departments during interviews, a main reason to 
implement IT-systems for conducting tasks is to reduce the need for managers to 
search for knowledge, as the IT-system should provide the manager with all 
knowledge needed. As a manager of the Central & Support unit at Deloitte 
expressed ‘I would call them [the IT-systems] successful if people stop making 
calls to each other, if they don’t visit each other any more, if the systems provide 
them, in a personalized and specialized way, with all knowledge they need.’ 
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Accordingly, we expect the use of IT-systems by a manager to conduct tasks to be 
negatively related to a manager’s knowledge inflows, except for top-down 
knowledge inflows as the knowledge provided by these systems, or changes 
regarding the content of the systems, typically comes from departments at higher 
hierarchical levels.  
 
Hypothesis 12a: Use of IT-systems by a manager to conduct tasks is positively 
related to this manager’s top-down knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 12b: Use of IT-systems by a manager to conduct tasks is negatively 
related to this manager’s bottom-up knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 12c: Use of IT-systems by a manager to conduct tasks is negatively 
related to this manager’s horizontal knowledge inflows 
 
Organizational Factors as Common Features of Socialization Capabilities 
Connectedness refers to the frequency of contacts a manager has with 
other organization members within and across organization units, and the density 
of this network of contacts (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). Connectedness positively 
affects the exchange of knowledge among network members, regardless of 
position (Jansen et al., 2005b; Jaworski & Kohli, 1993) as an increase in 
connectedness is associated with an increase in knowledge acquisition 
opportunities (Subramaniam & Youndt, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) and an 
increase in the understanding of cause-effect relationships pertaining to the 
knowledge embedded in the network (Coleman, 1988; Rowley et al., 2000). It is 
recognized that a dense network, as it is likely to be closed off from the outside, 
makes it hard for new knowledge to penetrate the network (Uzzi, 1997). However, 
it facilitates the circulation of knowledge which resides in the network, as a reason 
for managers for being connected is to gain access to the others’ knowledge 
(Hansen et al., 2001). As a manager’s network of contacts may contain 
organization members from various positions and places in the organization 
(Sumbramaniam & Youndt, 2005; Van Wijk, 2003), i.e. peer members, 
subordinates, and/ or superiors, we expect connectedness to positively affect a 
manager’s top-down, bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows. 
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Hypothesis 13a: A manager’s connectedness to other organization members is 
positively related to this manager’s top-down knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 13b: A manager’s connectedness to other organization members is 
positively related to this manager’s bottom-up knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 13c: A manager’s connectedness to other organization members is 
positively related to this manager’s horizontal knowledge inflows 
 
Tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors reflects the 
extent to which a manager’s contacts allow a manager to have and/or express new 
ideas, different opinions, and deviant behavior, norms or values (Camerer & 
Vepsalainen, 1988; Volberda, 1998). It increases openness to new opinions and 
diversity (Camerer & Vepsalainen, 1988) and it increases managers’ capacity for 
boundary spanning knowledge acquisition (Dollinger, 1984). Consequently, we 
expect tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors to be 
positively related to a manager’s bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows, as 
these knowledge inflows typically deviate from, are less related or more distant to 
the recipient’s knowledge base, and posses more ambiguity because of more 
uncertainty regarding the cause-effect relations. On the contrary, intolerance for 
ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors causes managers to focus on the 
acquisition of unambiguous knowledge which is already related to their existing 
knowledge base (Dollinger, 1984). Consequently, we expect tolerance for 
ambiguity of a manager’s contacts to be negatively related to a manager’s top-
down knowledge inflows as these knowledge inflows are typically closely related 
to the recipient’s areas of expertise (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; Winter & 
Szulanski, 2001) and tend to be rather unambiguous; i.e. they possess a clear and 
proven understanding of cause-effect relationships (Egelhoff, 1991). 
 
Hypothesis 14a: Tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors is 
negatively related to this manager’s top-down knowledge inflows 
 
Hypothesis 14b: Tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors is 
positively related to this manager’s bottom-up knowledge inflows 
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Hypothesis 14c: Tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors is 
positively related to this manager’s horizontal knowledge inflows 
 
 
3.4 – The Impact of Knowledge Inflows on Manager’s Exploration and 
Exploitation Activities 
 
Top-down Knowledge Inflows 
Top-down knowledge inflows of a manager proceed along the hierarchy 
and are associated with knowledge coming from persons and units at higher 
hierarchical levels than the manager. Within large multi-unit firms, top-down 
flows of knowledge are typically confined to the vertical chains of organizational 
units specialized in functional, technological, geographic, or product-market 
related areas of expertise (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; Hedlund, 1994). This 
implies that the scope of top-down inflows of knowledge is likely to be narrow 
(Winter & Szulanski, 2001), i.e. closely related and even restricted to the 
recipient’s specialized areas of expertise. Consequently, top-down inflows of 
knowledge increase the depth of the recipient manager’s existing knowledge base 
rather than the broadness; they enable the recipient to increase, refine, or improve 
his or her expertise in a limited or specialized area (Cf. Katila & Ahuja, 2002). 
Moreover, top-down inflows of knowledge tend to be rather unambiguous; 
i.e. they possess a clear and proven understanding of cause-effect relationships 
(Egelhoff, 1991), and their relevance with respect to improving the recipient’s 
current activities is normally well-known (Schulz, 2003). Consequently, top-down 
knowledge inflows allow the recipient manager to respond to problems in familiar 
ways, and to increase the manager’s ability to effectively and efficiently perform 
existing activities (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Galunic & Rodan, 1998); i.e. they allow 
the recipient manager to increase reliability, rather than variety, in experience. 
The arguments above indicate that top-down knowledge inflows of a 
manager, being rather narrow and unambiguous (Egelhoff, 1991; Schulz, 2003; 
Winter & Szulanski, 2001), positively relate to the manager’s exploitation 
activities, but are unlikely to relate to the manager’s exploration activities. 
However, senior management can influence middle and front-line managers’ 
exploration activities by other means then by top-down knowledge inflows. Senior 
management, for example, may trigger exploration within a firm by changing the 
characteristics of the organizational structure such as increasing other managers’ 
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participation in decision making or decreasing managers’ formalization of tasks 
(e.g. Duncan, 1976; McGrath, 2001; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), or by 
implementing cross-functional interfaces (Egelhoff, 1991; Galbraith, 1973). Other 
studies argue that the CEO can trigger managers’ exploration activities, for 
instance, by fostering a culture which allows for deviant behavior and differing 
opinions and ideas (Volberda, 1998), or by challenging the strategic status quo of 
the firm (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993; O’Reilly & Tushman 2004). 
 Although the literature indicates that higher level managers may exert an 
influence on other managers’ exploration activities by other means than top-down 
knowledge inflows, we argue that knowledge which comes from higher 
hierarchical levels does not relate to the recipient manager’s exploration activities, 
but rather will be positively related to this manager’s exploitation activities, 
suggesting the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 15: Top-down knowledge inflows of a manager will be 
positively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploitation activities. 
 
Bottom-up Knowledge Inflows 
Bottom-up knowledge inflows of a manager are associated with 
knowledge coming from persons and units at lower hierarchical levels than the 
manager. Contrary to bottom-up knowledge inflows of a manager, bottom-up 
inflows of data are rather unambiguous and provide the recipient manager in 
standardized and formalized ways with data about, for instance, the current 
performance of the organization; motivating the recipient manager to engage in 
exploitation activities (Brady & Davies, 2004; Sanchez & Heene, 1996). Bottom-
up inflows of knowledge, however, do not follow these standardized and 
formalized paths in an organization, rather they come about in ad hoc, random, 
unpredictable, and reciprocal interactions between the knowledge donor and 
knowledge recipient (Burgelman, 1983b) and typically demand qualitative rather 
than quantitative changes of existing activities (Sanchez & Heene, 1996). 
Consequently, bottom-up knowledge inflows of a manager do not relate to this 
manager’s reliability in experience or to the depth of this manager’s existing 
knowledge base; they are unlikely to impact upon the extent to which this manager 
engages in exploitation activities. 
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Regarding exploration, bottom-up knowledge inflows of a manager are 
likely to increase variety in experience; previous conceptual and case studies in the 
field of strategy research illustrate that front-line managers are directly confronted 
with new technological developments, unexpected problems, and changing market 
conditions and customer demands (Branzei et al., 2004; Burgelman, 1983b; 
Sheremata, 2000; Van de Ven 1980) and that bottom-up inflows of knowledge 
provide higher level managers with an increased understanding of changes 
regarding existing technologies, products, processes, and markets and with 
increased understanding of new or emerging technologies, markets, customer 
needs, or internal initiatives (Brady & Davies, 2004; Branzei et al., 2004; 
Burgelman, 1983b; Floyd & Lane, 2000). Consequently, a manager’s bottom-up 
knowledge inflows may be a major source of exploratory learning by adding new 
knowledge to the recipient’s existing knowledge base (Brady & Davies, 2004); 
bottom-up knowledge inflows may trigger knowledge recipient managers to revise 
current beliefs, to search for, develop, and experiment with various novel solutions 
to emerging problems, and to redefine strategic decisions (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
1993; Burgelman, 1983b; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Kimberly, 1979; Quinn, 1985). 
The arguments above suggest that bottom-up knowledge inflows of a 
manager do not relate to this manager’s exploitation activities, but rather 
positively influence this manager’s exploration activities, suggesting the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 16: Bottom-up knowledge inflows of a manager will be 
positively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploration activities. 
 
Horizontal Knowledge Inflows 
Horizontal knowledge inflows of a manager are associated with 
knowledge coming from peer managers in the same organizational unit, or coming 
from other units at the same hierarchical level. Acquiring horizontal knowledge is 
enabled by rich and dense personal reciprocal interactions (Galbraith, 1973; 
Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005; Tsai, 2001). Through such reciprocal personal 
interactions, managers typically acquire knowledge from other parts of the 
organization which is rather ambiguous, complex and tacit (Egelhoff, 1991; Daft 
& Lengel, 1986). Acquiring this knowledge is less effective for dealing with or 
improving analyzable and rather unequivocal tasks and associated problems 
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(Egelhoff, 1991; Daft & Lengel, 1986). Hence, horizontal knowledge inflows are 
unlikely to influence reliability in managers’ experience; they do not relate to a 
manager’s exploitation activities. 
However, the personal and reciprocal interactions by which a manager 
acquires horizontal knowledge, contribute to this manager’s ability to interpret 
ambiguous and complex issues and to build understanding about new acquired 
knowledge (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Jansen et al., 2005), enabling the manager to 
increase variety in experience (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Van Den Bosch & Van 
Wijk, 1999). Consequently, by stimulating cross-fertilization or (re-)combinations 
of different kinds of knowledge, horizontal inflows of knowledge have been found 
to enhance innovation and the creation of new knowledge at the recipient level 
(e.g. Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Moreover, 
horizontal knowledge inflows cross functional, disciplinary, and technological 
areas (Grant, 1996; Hedlund, 1994; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Thompson, 1967). 
Consequently, their scope is likely to be broad (Winter & Szulanski, 2001); they 
are distant or unrelated to the recipient’s existing knowledge base, increasing the 
broadness, rather than the depth, of the manager’s existing knowledge base. 
As the arguments above indicate that horizontal knowledge inflows of a 
manager are unlikely to relate to this manager’s reliability in experience or to the 
depth of this manager’s knowledge base, we argue that horizontal knowledge 
inflows are not related to a manager’s exploitation activities. However, as 
horizontal knowledge inflows increase the broadness of the manager’s knowledge 
base and variety in experience, we argue that these knowledge inflows positively 
relate to the manager’s exploration activities. 
 
Hypothesis 17: Horizontal knowledge inflows of a manager will be 
positively related to the extent to which this manager engages in 
exploration activities. 
 
  
3.5 – Conclusion 
 
Drawing on preceding literatures, this chapter developed hypotheses on the direct 
impact of organizational factors on managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities (see table 3.1 for an overview). To investigate the mediating role of 
knowledge inflows, hypotheses were developed on the impact of the 
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organizational factors on managers’ knowledge inflows (see table 3.2 for an 
overview), and on the impact of managers’ knowledge inflows on their exploration 
and exploitation activities (see table 3.3 for an overview). 
 
Table 3.1 – Overview of Hypothesized Direct Impact† of Organizational Factors on 
Managers’ Exploration & Exploitation Activities 
 Dependent variables: Managers’ 
Independent variables 
exploration 
activities 
exploitation 
activities 
Org. factors as common features of coordination caps.   
• Manager’s participation in decision making H1a: + H1b: – 
• Manager’s participation in cross-functional interfaces H2a: + H2b: – 
• Manager’s rewards based on overall firm performance  H3a: + H3b: – 
   
Org. factors as common features of systems caps.   
• Formalization of manager’s tasks H4a: – H4b: + 
• Manager’s use of IT-systems to conduct tasks H5a: – H5b: + 
   
Org. factors as common features of socialization caps.   
• Manager’s connectedness to other org. members H6a: – H6b: + 
• Tolerance for ambiguity of mgr.’s peers and/or superiors H7a: + H7b: – 
†+ = positive impact; – = negative impact 
 
Table 3.2 – Overview of Hypothesized Impact† of Organizational Factors on Managers’ 
Knowledge Inflows 
Dependent variables: manager’s knowledge inflows 
Independent variables 
Top-
down 
Bottom-
up 
Horizon
tal 
Org. factors as common features of coordination caps.    
• Manager’s participation in decision making H8a – H8b + H8c + 
• Manager’s participation in cross-functional interfaces H9a + H9b + H9c + 
• Manager’s rewards based on overall firm performance H10a + H10b + H10c + 
    
Org. factors as common features of systems caps.    
• Formalization of manager’s tasks H11a + H11b – H11c – 
• Manager’s use of IT-systems to conduct tasks H12a + H12b – H12c – 
    
Org. factors as common features of socialization caps.    
• Manager’s connectedness to other org. members H13a + H13b + H13c + 
• Tolerance for ambiguity of mgr.’s peers and/or superiors H14a – H14b + H14c + 
†+ = positive impact; – = negative impact 
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Table 3.3 – Overview of Hypothesized Impact† of Managers’ Knowledge Inflows on 
Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation activities  
 Dependent  variables: Managers’ 
Predictor variables 
exploration 
activities 
exploitation 
activities 
Manager’s top-down knowledge inflows  H15: + 
Manager’s bottom-up knowledge inflows H16: +  
Manager’s horizontal knowledge inflows H17: +  
†+ = positive impact 
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CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODS 
 
 
4.1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter describes important aspects of the study’s research methodology. 
Section four of chapter one, ‘Research Design’, already illustrated how this 
research is designed and why; clarifying how the research approach, the research 
purpose and questions, the empirical setting, methods employed, and research 
activities conducted, make up the parts of an integrated whole (cf. Arbnor & 
Bjerke, 1997; Creswell, 2003). Section 4.2 of this chapter clarifies the congruence 
between the level of theory, level of measurement, and level of analysis in this 
study. The next section gives a description of and justification for the research 
setting, describing the companies at which the empirical research took place, their 
industries, and managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. The next section 
describes the samples and elaborates on the sampling and data collection 
procedures. Finally, section 4.5 provides an overview of the sources and 
development of the survey’s multiple-item scales which are used to measure the 
study’s constructs, as well as an assessment of their reliability and validity. 
Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.   
 
 
4.2 – Methodological Consequences of Focusing at the Manager Level 
 
To gain valid and reliable answers to the study’s research question, it matters to 
make sure that the level of theory, the level of measurement, and the level of 
analysis are congruent. The level of theory describes the target that a researcher 
aims to depict and explain (Klein et al., 1994: 199); in this study exploration and 
exploitation activities of managers of large knowledge-intense multi-unit firms in 
dynamic environments. It is the level to which generalizations are made. Focusing 
at the manager level would have the following consequences for the research 
approach; first that the level of measurement, i.e. the actual source of the data; the 
unit to which data are directly attached (Klein et al., 1994: 209), and the level of 
analysis, i.e. the treatment of the data during statistical analyses (Klein et al., 1994: 
212), be also geared to the manager level of analysis. Accordingly, the survey’s 
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measures, data collection and analysis, and theoretical and practitioners’ 
implications of this study will all pertain to the manager level. Second, variation 
should exist in the dependent constructs at the manager level (Klein et al., 1994: 
200). In other words, in order to justify examining exploration and exploitation at 
the manager level within a small number of firms, as this study does, managers 
within the same firm should sufficiently differ in the extent to which they engage 
in exploration and/or exploitation activities. Several studies examined in chapter 
two argue that managers, within the same firm, may differ in the extent to which 
they engage in exploration and/or exploitation activities; not only across 
hierarchical levels, functions, and units (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Duncan, 1976; 
Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), but also within a 
hierarchical level, function, or unit (Burgelman, 1983a; b; De Leede et al., 2002; 
Floyd & Lane, 2000; Gibson & Birkinshaw; 2004; Leana & Barry, 2000). 
Accordingly, we surveyed managers of all levels, functions, and units of the three 
firms. Third, examining the dependent variables at the manager level argues for 
examining the predictor variables at the manager level as well (Klein et al., 1994: 
201). Moreover, variation should exist in the predictor variables at the manager 
level. Studies on social capital and strategic management, for instance, indicate 
that managers of the same firm may differ with respect to the extent to which they 
receive or gather knowledge and with respect to the directionality of knowledge 
inflows (i.e. top-down, bottom-up and/or horizontal) (e.g. Burgelman, 1983a; b; 
Floyd & Lane, 2000; Hansen et al., 2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Subramanian & Youndt, 2005). Studies on organization design indicate that with 
one and the same firm, different levels of managers’ participation in decision 
making, participation in cross functional teams, different reward systems, different 
levels of formalization, use of IT-systems, connectedness, and tolerance for 
ambiguity may exist (e.g. Adler et al., 1999; McDonough & Leifer, 1983; 
Volberda, 1998). 
 
 
4.3 – Research Setting 
 
The empirical research of this study has been conducted within three large multi-
unit companies operating in the financial services sector (Rabobank), electronics 
industry (Philips), and the accountancy and financial advisory sector (Deloitte). In 
each company, data has been gathered by means of in-depth interviews, company 
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documents, and a survey. The same survey has been conducted in each company. 
Regarding the selection logic; the goal of this study compels us to ensure that 
enough variation exists in our empirical data with respect to managers’ exploration 
and exploitation activities. Therefore, we decided to examine managers whose 
firms are confronted with pressures to explore and with pressures to exploit. The 
literature indicates that several challenges within all three firms’ industries make 
them an interesting context to investigate managers’ abilities to conduct 
exploration and exploitation activities. Changes regarding technologies, 
competition, regulation, and customer demands, force managers of firms in these 
industries to conduct exploration activities (Banker et al., 2005; Flier et al., 2001; 
Greenwood et al., 2005; Henisz & Macher, 2004; Sarvary, 1999). At the same 
time, an increased pressure to focus on efficiency and cutting costs, increasing 
importance of economies of scale, and short-term competitive pressures, force 
managers of firms in these industries to conduct exploitation activities (Banker et 
al., 2005; Flier et al., 2001; Greenwood et al., 2005; Henisz & Macher, 2004; 
Sarvary, 1999). Furthermore, regarding the selection logic, the knowledge 
literature indicates the value of examining firms whose members posses high 
levels of specialized knowledge (Grant, 1996) when investigating the role of 
knowledge flows within a firm with respect to managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. Technology firms like Philips are often used examples of 
such firms (cf. Smith et al., 2005). Furthermore, the greater part of empirical 
studies on exploration and exploitation, take technology firms as an empirical 
setting (see Appendix A). Therefore, to increase variety in our empirical dataset, 
we decided to do empirical research within service firms as well. The professional 
advisory sector in which Deloitte is active, and the financial services sector in 
which Rabobank is active, are cited examples of industries of which the firms’ 
members posses high levels of specialized knowledge (Lievens & Moenaert, 2000; 
Van Den Bosch et al., 2005). 
The three sections below each give more insight into the research setting 
at, successively, Rabobank, Philips, and Deloitte. Each section describes 
developments in the industry which challenge managers of firms in these 
industries to increasingly conduct exploration and exploitation activities. Insight is 
also given into the companies’ history, important current developments, figures, 
and the companies’ structure. Finally, we briefly delve into these firms’ managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities. A more elaborate description of the 
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managers of these companies is given at the ‘sample and data collection’ section; 
section 4.4 of this chapter. 
 
4.3.1 – Rabobank 
 
Industry 
The first company at which the empirical research of this study has been 
conducted is a European financial services company; the Rabobank Group. The 
research took place at five local banks of the Group. Several developments within 
the European financial services industry, most notably those pertaining to 
regulations, technologies, globalization, and customer demands (Flier et al., 2001; 
2003; Taylor, 1999), confront managers of firms in this industry with the 
challenge to increasingly focus upon exploration and exploitation activities. Since 
the mid-1980s the European financial services industry has witnessed a gradual 
process of deregulation, privatization, and harmonization (Flier et al., 2001; 
Taylor, 1999). By the elimination of restrictions on the entry of new domestic 
firms and restrictions on mergers and acquisitions, domestic and cross-border 
competition increases. A process of increasing scale and scope of financial 
services provided by firms has been started after relaxation of limits on combining 
banking, insurance and security activities within a single firm. These 
consequences of regulatory changes increase pressures for financial firms to 
consolidate, increase economies of scale, control costs, explore new markets, 
develop new hybrid products, and strategically renew themselves (Flier et al., 
2001; Taylor, 1999).   
Technological developments force financial firms to embrace new 
information and communication technologies and electronic commerce (Hensmans 
et al., 2001). These technological developments, enabling remote banking, i.e. 
managing one’s account without physically going to a bank office (Flier et al., 
2001: 188), change the interface between clients and financial services providers. 
They also enable non-financial players, such as telecommunication and retail 
companies, to enter the market (Hensmans, et al., 2001), forcing managers to 
develop new business models for both competing and cooperating with new 
players. Financial services firms invest heavily in information and communication 
technologies, not only to change the interface with customers, but also to renew or 
refine internal information and communication systems and processes. IT has for 
instance increased the transactions per employees (Vermeulen, 2001). 
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Changing customer preferences, such as the increasing appreciation of 
remote banking and a movement towards electronic payment devices undermine 
the importance of conventional brick-and-mortal outlets, stimulating financial 
firms to reduce costs and apply new technological developments, (Hensmans, 
2001; Smits & Groeneveld, 2001; LRP). Growing popularity of new financial 
products such as hybrid products, increase the importance of combining banking 
and insurance activities. 
Finally, there is an ongoing trend of globalization in the financial services 
industry. Growing global interdependence of regional financial services, and 
cross-border trade (Flier et al., 2001; Taylor, 1999), trigger major global financial 
players to geographically extent their activities within and across continents. 
Moreover, increased competition, the need to achieve economies of scale and 
scope, and pressure to focus on performance and cut costs, drive mergers and 
acquisitions within and across borders (Taylor, 1999).  
 
Rabobank Group: Short Historical Overview1 
The foundation for the current Rabobank Group has been laid in 1898 in 
the Netherlands with the establishment of two cooperatives; southern agricultural 
credit cooperatives merged into the Boerenleenbank and northern agricultural 
credit cooperatives into the Raiffeisenbank. The two cooperatives founded a 
common central organization which served to support the local banks and fostered 
the foundation of new local bank members. In 1970, the two cooperatives had 
about 1,200 members. The local banks were autonomous and had own 
responsibility for their actions. In 1972 the cooperative Boerenleenbank and 
Raiffeisenbank merged into Rabobank. A main reason for this merger was the 
increasing importance of economies of scale as in the 60s and 70s several other 
firms in the Dutch banking sector had merged. Another trigger for the merger was 
the need to offer a wider range of products to customers; more non-agricultural 
customers entered the customer base, as well as small and medium sized firms. 
The next two decades are characterized by further growth –also through 
acquisitions–, diversification, and a start is made with internationalization. In the 
last decade of the 20th century, the strategy to become an integrated financial 
services provider translates itself, for instance, into the acquisition of the insurer 
Interpolis in 1990 and the investment banker Robeco, in 1997. To provide 
                                                 
1 Based on Sluyterman et al. (1998) and Van Wijk (2003) 
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international clients with products, Rabobank enters into alliances with other 
European financial cooperatives such as, for instance, Credit Agricole in 1990.  
 
Rabobank Group and its Local Banks: Figures, Structure, and Recent 
Developments 
In 2004, the Rabobank Group comprised 288 independent local 
cooperative banks. Together, they own the supra-local organization, Rabobank 
Nederland, which is responsible for managing the Group’s interest. The local 
banks enable the group to function as an all-financial services provider together 
with the specialized business of the group which engage in asset management, 
insurance, leasing, private banking, venture capital, and corporate and investment 
banking (Smits & Groeneveld, 2001). The Group employed in 2004 about 56,000 
employees, had total assets of € 475 billion, a total income of € 10 billion, and net 
profits of € 1.5 billion. It ranks among the top 30 on the Fortune Global 500 in 
terms of revenues in the banking industry. About 20% of the incomes are 
generated from activities in other countries than the Netherlands. Total assets 
increased last decade with a factor of about 3.5, revenues and net profits increased 
with a factor of approximately 2.5, the number of employees increased with a 
factor 1.5 (see also figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1 – Rabobank: Total Assets, Revenues, Net Profits, and Number of Local Banks 
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Source: Rabobank, Annual Reports 1995-2004 
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One of the strategic ambitions of the Rabobank Group is being the Dutch 
Allfinanz market leader (annual reports 2003-2005). The group partly aims at 
realizing this ambition through acquisitions. In 2005, for instance, the merger of 
the Group’s insurance subsidiary with the insurance company Achmea, resulted in 
the largest Dutch insurance company. Another way of realizing the ambition to 
become the leading Dutch Allfinanz company is by increasing both the scale and 
scope of financial products and services offered by the local banks. Therefore, 
since over a decade, the number of independent local banks has decreased from 
547 in 1995 to 288 in 2004 due to local banks merging with each other (see also 
figure 4.1). The larger local banks are assumed to have an increased ability to offer 
complex financial products, to better serve large local firms, and to profit from 
economies of scale. Rabobank furthermore tries to increase market share by 
exploring new distribution channels such as the internet and by increasing the 
number of small branches which customers may visit for standard products. 
Another strategic ambition of Rabobank is becoming the world leading financial 
player in the food & agri business by acquiring financial institutions which focus 
on the agricultural sector (annual report 2004). 
The Rabobank Group is owned by local banks which each provide 
financial services and products to distinct geographical areas of the Dutch retail 
and business markets. Each bank has an own board of directors and autonomy 
with respect to operational and strategic decisions, i.e. with respect to products and 
services offered, the allocation of their resources, the markets they wish to serve, 
and processes and systems they employ. The local banks have a cooperative 
structure as well; their local customers may become ‘member’ of the bank. These 
members influence the banks’ policy, especially about the provision of services, 
customer relations, and social activities through various panels and committees 
which act as a sounding board for the bank, increasing the Rabobanks local 
orientation and their customer knowledge (Van der Steen, 2004). A typical local 
Rabobank has a business unit which focuses on the business market and a business 
unit which focuses on the private, or retail, market. Each business unit is 
comprised of several organizational units, focusing either on distinct market 
segments within business and retail and/ or on distinct products and services such 
as mortgages, savings, loans, insurance, leasing, asset management, investments 
banking, and private and business accounts. Each local bank also has 
organizational units focusing distinct aspects of internal operations such as HRM, 
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risk management, marketing and communication, and ICT. Each organizational 
unit has its own management team and responsibility for its own activities. 
  
Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities 
The managers of the local Rabobanks are confronted with the same 
developments which characterize the financial services industry as a whole; i.e. 
challenges with respect to regulation, technology, and customer preferences. 
Moreover, each current bank has recently been, is, or will be soon, in the process 
of a merger with one or more other local banks. Interviews with managers of 
several local banks revealed that these developments challenge managers to 
conduct exploration activities; i.e. to increase variety in experience and to broaden 
their knowledge base. Managers, for instance, engage in activities related to 
developing new products or product combinations, renewing internal processes 
and systems, learning about new information and communication technologies, 
experimenting with new distribution channels, searching for new opportunities in 
existing or new markets, and discovering changing customer preferences. 
Managers are also challenged to conduct exploitation activities; i.e. to increase 
reliability in experience and to deepen their knowledge base. For instance, they 
increasingly have to improve, refine, and specialize their knowledge and 
experience in specific limited areas of expertise because of increasing economies 
of scale and because of an increased competition among managers caused by the 
ongoing merger between banks. Other exploitation activities include activities 
related to fine tuning processes, procedures, and tasks throughout the newly 
merged bank, increasing efficiency through standardization of simple products, 
services and tasks in more stable markets, and consolidating, extending, and/ or 
divesting existing activities.  
 
4.3.2 – Philips 
 
Industry 
The second company at which the empirical research of this study has 
been conducted is an international electronics firm; Philips. Julien de Jong assisted 
us in collecting the data. Research in this firm was carried out in one of the three 
divisions of the firm’s semiconductor group. Regarding the selection of this group, 
several challenges in the semiconductor industry confront managers with the 
challenge to increasingly focus upon exploration and exploitation activities 
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(Burgelman, 2002; Nonaka, 1994; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). The 
semiconductor industry, as we know it today, traces its origins to the inventions of 
the point-contact and the junction transistor by Bell Labs in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s (Holbrook et al., 2000). The Philips semiconductor group has a track 
record that spans 50 years, making it one of the long-term players in the industry. 
There are a few general, interrelated, characteristics which shaped this industry, 
from its origins to today, such as an ongoing trend of miniaturization, fierce 
competition on low costs and first-to-market, rapid technological progress, 
manufacturing complexity, and globalization (Henisz & Macher, 2004; Holbrook 
et al., 2000; Methe, 1992). The performance of semiconductor firms is to an 
important extent determined by their ability to lead, or keep up with, the pace of 
miniaturization in the industry (Iansiti & West, 1999; Methe, 1992), i.e. the 
increasing number of semiconductor components placed onto a given area of chip. 
The advantages of miniaturization come in the form of lower costs, resulting from 
smaller transistor and chip size, and improvements of product functionality, 
resulting from the device components being placed closer together which 
consequently increases the speed with which the components can perform their 
functions (Iansiti & West, 1999; Methe, 1992). To gain these advantages, 
semiconductor firm R&D projects not only focus on the generation of novel 
technologies, but also on the rapid introduction of new manufacturing process 
generations to implement technological innovations timely into effective products 
(Iantisi, 2000). Speed to market indeed is important as the industry’s product 
generations are characterized by price declines of 25%-30% per year and 
shortening product life cycles (Henisz & Macher, 2004). Besides the great weight 
semiconductor firms place on R&D, manufacturing capabilities matter as well. 
One of the factors driving a semiconductor firm’s success is the quality of chips it 
produces (Langlois & Steinmueller, 2000) which is expressed in defect rates, i.e. 
the fraction of chips that proves to be defective. These industry characteristics as 
described above illustrate that success in the industry is largely determined by low 
costs, operational excellence, radical and incremental technological innovations, 
and speed to market. 
A recent trend in the industry is the increasing demand for 
interconnectedness among a broad range of diverse semiconductor devices. 
Changes is the market demand, for instance, multiple functions per products such 
as a cell phone containing a camera and fm radio, or a television including an 
internet browser. The change from a preference of stand-alone products to wireless 
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interconnected products also increasingly demands interconnectedness between 
diverse semiconductor devices. This trend increasingly forces semiconductor firms 
to collaborate with each other and with diverse content and software providers 
through, for instance, alliances, joint ventures, or mergers (Philips annual report, 
2004).   
 
Philips: Short Historical Overview2 
The foundations for the Royal Philips Electronics Company, Philips for 
short, were laid in Eindhoven, the Netherlands, by Frederik Philips and his son 
Gerard, in 1891. It started by making carbon-filament lamps and soon became one 
of the largest producers in Europe. In 1918, it introduced a medical X-ray tube, 
which marked the beginning of an internationalization and diversification 
processes driven by innovative research and development. In the 1920s it started 
developing and producing radios and televisions. After WOII, Philips Research 
invented the rotary heads that led to the development of the Philishave electric 
shaver. Moreover, it contributed to the development of the recording, transmission 
and reproduction of television pictures. In 1963, it introduced the Compact Audio 
Cassette. In 1965, it produced its first integrated circuits. In the 1970s, research in 
lighting contributed to the new PL and SL energy-saving lamps, while Philips 
Research made breakthroughs in the processing, storage and transmission of 
images, sound and data. These led to the inventions of the LaserVision optical 
disc, the Compact Disc (launched in 1983) and optical telecommunication 
systems. In 1997, in cooperation with several other companies, by building on its 
Compact Disc technology, Philips invented and jointly introduced with Sony the 
DVD. The 1990s was a decade of significant change for Philips. The company 
carried out a major restructuring program to return it to a healthy footing, 
simplifying its structure and reducing the number of business areas. Moving into 
the 21st century, Philips has continued to change; it has dedicated itself to 
projecting a new and more representative image that reflects the products it offers 
in the areas of Healthcare, Lifestyle and Technology. By following this up in 2004 
with a massive advertising campaign to unveil its new brand promise of 'Sense and 
Simplicity', the company aims at confirming its dedication to offering consumers 
around the world products that are advanced, easy to use and, above all, designed 
to meet their needs. 
                                                 
2 Based on Philips Company Manual, 2004; and Metze (1991) 
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Today, Philips is an international company with five product groups; 
medical systems, domestic appliances & personal care, semiconductors, consumer 
electronics, and lightning. It had sales of slightly over € 30 billion in 2004, and 
employs over 161 thousand employees, which makes that it ranks within the top 
10 in the electronics industry on the Fortune Global 500 (2005) in terms of 
revenue. Whereas sales yearly decreased in the 2000 – 2003 period with on 
average 8 % due to divestitures and losses in market share, and net losses were 
made in 2001 and 2002, sales increased in 2004 with 4%, and a net profit was 
made of  € 2.8 billion. 
 
Philips Semiconductors: Figures, Structure, and Recent Developments 
The empirical research took place in the international multi-market 
semiconductor division of Philips’ semiconductor group. The choice for this 
division was made because it serves multiple markets with different degrees of 
dynamism and competitiveness, which increases the probability of observing 
managers with a broad variety in terms of exploration and/ or exploitation 
activities they engage in (Cheng & Van De Ven, 1996; Garcia et al., 2003; Luo, 
2002). The other two group’s divisions each serve a single market. In the period 
2000 – 2003, yearly sales of the semiconductor group were about 5.0 billion, but 
decreased each year with about 1%. In the same period the group suffered negative 
profit results. In 2004 sales increased to € 5.5 billion and the group made a profit 
of € 450 million. Figure 4.2 shows group level figures. 
The selected division employs over 7,000 employees and has R&D and 
production facilities in the Americas, Asia, and Europe. With sales of € 1.2 billion 
in 2004, profits of € 180 million, and a market share of about 4,2%, the division 
ranked in 2004 worldwide 5th in terms of sales (annual report 2004, Royal Philips 
Electronics). The division is active in the entire semiconductor industry, most 
notably the automotive, communications, computing, and consumer electronics 
markets. Each market is served by a range of product types; i.e. power 
management products, interface products, standard ICs, and general application 
discretes. The division is a conglomerate of five business units which focus on 
specific market segments, customers and/ or technologies, supported by a 
headquarters and a production support unit. For three business units, research, 
development, and design are particular critical key success factors as they focus on 
systems, applications, and niche products (internal company document ‘sustaining 
profitable growth’, 2004). These are the ‘automotive’ business unit which 
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develops in-vehicle network applications, the ‘interface products’ business unit, 
which offers customer specific interface solutions, and the ‘power management’ 
business unit, which has a variety of MOS and bipolar power discrete devices and 
power management ICs. For the other two business units, low costs are a particular 
critical success factor (internal company document ‘sustaining profitable growth’, 
2004). These are the ‘general applications’ business unit, which delivers 
transistors and diodes for several markets, and the ‘standard ICs’ business unit, 
which delivers microcontrollers and general purpose logic solutions. The five 
business units are supported by the ‘production support unit’, which has four 
plants for high-volume manufacturing, and packaging, and test platforms. The 
headquarters holds final responsibility for the division towards the semiconductor 
group and steers the business units with respect to strategy formulation and 
resource allocation. 
 
Figure 4.2 – Philips Semiconductor Group: Net Operating Capital, Revenues, and 
Operating Income (million euro) 
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Currently, Philips investigates options for its semiconductor group, such 
as divestment or close collaboration with other semiconductor companies. A 
reason for this are disappointing financial results, which mainly result, according 
to financial annalists (het Financieele Dagblad, December 16th, 2005) from lack of 
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economies of scale. Another reason for divestment is that the semiconductor group 
makes Philips’ stock prices to fluctuate too much according to Philips due to its 
fluctuating market. As other semiconductor companies continue to merge, Philips’ 
semiconductor group has lost in 2005 a position in the world’s top 10 
semiconductor companies in terms of sales. 
 
Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities 
The managers of the Philips multi-market semiconductor division are 
confronted with the same developments which characterize the industry as a whole 
as described above. This makes managers to focus on exploration activities; i.e. to 
increase variety in experience and to broaden their knowledge base. Managers 
engage, for instance, in activities related to exploring new and emerging markets, 
searching for, discovering, experimenting with, and developing new technologies 
and products, experimenting with new distribution channels, and searching for 
leading customers, content and service providers with whom partnerships can be 
established to extent capabilities in technology, manufacturing and access to 
customers. Managers are also challenged to conduct exploitation activities; i.e. to 
increase reliability in experience and to deepen their knowledge base. For instance, 
they conduct activities related to improving, refining, and standardizing existing  
technologies, products, procedures, and processes, achieving operational 
excellence, increasing economies of scale, aiming at utilizing 100% of the own 
production capacity, and divesting or outsourcing activities. 
 
4.3.3 – Deloitte 
 
Industry 
The third company at which the empirical research of this study has been 
conducted is an international accountancy and (financial) advisory firm; Deloitte. 
Firms in the accountancy and financial advisory industry are generally active in 
providing accounting and auditing services including compilations, special reports, 
and reviews in addition to engagements involving the attest function, tax services 
including tax research, planning, and preparation work, and management advisory 
services including consulting, systems development, integrating and reselling 
computer equipment and software, and any other management assistance. Several 
developments within the accountancy and financial advisory industry, most 
notably those pertaining to changing customer demands, information technology, 
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changing regulation, and increased competition (Banker, et al., 2005; Greenwood 
et al., 2005; Tarca, 2005), confront managers of firms in this industry with the 
challenge to increasingly focus upon exploration and exploitation activities. 
Several transformations characterize the accounting and financial advisory 
industry in the last decade. Global competition, technological change, and 
advances in information technology had a significant impact on the survival and 
growth of accounting and financial advisory firms’ client organizations during the 
last decade. This, in turn, led to considerable growth in the demand for 
management advisory services (Banker et al., 2005). Consequently, the accounting 
and financial advisory firms diversified; next to the traditional, low-margin 
revenue product areas of accounting, auditing, and tax services they also went into 
the high margin revenue product area of management advisory services (Firth, 
1997). These services yield higher returns because they allow for more 
differentiation as compared to the traditional services. The increasing demand for 
services in different areas triggered consolidation in the industry to address the 
“one-stop shopping” needs of the consumers of accounting and financial advisory 
firms. Hence, firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s reduced their reliance on 
traditional accounting, auditing, and tax services and moved into the practice of 
new assurance services and consulting services (Rankin & Sharp 2000). 
Investments in IT, both by clients and accounting and financial advisory 
firms themselves, also changed the industry (Siegel, 1999; Stiroh, 2001; Van Den 
Bosch et al., 2005). Accounting and financial advisory firms started assisting their 
clients in the computerization of their information systems. This also enabled the 
automation of many routine accounting and auditing tasks, changing the traditional 
way of doing business (Stiroh, 2001). 
In 2002, a number of large enterprises, also in the Netherlands, such as 
Ahold and firms in the building sector, were under fire because their accounting 
raised questions. In response to this, new rules and market developments were 
imposing restrictions on the combination of auditing and consultancy. This not 
only made firms in the accounting and financial advisory industry to start 
worrying about maintaining or improving their reputation (Greenwood et al., 
2005; Moore et al., 2006), but also that often firms should make a choice as to 
which form of service can and may be offered to (potential) clients for which new 
restrictions apply. This has led to some accounting and financial advisory firms 
divesting their management advisory services divisions or setting them up as 
independent companies (Banker et al., 2005; Greenwood et al., 2005). 
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Consequently these firms will need to develop new services in the attest and tax 
areas or improve productivity in these traditional services if they do not provide 
management advisory services because of regulatory pressure. This is because the 
profitability of the accounting and financial advisory firms has been sustained in 
recent years largely by the impact that management advisory services have had on 
their profitability (Banker et al., 2005). 
 Finally, increased competition for market share, pressure on prices and a 
deteriorating economy, put pressures on firms in the accounting and financial 
advisory industry to become leaner, more productive, more specialized, and more 
quality and customer oriented than before (Banker et al., 2005; Dopuch et al., 
2003). 
 
Deloitte: Short Historical Overview3 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu belongs together with Ernst & Young, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and KPMG to the largest four accounting and financial 
services companies in the world. Sales increased since 2000 each year with on 
average 13% to $18.2 in 2004/5. The company is active in nearly 150 countries, 
employing 121 thousand people. The origins of today’s Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
trace back to 1845 when William Welch Deloitte opens an accountancy office in 
London. Its history is characterized by mergers, acquisitions, and 
internationalization. The accountancy firm established by George Touche in 1900 
in New York and the accountancy firm established by Nobuzo Tohmatsu in 1952 
in Tokyo merge in 1975. A subsequent merger with Deloitte Haskins & Sells in 
1990 has lead to today’s Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. Since then, the company 
diversifies into management advisory services. It decides in 2003 to remain a 
broad-range financial services company by not divesting its consulting activities, 
despite changing regulation.   
 
Deloitte Nederland: Figures, Structure, and Recent Developments 
The empirical research took place at the Dutch member firm, further 
referred to as ‘Deloitte’, of the international Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Company. 
Deloitte provides a broad range of financial services, targeting for the whole Dutch 
market; that is services in the area of accounting, consulting, and advisory services 
with respect to taxes and finance for small- and medium-sized organizations, and 
                                                 
3 Based on www.deloitte.com 
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large and multinational organizations in both the private and public sector. In 
terms of sales, € 665 million in 2004/5, Deloitte is the largest of such financial 
services providers in the Netherlands. The accounting division accounted in 
2004/5 for 57 % of total revenues, consulting for 14 %, tax advisory for 25 %, and 
financial advisory for 4 %. 
 
Figure 4.3 – Deloitte Nederland: Revenues, Net Profits, Number of Employees, and 
Revenues per Employee 
0
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Source: Deloitte, Annual Reports 1995/6-2004/5 
 
Sales of the company increased yearly in the period 1995/6 – 2002/3 from 
€ 216 million to € 756 million, which corresponds to an average yearly growth of 
36% (see also figure 4.3). The sales growth is mainly due to growth of existing 
markets and to two major acquisitions. In 1998 Deloitte acquired VB Groep, an 
accountants and financial advisory organization specialized in the non-for profit 
sector, employing 1,400 people. In 2002 it acquired Andersen Nederland which 
focused on large and multinational firms in both the private and public sector. 
Andersen employed about 1,200 employees. In the last two years, Deloitte’s sales 
declined yearly with 6%. This decline of revenues is on one hand due to stagnation 
of the Dutch economy, which struck particularly the consulting division. On the 
other hand, Deloitte divested several segments of the consulting division due to 
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changing regulations which impose restrictions on combining accountancy and 
consulting activities within one firm. Other firms comparable to Deloitte, such as, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PWC which are active in accounting and legal and 
financial advice, but not explicitly in consulting, did face since 2002/3 a 
decreasing growth, but not a decline in sales. Comparing the revenues per 
employee between the three firms, an often used measure for efficiency in the 
sector, reveals that Deloitte’s efficiency clearly lacks behind to that of its main 
competitors. Although revenues per employee at Deloitte steadily increased from € 
75 thousand in 1995/6 to € 107 thousand in 2004/5 (see also figure 4.3), revenues 
per employee in 2004/5 at Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PWC were between € 150 
and 170 thousand (based on annual reports Ernst & Young, 2004/5; KPMG 
2004/5; PWC 2004/5). 
 
Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities 
Managers conduct both exploitation and exploration activities to deal with 
recent and intended future developments at Deloitte and to deal with the above 
described challenge for Deloitte to confront changes in the industry and to increase 
both growth and cost-effectiveness. Managers are triggered to increase reliability 
in experience and to increase the depth of their knowledge as Deloitte tries to 
increase efficiency and to gain market share by increasing the level of its 
managers’ specialization. Within each of the four product divisions, different 
sections are created corresponding to segmentation of the market into small- and 
medium-sized firms, large and multinational firms, and public firms. As such, 
managers within each product group are encouraged to develop, improve, and 
refine in-depth knowledge pertaining to a certain market segment, product or 
service, or internal process, which should improve (potential) customers’ 
impression about the ability of Deloitte to deliver valuable and suitable services to 
them. Furthermore, the reduction of the number of branches throughout the 
Netherlands from about 100 to about 50 by combining smaller branches into larger 
units, leads managers to engage into activities related to increasing economies of 
scale, improving the efficiency of internal operations, and standardizing products, 
processes and systems throughout the organization. Managers are also challenged 
to conduct exploration activities; i.e. to increase variety in experience and to 
broaden their knowledge base. Examples of exploration activities include those 
related to searching for and experimenting with new electronic distribution 
channels and online products, creating new product(combinations) by recombining 
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products across divisions, searching for, discovering, and experimenting with new 
business models, products, and services in both existing and previously un-served 
markets. 
 
 
4.4 – Samples and Data Collection 
 
As indicated in chapter one’s section 1.4; quantitative data for this study was 
obtained through a questionnaire survey. Consistent with Ghoshal et al. (1994), the 
same survey was administered to managers of Rabobank, Philips, and Deloitte to 
reduce bias and increase comparability of results. This section describes the 
survey’s samples (see also table 4.1) and elaborates on the data collection 
procedures.  
At Rabobank, the survey was administered to all 237 managers of five 
local banks; hence, the sample covered all hierarchical levels, functions and 
organization units. In cooperation with Rabobank Nederland, we approached 
several local banks throughout the Netherlands to cooperate with this study’s 
research; five of them agreed to join the research. With an average size of about 
280 employees and an operating field in both urban and less urban like areas, the 
five local banks represent a cross-section of Rabobank’s local banks. Based on 
interviews and company specific documents, this study distinguishes three 
hierarchical levels at the local Rabobanks. The highest level is comprised of the 
banks’ director and the business units’ directors; together, they comprise the 
banks’ board of directors. The middle level managers are those who are 
responsible for the business units’ organizational units. These managers typically 
are responsible for a functional area, market segment, or product group. The 
sample’s lowest level managers are the ‘team-managers’. A team manager is 
typically responsible for a distinct product or process within an organizational 
unit, or responsible for a geographically distinct set of customers. Their span of 
control typically ranges from three to seven. 
At the multi-market semiconductor division of Philips, a sample was 
drawn, in cooperation with the division’s headquarters, of 255 managers. These 
comprise managers of various hierarchical levels, functional areas, and of the 
division’s business units and the division’s production support unit. Chi-square 
tests (p < .05; α = .05) indicate that the hypotheses that the distribution of the 
sample’s managers over the hierarchical levels, functional areas, and units 
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corresponds to the distribution of all the division’s managers, can not be rejected. 
This indicates that bias due to the sampling procedure may not be a problem. We 
distinguish the following hierarchical levels in the sample; the sample’s highest 
level managers are those who report directly to the division’s CEO. They typically 
are the business units’ or production support unit’s CEO, and the vice-president(s). 
The second level managers are those managers who are responsible for a 
functional area or a geographical area within a business unit or the production 
support unit, or responsible for product-market combinations within the business 
units. The sample’s lowest level managers are those who are responsible for a 
functional area within a product-market combination, or a particular product or 
technology within a business unit or the production support unit.  
 
Table 4.1 – Samples: Number of Respondents and Distribution 
Company Rabobank sample  Philips sample  Deloitte sample 
         
Usable 
respondents (n) 
177  118  224 
Response rate 76%  53%  35% 
         
Distribution respondents in absolute numbers     
Top 16  Top 8  Top 33 -Hierar. level 
Middle 34  Middle 32  Middle 76 
 Front 127  Front 78  Front 115 
         
-Functiona Back-office 71  R&D 53    
 Front-office 106  M&S 17    
    Other 48    
         
-Business Unita Retail 65  Innovative prods. 41  Audit 95 
 Whole-sale 63  Standard prods. 51  Tax & Legal 48 
 Operations 49  Production sup. 26  Consultancy 34 
       Finance 13 
       Centr. & Sup. 34 
aFor classification: see section 4.5.4 ‘control variables’ 
 
At Deloitte, it was decided, in cooperation with the Chief Knowledge 
Officer (CKO), to administer the survey to those managers who are subscribed to 
the CKO’s weekly electronic newsletter. This sample includes 653 managers 
distributed among all hierarchical levels, functional areas, and business units. Chi-
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square tests (p < .05; α = .05) indicate that the hypotheses that the distribution of 
the sample’s managers over the hierarchical levels, functional areas, and business 
units, corresponds to the distribution of all Deloitte Nederland’s managers, can not 
be rejected. This indicates that bias due to the sampling procedure may not be a 
problem. Based on interviews and company specific documents, this study 
distinguishes three hierarchical levels at Deloitte as well. The highest level is 
comprised of managers who, within Deloitte, have the label ‘director’ or ‘partner’. 
They own the company and/ or mainly engage in large, unique projects and the 
acquisition of new customers or orders. The middle level managers are those who, 
within Deloitte, have the label ‘manager’. They have responsibility for large 
projects, several teams, and the maintenance of customer relationships. They 
usually are specialized in several areas of expertise. The sample’s lowest level 
managers have within Deloitte the label ‘consultant’ or ‘senior assistant/ annalist’. 
They typically are specialized in one or two specific areas of expertise and have 
responsibility for a specific team. They support the middle level managers, based 
on quantitative analyses carried out by themselves or their assistants. 
 In each company, the survey was made electronically available to the 
managers. In the case of Rabobank and Deloitte, a special website was created 
which allowed the managers to access the survey. At Philips, we used the 
company’s web-based electronic survey automation tool. To ensure 
confidentiality, we agreed not to reveal the names of the respondents and to return 
the electronic files, containing the data of completed surveys, to us without 
inference of the companies’ management. To stimulate response rate, managers 
received an invitation to participate in the research at the moment that the survey 
became electronically available. The invitation, sent by email, included a short 
explanation about the research goals and relevance, and was undersigned by both 
the research team and a senior level manager; at Rabobank a member of each 
bank’s board of directors, at Phillips the division’s HRM manager, and at Deloitte 
the company’s CKO. At each company, the survey was during a period of three 
consecutive weeks electronically available. After the first and second week, a 
reminder was sent to all managers by email, inviting them to fill out the survey if 
they had not done so. At Rabobank, we received a total of 181 surveys, 
corresponding to a response rate of 76 %. Listwise deletion of cases with missing 
values reduced the final sample size to 177. At Philips, we received a total of 136 
surveys, corresponding to a response rate of 53 %. Listwise deletion of cases with 
missing values reduced the final sample size to 118. At Deloitte, We received a 
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total of 229 surveys, corresponding to a response rate of 35%. Listwise deletion of 
cases with missing values reduced the final sample size to 224. 
To test for non-response bias, we first compared, for each firm, 
respondents and non-respondents based on hierarchical level, function, and 
organization unit. Chi-square tests indicate that the hypotheses that the distribution 
of the respondents over hierarchical levels, functions, and organization units, 
corresponds to the population’s distribution, can not be rejected (p < .05; α = .05). 
Only at Deloitte, the hypothesis that the distribution of the respondents over the 
business units corresponds to the population’s distribution, has to be rejected (Chi-
square = 10.01, df = 4, p > .05; α = .05), due to an under-representation of 
managers of the business unit Audit (expected number of respondents is 107, 
whereas the actual number of respondents is 95). Possible bias due this under-
representation will be overcome by controlling for business unit in the regression 
analyses. We furthermore compared, for each firm, early and late respondents in 
terms of model variables. No significant differences (t-test; p < .05) appeared, 
indicating that non-response bias is not a problem. To check for bias pertaining to 
the fact that the survey was administered electronically in stead of paper, we 
included in the survey three items, based on Davis (1989), measuring the 
respondent’s computer efficacy in terms of the respondent’s perceived ease of use 
of the company’s intranet, as the electronic surveys were accessible via the 
companies’ intranets. The z-values for skewness (Rabobank -.10; Philips .06; 
Deloitte .50) and kurtosis (Rabobank -.40; Philips -.95; Deloitte 1.15) indicate that 
the distribution of this measure not significantly deviates from a normal 
distribution. In other words, not only managers with high computer efficacy 
completed the survey; but also managers with low or average levels of computer 
efficacy completed the survey, corresponding to a normal distribution. It seems not 
to be the case that using an electronic survey in stead of paper work has created a 
response bias.  
 
 
4.5 – Measurement Development and Validation 
 
This section describes the sources and development of the survey’s multiple-item 
scales meant to measure the study’s constructs, as well as an assessment of their 
reliability and validity. Most of the scales are based on existing measures in the 
literature. If appropriate measures were not available in the literature, such as for 
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managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, then these measures have been 
developed based on conceptualizations within the literature. Furthermore, 
reliability and validity of the measures has been enhanced by eight in-depth 
interviews and pre-testing of the survey within Rabobank, as Rabobank was the 
first company at which the survey has been conducted. Based on the literature, the 
in-depth interviews, and the pre-test, a final version of the survey was constructed. 
This survey was administered to the managers of Rabobank, Philips, and Deloitte, 
resulting in three separate data sets. Reliability and validity analyses are conducted 
for each data set.    
 
4.5.1 – Exploration and Exploitation Activities 
 
Scales for managers’ exploration activities and exploitation activities were 
constructed, as appropriate scales at the individual level of analysis were not yet 
available in the literature. Several steps were taken to achieve reliable and valid 
new scales. To achieve content validity, i.e. that the scales capture the theoretical 
domain of the construct in question, we first developed exploration activity items 
and exploitation activity items based on the features by which March (1991: 71) 
characterizes the constructs of exploration and exploitation. As a next step, six in-
depth interviews were conducted at Rabobank with managers at various 
hierarchical levels, functions, and business units. Based on these interviews, the 
wording of the items was enhanced. Subsequently, the survey, with the items 
edited based on the interviews, was pre-tested to further allow enhancement of the 
reliability, unidimensionality, and convergent and discriminant validity of the 
items and scales. The pilot survey was administered to 50 managers of Rabobank, 
of which 33 returned a completed version. Based on reliability and validity 
analyses, ambiguous items were identified and rephrased with the help of two 
interviews with business unit managers. The final seven-item exploration scale 
determines the extent to which a manager engaged last year in exploration 
activities and the seven-item exploitation scale determines the extent to which the 
manager engaged last year in exploitation activities. The items can be found in 
table 4.2. Answers range on a 7-point Likert scale from ‘to a very small extent’ to 
‘to a very great extent’. 
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Exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation for each data set (see 
table 4.2), reveals that two summated scales can be constructed; one exploration 
scale with seven exploration items (five for Philips), and one exploitation scale 
with seven exploitation items (six for Philips). Both the items pertaining to the 
exploration scale and those pertaining to the exploitation scale are unidimensional 
and posses good convergent and discriminant validity. For each data set, 
eigenvalues for the two factors more than 2.8, all items load on their appropriate 
factors with factor loadings above .61, and no item cross-loading is above .25. The 
reliability of the exploration scale, as represented by Cronbach’s alpha, is .91 for 
Rabobank, .86 for Philips, and .91 for Deloitte. Cronbach’s alphas for the 
exploitation scale are .89 for Rabobank, .83 for Philips, and .87 for Deloitte. 
Confirmatory factor analysis, conducted for each data set, allowing each item to 
load only on the factor for which it is a proposed indicator, indicates that a two 
factor model fits the data well (Rabobank: χ276df = 164.61; NFI = .90; CFI = .94; 
RMSEA = .08; Philips: χ243df = 52.37; NFI = .91; CFI = .98; RMSEA = .05; 
Deloitte: χ276df = 158.90; NFI = .91; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .07). Moreover, the 
competing model that the items of both scales converge on one common factor, 
i.e. the hypothesis that exploration and exploitation represent the extremes of one 
continuum, can be rejected. A comparison of the two factor model with the one 
factor model shows a significant improvement of the Chi-square pertaining to each 
dataset (∆χ21df Rabobank = 469.23; Philips = 246.94; Deloitte = 555.67; all p < 
.001). 
Regarding Philips, an investigation to create understanding about why the 
empirical data indicates that two of the exploration items (see table 4.2) and one of 
the exploitation items (see table 4.2) should be excluded from the construction of a 
summated exploration respectively a summated exploitation scale, indicates the 
following: the facts that, within the Philips dataset, the three items have the highest 
standard deviations among all the 14 items and that Cronbach’s alphas of the two 
summated scales increase when the concerned three items are excluded indicate 
that the three items contain more random error than the other items. Moreover, the 
fact that the means of the two excluded exploration items and the mean of the 
excluded exploitation item are all significantly lower (t-test, p < .001) than the 
means of the summated exploration, respectively exploitation scales, indicates that 
the three items may have a systematic biasing effect as well, i.e. they may contain 
significant nonrandom error. Interviews with Philips’ managers, conducted after 
the analysis of the data, indicate that managers engage in exploration activities, 
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such as searching, discovering, experimenting, and innovating, as long as these 
activities not conflict with existing company policy (referring to excluded 
exploration item seven) and clearly fit into pre-specified financial budgets 
(referring to excluded exploration item four). Regarding exploitation, the 
interviews indicate, referring to excluded exploitation item two that, as one 
manager expressed it ‘people are not proud to say that they do boring routine 
work. That is not considered to be cool here. Instead, people are proud to say that 
they innovate’. These interviews indicate that the three excluded items all refer to 
activities which managers are ‘not supposed to do’ at the division, probably 
leading to the low mean values of the three items (nonrandom error) and probably 
also leading to some confusion about the items’ meaning (random error). 
 
4.5.2 – Organizational Factors 
 
The scales used to measure the organizational factors are all related to 
existing scales in the literature. Answers of the scales’ items range on a 7-point 
Likert scale from ‘to a very small extent’ or ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘to a very great 
extent’ or ‘strongly agree’. 
To measure participation in decision making, this study used, on the basis 
of Jansen et al. (2005), a four item scale ‘participation in decision making’ (Dewar 
et al., 1980), which assesses the extent to which a manager participates in 
decisions concerning the distribution of resources or policy formulation (α 
Rabobank = .89; Philips = .86; Deloitte = .91). To measure participation in cross-
functional interfaces, this study used a scale on the basis of Nadler and Tushman 
(1987) and Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) which assesses the extent to which a 
manager participates in formal cross-unit integrative mechanisms, asking each 
manager to what extent he or she (1) coordinates work across organizational units, 
(2) works in temporary cross-unit task forces, and (3) works in permanent cross-
unit teams. The final measure is constructed as a weighted average of the three 
items, where the first item is given a weight of 1, the second item a weight of 2, 
and the last item a weight of 3 (cf. Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). To measure the 
extent to which a manager’s rewards are based on overall firm performance in 
stead of individual performance, this study used a three-item scale on the basis of 
Lawler (1986) which measures the extent to which a manager’s rewards such as 
pay increases, bonuses, and promotions are related to overall-firm performance (α 
Rabobank = .84; Philips = .86; Deloitte = .89). To asses the extent of formalization 
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of a manager’s tasks, this study used a four item scale (α Rabobank = .86; Philips 
= .89; Deloitte = .91) from Desphande and Zaltman (1982), which measures the 
extent to which a manager’s tasks are being defined by rules, procedures, or 
regulations. To measure the use of IT-systems for work related activities, some 
authors, e.g. Teo et al. (1999), use daily time spend at IT-systems by a manager as 
a standard. Using this standard during the survey’s pretest resulted however in 
insufficient variation; most of the managers indicated to spend considerable 
amounts of time each day behind their pc. Another way to measure the use of IT-
systems for work related activities, as used in the final survey, is to ask managers’ 
to indicate the extent to which IT-systems support their daily activities (e.g. Doll 
& Torkzadeh, 1988; Sanders & Courtney, 1985). The three item scale (α 
Rabobank = .85; Philips = .91; Deloitte = .91), based on Davis (1989) and Sanders 
1984) measures the extent to which IT-systems enable a manager to conduct work 
related activities. These exclude the use of IT by a manager as a communication 
device, as, for instance, is the case when using email or discussion boards on the 
company’s intranet. To measure connectedness to other organization members, a 
four-item scale (α Rabobank = .88; Philips = .92; Deloitte = .87), based on 
Jaworski and Kohli (1993) was used, assessing the extent to which managers are 
networked or connected to other organization members, both along and across the 
vertical hierarchy. To assess tolerance for ambiguity, a four-item scale (α 
Rabobank = .86; Philips = .85; Deloitte = .89) was used based on Volberda (1998: 
178), which measures the extent to which a manager’s contacts, especially his or 
her peers and/or supervisor(s), tolerate deviant ideas, opinions, visions, etc.  
Confirmatory factor analysis, conducted for each dataset, allowing each 
item to load only on the factor for which it is a proposed indicator, indicates that a 
six factor model fits the data well (the CFA excluded the scale for participation in 
cross-unit interfaces, due to its weighted structure); Rabobank: χ2194df = 291.89; 
NFI = .88; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .05; Philips: χ2194df = 206.75; NFI = .88; CFI = 
.99; RMSEA = .02; Deloitte: χ2194df = 361.75; NFI = .91; CFI = .96; RMSEA = 
.06. All three datasets indicate that the six-factor model provides a better fit to the 
data than a one-factor model. Moreover, the six-factor model provides a better fit 
to the data that the three-factor rival in which the organization factors as common 
features of coordination capabilities converge on one factor, those of systems 
capabilities converge on a second factor, and those of socialization capabilities 
converge on a third factor (∆χ212df Rabobank = 771.80; Philips = 649.45; Deloitte 
= 1659.79; all p < .001). Furthermore, a comparison of a one-factor model with a 
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two-factor model for every pair among the six factors shows a significant 
improvement of the Chi-square for each of the 15 pairs (∆χ21df between 376.59 and 
603.17; p < .001), providing evidence of discriminant validity (Bagozzi & Philips, 
1982). 
 
4.5.3 – Knowledge Inflows 
 
Top-down knowledge inflows are associated with knowledge coming 
from persons and units at higher hierarchical levels than the recipient manager. 
Bottom-up knowledge inflows are associated with knowledge coming from 
persons and units at lower hierarchical levels than the recipient manager. 
Horizontal knowledge inflows are associated with knowledge coming from 
persons and units at the same hierarchical level. Following our conceptualization 
of knowledge (cf. Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Schulz, 2001; see also section 2.5 
of this study), we informed respondents that we are not interested in operational or 
financial data or the taking and giving of orders, but rather in tacit and explicit 
knowledge pertaining to: technologies, processes, systems, products, strategies, 
and markets. Managers were instructed to think about different channels through 
which knowledge might flow such as formal and informal meetings, telephone 
conversations, e-mail, regular mail, face-to-face contacts, virtual meeting rooms 
on the company’s intranet, etcetera. 
Regarding top-down knowledge inflows three items were used; each 
manager was asked to indicate the extent of knowledge he or she received or 
gathered last year from: “your direct supervisor”, “one more hierarchical level up 
than your direct supervisor”, and “two more hierarchical levels up than your direct 
supervisor”. Regarding bottom-up knowledge inflows, one item was used; each 
manager was asked to indicate the extent of knowledge he or she received or 
gathered last year from: “your direct assistants”. Because the items focused on 
different loci within the organization from where the knowledge comes from, it 
was not possible to develop more than one item regarding bottom-up knowledge 
inflows as the largest groups of managers, i.e. the front-line managers, only had 
one hierarchical level below them; their direct assistants. Regarding horizontal 
knowledge inflows three items were used. The wording of the items as used for 
Rabobank had to be slightly adapted to make them appropriate for the Philips 
context and for the Deloitte context. At Rabobank, each manager was asked to 
indicate the extent of knowledge he or she received or gathered last year from: 
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“peer managers within your business unit”, “other business units”, and “other local 
banks of the Rabobank Group”. To make the items suitable to the sample’s highest 
level managers, the following was added, in parentheses, to the first item: “for 
members of the board of directors refer to: ‘other members of the board of 
directors’”. At Philips, each manager was asked to indicate the extent of 
knowledge he or she received or gathered last year from: “peer teams within your 
own organizational unit”, “teams in other organizational units within your own 
division”, and “teams in other divisions’ units”. At Deloitte, each manager was 
asked to indicate the extent of knowledge he or she received or gathered last year 
from: “peer managers within your department”, “other departments within your 
division”, and “other divisions of Deloitte Nederland”. At Philips and Deloitte, it 
was not needed to adapt the first item for the sample’s highest level managers, as 
each organizational unit or department, have several of these highest level 
managers. 
Confirmatory factor analysis, conducted for each dataset, allowing each 
item to load only on the factor for which it is a proposed indicator, and allowing 
the three factors to be intercorrelated, indicates that a three factor model fits the 
data well (Rabobank: χ211df = 21.73; NFI = .94; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .09; Philips: 
χ211df = 21.73; NFI = .94; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .09; Deloitte: χ211df = 20.22; NFI = 
.97; CFI = .98; RMSEA = .06). All three datasets indicate that the competing 
model that the items converge on one common factor, can be rejected (Rabobank: 
∆χ23df = 104.62; Philips: ∆χ23df = 104.62; Deloitte: ∆χ23df = 260.69; all p < .001). 
There are, furthermore, three competing models where the items of the scales 
converge on two factors. All three datasets indicate that two of these competing 
models can be clearly rejected, i.e. the model where the top-down and bottom-up 
items load together on one factor and the horizontal items on another factor 
(Rabobank: ∆χ22df = 9.73 (p < .01); Philips: ∆χ22df = 19.06 (p < .001); Deloitte: 
∆χ22df = 32.24 (p < .001)), and the model where the top-down and horizontal items 
load together on one factor and the bottom-up item on another factor (Rabobank: 
∆χ22df = 67, 92; Philips: ∆χ22df = 104.62; Deloitte: ∆χ22df = 260.73; all p < .001). 
The change in χ22df for the final competing model, i.e. where the horizontal and 
bottom-up items load together on one factor and the top-down items load on 
another factor is 6.12 for Rabobank, 5.13 for Philips, and 1.62 for Deloitte, 
indicating that the improvement of fit from this two factor model to the three 
factor model is only significant (one-tail testing) at the p < .05 level for Rabobank, 
p < .10 level for Philips, and not significant for Deloitte. Summarizing; 
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confirmatory factor analyses conducted at the three datasets indicate, albeit not 
always with very strong support, that the three factor model has the best fit. As this 
three factor model corresponds to the theoretical distinctions underlying the items, 
the following scales will be maintained; one top-down knowledge inflow 
summated scale based on the corresponding three top-down items, one horizontal 
knowledge inflow summated scale based on the corresponding three horizontal 
items, and one bottom-up knowledge inflow scale based on the corresponding 
bottom-up item. The reliability of the top-down knowledge inflow scale, as 
represented by Cronbach’s alpha, is .76 for Rabobank, .82 for Philips, and .83 for 
Deloitte. Cronbach’s alphas for the horizontal knowledge inflow scale are .81 for 
Rabobank, .83 for Philips, and .84 for Deloitte. 
 
4.5.4 – Control Variables 
 
As can be concluded from chapter two, hierarchical level, function, and 
unit effects can be expected to impact upon managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. Some authors, e.g. Burgelman, (1983a; b), Floyd & Lane 
(2000), argue that between hierarchical levels, different degrees of exploration 
and exploitation may exists corresponding to different strategic processes, such as 
induced and autonomous strategic process (Burgelman, 1983a) or competence 
deployment and competence definition process (Floyd & Lane, 2000). Others, e.g. 
De Leede et al. (2002), argue that different degrees of exploration and exploitation 
may exist between functional areas. Typically, a functional area like R&D is 
characterized by explorative activities such as experimenting and discovering, 
whereas a functional area like production is characterized by exploitative activities 
such as producing and implementing. Finally, others, e.g. Benner and Tushman 
(2003) and Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) stress that between organizational units 
different degrees of exploration and exploitation exist. These authors typically 
argue that top-managers engage in high levels of both exploration and 
exploitation, whereas lower level managers specialize in either exploration or 
exploitation activities, depending on the level of dynamism in their unit’s 
environment. The categorization of respondents into different hierarchical levels, 
functional areas, and organization units, is based on company documents and 
interviews. 
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Hierarchical Levels 
As has been argued in section 4.4, based on interviews and company 
specific documents we distinguish three hierarchical levels at the local 
Rabobanks, the Philips division, and Deloitte Nederland (see section 4.4 for a 
description of managers’ tasks pertaining to these levels). In each dataset, we 
control for hierarchical level effects using two dummy variables; one for top-level 
managers (hierarchical level: top) and another for middle-level managers 
(hierarchical level: middle). Based on the literature, we expect top-level managers 
to engage more than middle-level and front-line managers in both exploration and 
exploitation activities (Benner & Tushman, 2003; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004), 
furthermore, middle-level and front-line managers are expected to focus on either 
exploration or exploitation, depending on their organizational unit and function 
(Benner & Tushman, 2003; De Leede et al., 2002; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). 
 
Functional Areas 
Regarding functional areas at Rabobank a distinction will be made 
between two broad functional areas; back-office and front-office, following the 
common functional typology as used within the local banks. Back-office refers to 
those internal operations or activities which do not directly relate to, or are not 
accessible for, customers. Front-office refers to those operations or activities with 
direct customer contact. Back- and front-office functions can be found in each 
business unit and at each hierarchical level. To control for functional effects within 
the Rabobank dataset, we include one dummy variable, front/back-office (1 = 
front-office; 0 = back-office). We expect managers with a back-office function to 
engage more than other managers in exploration tasks such as developing new 
products or product combinations and renewing internal processes and systems 
triggered by changes in technology. We expect managers in front-office functions 
to engage more than other managers in exploitation activities such as selling 
existing products and services, increasing market share in existing markets, and 
increasing efficiency through standardizing simple products and services.  
At the multi-market semiconductor division of Philips, functional areas 
relate in particular to research & development and marketing & sales. Other 
functional areas are finance, human resources and logistics. We control for 
functional effects within the Philips dataset by using two dummy variables; one 
for research & development (function: R&D) and another for marketing & sales 
(function: M&S). We expect managers in research & development to engage more 
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in exploration activities as compared to managers in the other functional areas. 
Exploration related activities, like searching, experimenting, discovering, and 
innovating constitute an important part of R&D. We expect managers in marketing 
& sales, and those in the category ‘other functional areas’ to engage more in 
exploitation activities than R&D managers, like improving existing product 
market positions, focusing on short-term rent-generation, and conducting rather 
formalized routine tasks.  
At Deloitte we will only distinguish hierarchical levels and organizational 
units, and not also functional areas. The reason for this is that the various 
hierarchical levels at Deloitte incorporate a different ‘functional focus’ as well 
(Banker et al., 2005; Dopuch et al., 2003). For instance, managers at higher 
hierarchical levels, the seniors or partners, typically focus on what traditionally 
could be called the ‘sales function’ and the ‘research and development function’. 
Managers at lower hierarchical levels engage in what could be called the 
‘production function’. 
 
Organizational Units 
At Rabobank, a distinction will be made between three main 
organizational units, based on the local banks’ business units; retail, whole-sale, 
and operations. To control for unit effects, two dummy variables are included; one 
for the retail unit (unit: retail), and one for the whole-sale unit (unit: whole-sale). 
We expect managers in the operations business unit to engage more than other 
managers in exploration tasks such as developing new products or product 
combinations and renewing internal processes and systems triggered by changes in 
technology. We expect managers in the retail and wholesale business units to 
engage more than other managers in exploitation activities such selling existing 
products and services, increasing market share in existing markets, and increasing 
efficiency through standardizing simple products and services. 
Interviews at Philips with the divisions’ top-management indicate that the 
automotive business unit and the two niche product business units operate in a 
business environment in which competition on technological innovations is fiercer 
as compared to the other units’ environments. Therefore (e.g. cf. Cheng & Van De 
Ven, 1996; Sidhu et al., 2004) we expect managers of the automotive business unit 
and those of the two niche product business units to focus more on exploration 
activities as compared to the other managers of the division. We also expect 
managers of the production support unit, and those managers of the two business 
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units focusing on standardized products, to engage more in exploitation activities 
as compared to the other managers of the division as their focus is primarily 
centered on operational efficiency. Reflecting these expected effects, to control for 
unit effects, two dummy variables are included; one for the three exploration 
focused business units (unit: innovative products), and one for the two exploitation 
focused business units (unit: standard products). 
Reflecting Deloitte’s structure, a distinction will be made between four 
divisions and the central & support unit. To control for organizational unit effects, 
four dummy variables are included; for each division one (unit: Audit; unit: Tax & 
Legal; unit: Consulting; and unit: Finance). Based on the interviews and the 
literature, we expect managers of the Audit and the Tax & Legal divisions to focus 
more on exploitation as compared to the other managers as their business 
environments are the most stable ones (Banker et al., 2005; Firth, 1997; Rankin & 
Sharp, 2000). We also expect managers of the Consulting division to focus more 
on exploration as compared to the other managers as their business environment is 
the most dynamic one (Banker et al., 2005; Firth, 1997; Rankin & Sharp, 2000). 
 
Control Variables in the Integrated Dataset 
In the integrated dataset, i.e. the dataset in which the data of Rabobank, 
Philips, and Deloitte are combined, we use the same dummies to control for 
hierarchical level effects as in the separate datasets; i.e. hierarchical level: top, and 
hierarchical level: middle, to reflect the three hierarchical levels. Regarding 
functions, a distinction will be made between three broad functional areas; 
research & development, operations, and marketing & sales, using two dummy 
variables; function: R&D, and function: M&S. Although we acknowledge that at 
Rabobank and Deloitte the functions of operations and, especially, R&D are not 
present in a traditional way, some parallels exist. Concerning Rabobank, we 
classify in the integrated dataset managers with a back-office function as R&D 
managers as part of their job is related to developing new products or product 
combinations and renewing internal processes and systems. We classify managers 
with a front-office function as M&S managers, as they are the ones with direct 
customer contacts. Concerning Deloitte, we classify those who have at Deloitte the 
label ‘senior assistant/ annalist’ as operations managers, as their main job is to 
carry out quantitative analyses. We classify those who have the label ‘director’ or 
‘partner’ as R&D managers as part of their job is to develop new products and to 
engage into rather unique than standard projects. Finally, we classify those who 
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have the label ‘manager’ or ‘consultant’ as M&S managers as one of their main 
responsibilities is to maintain customer relationships. To control for unit effects, 
we used the same control variables as in the separate datasets. However, to reduce 
the number of control variables, we merged Deloitte’s Audit unit with the Tax & 
Legal unit. Within both units, managers appeared to focus on exploitation 
activities (see section 5.4) as their business environments are rather stable. We 
also merged Deloitte’s Consultancy unit with the Finance unit. Within both units 
managers appeared to focus on exploration activities (see section 5.4) due to high 
levels of dynamism in both units’ environments. The reference unit in the 
regression analysis will be Deloitte’s central & support unit. We do not include in 
the integrated dataset separate dummies for the three companies, as we 
automatically control for firm-level effects by having included dummies for the 
firms’ units. 
 
 
4.6 – Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we ensured that the level of theory, measurement, and analysis in 
this study is congruent, and that variation exists in our samples between managers 
in terms of the study’s constructs. After we described the research setting, we 
described the sampling and data collection procedures. A comparison for each 
dataset, between respondents, non-respondents, and all managers of the study’s 
companies, learned that no significant differences exist between them in terms of 
hierarchical levels, functional areas, organization units, and model variables, 
indicating that for each dataset, the respondents can be assumed to sufficiently 
represent the population. The final section of this chapter described the 
measurement development and validation. The study’s scales are based on existing 
scales in the literature, except the managers’ exploration and exploitation scales. 
We conducted several steps to develop valid and reliable exploration and 
exploitation scales. Reliability and validity analyses of the survey’s items and 
summated scales, indicate that they are reliable and unidimensional, and posses 
good convergent and discriminant validity. Summarizing, we can proceed to 
analyze the collected data in the next chapter.  
  
118
 108  
119
  109 
CHAPTER 5 – ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
 
5.1 – Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the data as collected by the survey will be analyzed. Sections 5.2, 
5.3, and 5.4 present the results pertaining to the data collected at successively 
Rabobank, Philips, and Deloitte. Section 5.5 compares results across the three 
firms. Section 5.6 presents the results pertaining to the integrated dataset. In each 
section, we will first provide descriptive statistics illustrating how managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities differ along the control variables’ groups. 
Subsequently, we analyze the data using OLS regression analyses. Analyzing the 
three datasets separately allows in section 5.5 to compare the three datasets and 
detect differences between the firms. As the findings between the three firms 
appear to be largely consistent, we decided in section 5.6 to merge the three 
datasets into one integrated dataset and to subsequently analyze this combined 
data. The hypotheses will be tested on the basis of the integrated dataset. The 
reason to analyze the integrated dataset is two fold; first it will facilitate our 
discussion of the results without loosing insights gained by the separate datasets as 
these appeared to be largely consistent. Hence, we base the discussion of this 
study’s findings in chapter 6 mainly on the results as brought forward by the 
analysis of the integrated dataset. Second, the integrated dataset allowed us to do 
structural equation modeling to assess the goodness of fit of our model, and 
compare it with competing models. Structural equation modeling was not 
appropriate for the separate datasets, as this method for analyzing complex path 
models requires a sample size of at least about 500 (Byrne, 1994; Kline, 1998). 
Our integrated dataset has a sample size of 519. 
 
 
5.2 – Rabobank Dataset 
 
Control Variables and Descriptives 
Table 5.1 shows managers’ mean levels of exploration and exploitation 
activities at different hierarchical levels, functions, and organization units. We 
conducted t-tests to identify significant (p < .05; 1-tail) differences, such as the 
LDS (least-significant-difference) method, which compares the mean of each
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Table 5.1 – Rabobank: Control Variables’ Categories with Corresponding Means and 
Standard Deviationsa of Outcome Variables 
Control Variable Exploration activities Exploitation activities 
Hierarchical level      
• Top (N = 16) 5.38 (.66) 5.19 (.75)  
• Middle (N = 34) 4.92 (.77) 5.24 (.71)  
• Front (N = 127) 3.89 (1.20) 4.86 (1.11)  
      
Function      
• Back-office (N = 71) 4.62 (1.07) 4.70 (.93)  
• Front-office (N = 106) 3.96 (1.24) 5.14 (1.06)  
      
Business Unit      
• Retail (N = 65) 3.92 (1.30) 5.12 (1.11)  
• Whole-sale (N = 63) 4.20 (1.17) 5.07 (.96)  
• Operations (N = 49) 4.65 (1.04) 4.63 (.93)  
      
Total ( N = 177) 4.22 (1.22) 4.96 (1.03)  
aStandard deviation in parentheses 
 
control variable’s group with the mean of each other group of the same control 
variable. Regarding hierarchical levels, top-level managers do not have significant 
differences between exploration and exploitation. Middle- and front-line managers 
engage more in exploitation activities as compared to exploration activities. 
Moreover, top- and middle-level managers engage more in exploration activities 
than front-line managers. There is no significant difference between top- and 
middle-level managers. With respect to exploitation activities, middle-level 
manager engage more than front-line managers in exploitation. There is no 
significant difference between top- and middle-level managers. Regarding 
function, managers with a back-office function do not significantly differ in terms 
of exploration and exploitation. Managers with a front-office function engage 
significantly more in exploitation activities as compared to exploration activities. 
Moreover, managers with a back-office function engage significantly more in 
exploration activities as compared to managers with a front-office function. Front-
office managers engage significantly more in exploitation activities compared to 
back-office managers. Regarding business unit; managers in the retail and 
wholesale units engage significantly more in exploitation activities as compared to 
121
  111 
exploration activities. Managers at the operations unit do not have significant 
differences between exploration and exploitation. The data indicates furthermore 
that managers in the operations business unit significantly engage more in 
exploration activities as compared to managers in the other two business units. 
There are no differences among the retail and whole-sale business units with 
respect to exploration. Furthermore, managers in the retail business unit and in the 
whole-sale business unit engage significantly more in exploitation activities as 
compared to managers in the operations business unit. There are no significant 
differences between the retail and whole-sale business units with respect to 
exploitation. 
 
Figure 5.1 – Rabobank: Different Mean Valuesa for Exploration and Exploitation across 
Units, at Various Hierarchical Levels 
3
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aDotted lines: insignificant difference at hierarchical level between units; Straight lines: 
significant difference at hierarchical level between units (t-test, p < .05; 1-tail) 
 
A closer examination of the data (see also figure 5.1) shows furthermore 
that differences between organization units in terms of exploration and of 
exploitation are strongly related to front-line managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. Although variation analyses of the interaction effects 
between hierarchical level and organization unit on exploration and exploitation 
indicate that none of these effects is significant (p < .05 of F values interaction 
effects), t-tests (significant at p < .05; 1-tailed), conducted at all hierarchical 
levels, of differences between exploration activities of managers in different 
organization units, indicate that different levels of exploration between units are 
mainly due to front-line managers. For instance, front-line managers of the 
operations business unit significantly engage more in exploration activities than 
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Table 5.2 – Rabobank: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 mean St.dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Exploration activities 4.22 1.22   
2 Exploitation activities 4.96 1.03 -.06   
3 Top-down Kn. Inflows 4.63 1.02 .34 .28   
4 Bottom-up Kn. Inflows 4.49 1.66 .46 -.01 .34   
5 Horizontal Kn. Inflows 3.82 1.05 .54 -.05 .42 .38   
6 Part. in decision making 3.60 1.55 .54 -.17 .36 .47 .57  
7 Cross-functional interfaces 4.61 1.19 .31 .01 .14 .26 .32 .28 
8 Rewards b.o. overall perf. 4.28 1.31 .34 .01 .36 .36 .41 .37 
9 Formalization of tasks 3.84 1.30 .05 .22 .21 .00 .07 01 
10 Use of IT-systems  4.10 1.16 -.23 .15 .07 -.06 -.26 -.19 
11 Connectedness 4.92 1.25 .24 -.07 .26 .29 .39 .40 
12 Tolerance Ambiguity 4.78 1.38 .48 -.04 .35 .46 .56 .63 
13 Hierarchical level top .09 .29 .30 .07 .22 .25 .27 .37 
14 Hierarchical level middle .19 .40 .28 .13 .23 .10 .18 .12 
15 Hierarchical level front .72 .45 -.44 -.16 -.34 -.25 -.32 -.34 
16 Function back-office .40 .49 .27 -.21 .13 .12 .28 .28 
17 Function front-office .60 .49 -.27 .21 -.13 -.12 -.28 -.28 
18 Unit retail .37 .48 -.19 .11 -.12 .02 -.06 -.19 
19 Unit whole-sale .36 .48 -.01 .07 .00 -.06 -.12 -.09 
20 Unit operations .28 .45 .22 -.20 .13 .05 .19 .30 
N = 177. All correlations above ⎜.20⎜ are significant at p < .01, All correlations above ⎜.15⎜ 
are significant at p < .05 (2-tailed) 
 
front line managers of the retail business unit, whereas there are no significant 
differences at the top- and middle-level. Similarly, regarding exploitation, 
differences between units are mainly due to front-line managers. For instance, 
front-line managers of the retail business unit significantly engage more in 
exploitation activities that front-line managers at the operations unit. There are no 
significant differences at the middle- and top-level. 
Summarizing; the data indicates that differences between organization 
units and between functions in levels of exploration and/ or exploitation are 
largely as expected. Managers with a back-office function and those in the 
operations business unit engage more in exploration activities than other 
managers, whereas managers with a front-office function and those in the retail 
and whole-sale business units engage more in exploitation activities than other 
managers. We expected furthermore, based on Benner and Tushman (2003) and
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Table 5.2 – (Cont.) 
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8 .17     
9 -.09 .11     
10 -.11 -.05 .02    
11 .22 .38 .04 -.10   
12 .25 .40 .00 -.15 .37   
13 .10 .03 .01 -.14 .23 .14   
14 .05 .04 .18 .03 -.05 .16 -.15   
15 -.11 -.05 -.16 .07 -.11 -.23 -.50 -.78   
16 .10 .10 .06 -.05 .05 .15 .14 .13 -.20   
17 -.10 -.10 -.06 .05 -.05 -.15 -.14 -.13 .20 -1.0   
18 -.05 -.02 .02 .10 -.05 -.10 -.04 -.01 .04 -.27 .27  
19 -.01 -.07 -.08 .01 -.03 .08 -.15 .03 .07 -.30 .30 -.57 
20 .06 .10 .06 -.12 .09 .03 .20 -.01 -.12 .60 -.60 -.47 -.46
 
O’Reilly and Tushman (1996) top-level managers to engage more than middle-
level and front-line managers in both exploration and exploitation activities. The 
data indicates however that both top- and middle-level managers tend to have 
higher levels of both exploration and exploitation than front-line mangers. The 
data indicates furthermore that differences between organization units in terms of 
exploration and of exploitation are strongly related to front-line managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities. In other words; front-line managers tend to 
specialize in either exploration or exploitation within distinct organization units, 
whereas top- and middle-level managers have more consistent levels of 
exploration and exploitation across organization units. 
 
Table 5.2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables 
as used in the study. The table shows that several of the predictor variables and 
several of the control variables significantly relate to each other. To examine the 
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issue of multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) have been calculated in 
each of the regression equations. VIF factors range between 1.06 and 2.40, which 
is below the rule-of-thumb cut-off of 10 (Hair et al., 1998). 
 
Organizational Factors and Managers’ Exploration & Exploitation Activities 
The first part of this study’s hypotheses is about the direct impact of the 
organizational factors on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Table 
5.3 shows the hierarchical regression results for exploration; table 5.4 shows the 
results for exploitation. In both tables, model 1 is the baseline models containing 
the control variables. The coefficients as shown in model 2 pertain to the total 
effect of the organizational factors on exploration (table 5.3) and on exploitation 
(table 5.4), i.e. both their direct and indirect effects. To gain insight into the direct 
effects only of the organizational factors, we have to look at the full model; model 
5 of both tables. 
Among the control variables, model 5 shows that top- and middle-level 
managers tend to engage significantly more in exploration activities (top-
managers: β = .16, p < .05; middle managers: β = .21, p < .01) than front-line 
managers. Top-managers also engage more in exploitation activities (β = .20, p < 
.05) than front-line managers. Furthermore, front-office managers conduct more 
exploitation activities (β = .17, p < .10) than back-office managers. These 
regression analysis results give additional insight into the discussion, as conducted 
above, on control variables. Whereas table 5.1 and its corresponding discussion 
indicate that significant differences exist between hierarchical levels, between 
functions, and between units with respect to both exploration and exploitation, 
tables 5.3 and 5.4 show that, among the control variables, hierarchical level effects 
explain most of the variance of managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. 
Regarding managers’ exploration activities, model 5 of table 5.3 shows 
that only participation in cross-functional interfaces has a significant, and positive 
direct effect (β = .10, p < .10). Regarding the total effect of the organizational 
factors; i.e. both their direct and indirect effects, model 2 of table 5.3 shows that 
all three organizational factors as common features of coordination capabilities; 
participation in decision making (β = .19, p < .05), participation in cross-functional 
interfaces (β = .14, p < .05), and rewards based on overall firm performance (β = 
.16, p < .05), are positively and significantly related to exploration activities. The 
coefficient for formalization of tasks is not significant. Hence, only the use of IT-
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systems to conduct tasks, as an organization factor associated with systems 
capabilities, has a negative and significant effect on managers’ exploration 
activities (β = -.11, p < .10). Finally, the coefficient for connectedness to other 
organization members is not significant, indicating that only tolerance for 
ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors (β = .18, p < .05) as an 
organizational factor of socialization capabilities positively and significantly 
relates to managers’ exploration activities. All significant relationships are as 
hypothesized. 
Regarding managers’ exploitation activities, model 5 of table 5.4 shows 
that managers’ participation in decision making has a significant and negative 
direct effect (β = -.28, p < .01) and that formalization of tasks (β = .15, p < .05) has 
a significant and positive direct effect on managers’ exploitation activities. 
Regarding the total effect of the organizational factors; i.e. both their direct and 
indirect effects, model 2 of table 5.4 shows that managers’ participation in 
decision making (β = -.28, p < .01) is negatively and significantly related to their 
exploitation activities. The coefficients for participation in cross-functional 
interfaces and rewards based on overall firm performance are not significant. Both 
organizational factors as features of systems capabilities, formalization of tasks (β 
= .20, p < .01) and the use of IT-systems for conducting tasks (β = .13, p < .10) are 
positively and significantly related to exploitation activities. Finally, the 
coefficients for connectedness to other organization members and tolerance for 
ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors are not significant. All 
significant relationships are as hypothesized. 
 
Organizational Factors and Managers’ Knowledge Inflows 
The second part of this study’s hypotheses is about the impact of 
organizational factors on managers’ knowledge inflows. Table 5.5 shows the 
corresponding hierarchical regression results for top-down, bottom-up, and 
horizontal knowledge inflows. In all three series of regression analyses, models 1 
are the baseline models containing the control variables. Models 2 are the full 
models, which show that, among the control variables, mainly the coefficients 
pertaining to hierarchical levels are significant. More precisely, top-level managers 
tend to have more top-down (β = .20, p < .01) and bottom-up (β = .15, p < .05) 
knowledge inflows than front-line managers. Middle-level managers tend to have 
more top-down (β = .19, p < .01) and horizontal (β = .11, p < .10) knowledge 
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inflows than front-line managers. Furthermore, front-office managers (β = -.13, p 
< .10) have less horizontal knowledge inflows than back-office managers. 
Regarding managers’ top down- knowledge inflows, model 2a of table 5.5 
shows that rewards based on overall firm performance (β = .23, p < .01), 
formalization of tasks (β = .15, p < .05), and the use of IT-systems to conduct tasks 
(β = .15, p < .05) are all positively related to top-down knowledge inflows. The 
coefficients of the other organizational factors are not significant. Hence, only 
rewards based on overall firm performance as an organizational factor of 
coordination capabilities affect top-down knowledge inflows, both organizational 
factors as common features of systems capabilities affect top-down knowledge 
inflows, and none of the organizational factors of socialization capabilities affect 
managers’ top-down knowledge inflows. All significant relationships are as 
hypothesized. 
Regarding managers’ bottom-up knowledge inflows, model 2b of table 5.5 
shows that two organizational factors as features of coordination capabilities are 
positively related to bottom-up knowledge inflows; participation in decision 
making (β = .20, p < .05) and rewards based on overall firm performance (β = .18, 
p < .05). None of the organizational factors pertaining to systems capabilities are 
significantly related to bottom-up knowledge inflows. Furthermore, only tolerance 
for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors (β = .21, p < .05) as an 
organizational factors as common feature of socialization capabilities is 
significantly related -positively- to bottom-up knowledge inflows. All significant 
relationships are as hypothesized. 
Regarding managers’ horizontal knowledge inflows, model 2c of table 5.5 
shows that, as expected, all three organizational factors of coordination 
capabilities are significantly and positively related to horizontal knowledge 
inflows; participation in decision making (β = .17, p < .05), participation in cross-
functional interfaces (β = .11, p < .10), and rewards based on overall firm 
performance (β = .14, p < .05). Regarding organizational factors as common 
features of systems capabilities, the coefficient for formalization of tasks is not 
significant; only the use of IT-systems to conduct tasks (β = -.15, p < .01) is 
negatively related to horizontal knowledge inflows. Finally, as expected, with 
respect to organizational factors of socialization capabilities; connectedness to 
other organization members (β = .11, p < .10) and tolerance for ambiguity of a 
manager’s peers and/ or superiors (β = .27, p < .01) positively relate to horizontal 
knowledge inflows. All significant relationships are as hypothesized. 
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Knowledge Inflows and Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities 
The third part of this study’s hypotheses is about the impact of managers’ 
knowledge inflows on their exploration and exploitation activities. Model 5 of 
tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the corresponding hierarchical regression results for 
exploration (table 5.3) and exploitation (table 5.4). Table 5.3, model 5, shows that, 
regarding exploration activities, as expected, top-down knowledge inflows are not 
significantly related to managers’ exploration activities, whereas both bottom-up 
knowledge inflows (β = .18, p < .05) and horizontal knowledge inflows (β = .17, p 
< .05) are significantly and positively related to managers’ exploration activities. 
Table 5.4, model 5, shows that, regarding exploitation activities, as expected, top-
down knowledge inflows (β = .32, p < .001) are significantly and positively related 
to managers’ exploitation activities. As expected, bottom-up and horizontal 
knowledge inflows are not significantly related to managers’ exploitation 
activities. All significant relationships are as hypothesized. 
 
The Mediating Role of Knowledge Inflows 
We argued in the previous chapters that managers’ knowledge inflows act 
as mediators between the organizational factors and managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. In this section, we will assess mediation effects with help of 
this section’s regression analyses, i.e. those in tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. Due to small 
sample size, we will not provide statistical tests for the mediation effects. 
However, in section 5.6, which is on the integrated data set, we will statistically 
test for the mediation effects. To assess mediation effects with regression analyses, 
the following regression equations should be estimated with several conditions to 
hold (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004): 
First, the independent variables (organizational factors) must affect the 
mediators (managers’ knowledge inflows). This refers to models 2 in table 5.5, 
which indicate that, (1) participation in cross functional interfaces, formalization 
of tasks, and use of IT systems to conduct tasks affect top-down knowledge 
inflows, (2) participation in decision making, rewards based on overall firm 
performance, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors 
affect bottom-up knowledge inflows, and (3) all organizational factors, but 
formalization of tasks, affect horizontal knowledge inflows. All directionalities are 
as hypothesized. 
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Second, the independent variables (organizational factors) must be shown 
to affect the dependent variables (managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities). This refers to models 2 in tables 5.3 and 5.4, which show that all 
organizational factors, but two (formalization of tasks and connectedness to other 
organization members) significantly relate to exploration, whereas three 
organizational factors (participation in decision making, formalization of tasks and 
use of IT-systems to conduct tasks) significantly relate to exploitation. All 
directionalities are as hypothesized. 
Third, the mediators (managers’ knowledge inflows) must affect the 
dependent variables (managers’ exploration and exploitation activities), with the 
independent variables controlled for. This refers to models 4 in tables 5.3 and 5.4, 
which show that managers’ bottom-up (β = .17, p < .05) and horizontal (β = .17, p 
< .05) knowledge inflows positively and significantly relate to managers’ 
exploration activities, and that top down knowledge inflows positively and 
significantly relate to manager’s exploitation activities (β = .30, p < .001). All 
directionalities are as hypothesized. 
If the previous three conditions all hold in the predicted directions, then, 
for mediation to exist, the effect of the organizational factors must be less in 
models 4 of tables 5.3 and 5.4 than in models 2 of tables 5.3 and 5.4; i.e. there 
should be a reduction of the size of the coefficients of organizational factors, and a 
reduction in significance level (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Taking the above 
mentioned conditions into consideration, and examining tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 
teaches that4 top-down knowledge inflows mediate the relation between 
formalization of tasks and use of IT-systems to conduct tasks, and managers’ 
exploitation activities. Bottom-up knowledge inflows mediate the relation between 
participation in decision making, rewards based on overall firm performance, and 
tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors, and managers’ 
exploration activities. Horizontal knowledge inflows mediate the relation between 
all organization factors, but formalization of tasks and connectedness to other 
organization members, and managers’ exploration activities.  
 
                                                 
4 As models 3 and 5 in tables 5.3 and 5.4 show, as expected, that top-down knowledge inflows not 
significantly relate to exploration, and that bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows not 
significantly relate to exploitation, it makes no sense to examine either mediation effects of top-down 
knowledge inflows regarding exploration, or mediation effects of bottom-up and horizontal 
knowledge inflows regarding exploitation. 
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5.3 – Philips Dataset 
 
Control Variables and Descriptives 
Table 5.6 shows managers’ mean levels of exploration and exploitation 
activities at different hierarchical levels, functions and organization units. We 
conducted t-tests to identify significant (p < .05; 1-tail) differences, such as the 
LDS (least-significant-difference) method, which compares the mean of each 
control variable’s group with the mean of each other group of the same control 
variable. Regarding hierarchical level, top managers engage more in exploration 
as compared to exploitation, whereas middle managers engage more in 
exploitation as compared to exploration. There is no significant difference between 
exploration and exploitation at front-line managers. The only significant difference 
between hierarchical levels is that middle level managers engage more in 
exploitation activities as compared to top-managers. 
Regarding function; managers with a R&D function and managers with a 
marketing and sales function engage significantly more in exploration activities as 
compared to exploitation activities. Managers with ‘other’ functions engage more 
in exploitation as compared to exploration. The data indicates moreover that 
managers with a R&D function and managers with a marketing and sales function 
engage significantly more in exploration activities as compared to managers with a 
function other than R&D or marketing and sales. There is no significant difference 
between R&D and marketing and sales managers. Moreover, there are no 
significant differences between functions in terms of exploitation.  
Regarding organization unit, managers in the innovative product units 
engage significantly more in exploration as compared to exploitation, whereas 
managers in the production support unit engage significantly more in exploitation 
activities as compared to exploration. There is no significant difference between 
exploration and exploitation within the standard products units. The data indicates 
furthermore that, between units, there are no significant differences in terms of 
managers’ exploration activities. With respect to exploitation, however, managers 
in the production support unit and those in the standard products units significantly 
engage more in exploitation activities as compared to managers in the innovative 
products units. There are no significant differences between managers of the 
production support and standard products units. 
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Table 5.6 – Philips: Control Variables’ Categories with Corresponding Means and 
Standard Deviationsa of Outcome Variables 
Control Variable Exploration activities Exploitation activities 
Hierarchical level      
• Top (N = 8) 5.08 (.66) 4.77 (.73)  
• Middle (N = 32) 5.01 (.89) 5.32 (.90)  
• Front (N = 78) 5.31 (.98) 5.12 (.76)  
      
Function      
• R&D (N = 53) 5.34 (.86) 5.11 (.72)  
• M&S (N = 17) 5.54 (1.09) 5.01 (.92)  
• Other (N = 48) 4.95 (.93) 5.35 (.82)  
      
Unit      
• Innovative prod. (N = 41) 5.44 (.80) 4.93 (.87)  
• Standard prod. (N = 51) 5.13 (1.05) 5.29 (.74)  
• Prod. support (N = 26) 5.02 (.95) 5.42 (.71)  
      
Total ( N = 118) 5.21 (.95) 5.19 (.80)  
aStandard deviation in parentheses 
 
A closer examination of the data (see also figure 5.2) shows furthermore 
that differences between organization units in terms of exploration and of 
exploitation are strongly related to front-line managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. Although variation analyses of the interaction effects 
between hierarchical level and organization unit on exploration and exploitation 
indicate that none of these effects is significant (p < .05 of F values interaction 
effects), t-tests (significant at p < .05; 1-tailed), conducted at all hierarchical 
levels, of differences between exploration activities of managers in different 
organization units, indicate that different levels of exploration between units are 
due to front-line managers. For instance, front-line managers of the innovative 
products units engage significantly more in exploration activities than front-line 
managers in the production support unit. There are no such significant differences 
at the top or middle-level. The large difference between top-managers is not 
significant due to small sample size. Similarly, regarding exploitation, differences 
between units are mainly due to front-line managers. For instance, front-line 
managers of the production support unit significantly engage more in exploitation 
activities than front line managers of the innovative products units, whereas there 
are no significant differences at the top- and middle-level. 
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Figure 5.2 – Philips: Different Mean Valuesa for Exploration and Exploitation across Units, at 
Various Hierarchical Levels 
4
4,5
5
5,5
6
Top
Middle
Front
Hierarchical
level
Managers’ exploration act. (mean)
Innovative units
(focus on exploration)
Prod. Support unit
(focus on exploitation)  
4
4,5
5
5,5
6
Top
Middle
Front
Hierarchical
level
Managers’ exploitation act. (mean)
Innovative units
(focus on exploration)
Prod. Support unit
(focus on exploitation)  
aDotted lines: insignificant difference at hierarchical level between units; Straight lines: 
significant difference at hierarchical level between units (t-test, p < .05; 1-tail) 
 
Table 5.7 – Philips: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 mean St.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Exploration activities 5.21 .95   
2 Exploitation activities 5.19 .80 .02   
3 Top-down Kn. Inflows 3.74 1.28 .20 .41   
4 Bottom-up Kn. Inflows 5.27 1.48 49 .23 .39   
5 Horizontal Kn. Inflows 4.37 1.11 .56 .12 .31 .42   
6 Part. in decision making 5.11 1.25 .35 .06 .05 .33 .37   
7 Cross-unit interfaces 4.71 1.39 .32 .14 .22 .30 .51 .13  
8 Rewards b.o. overall perf. 3.45 1.51 .47 .13 .37 .38 .56 .31 .41 
9 Formalization of tasks 4.58 1.12 -.07 .42 .33 .01 .04 -.05 .10 
10 Use of IT-systems 4.29 1.56 -.11 .13 .24 .08 -.15 -.15 .02 
11 Connectedness 3.92 1.41 .13 .11 .20 .10 .38 .11 .22 
12 Tolerance Ambiguity 5.09 1.10 .44 -.01 .16 .29 .44 .13 -.16 
13 Hierar. level top .07 .25 -.04 -.14 -.02 -.10 .10 -.05 .10 
14 Hierar. level middle .27 .45 -.13 .09 .02 .03 -.10 -.05 .04 
15 Hierar. level front .66 .46 .14 -.01 -.00 .02 .04 .07 -.09 
16 Function R&D .45 .50 .12 -.09 -.24 -.04 .02 .01 -.09 
17 Function M&S .14 .35 .14 -.10 .08 .09 .13 .01 .14 
18 Function Other .41 .49 -.23 .16 .18 -.02 -.11 -.02 -.02 
19 Innovative products unit .35 .48 .18 -.24 -.01 .07 .02 .03 -.05 
20 Standard products unit .43 .50 -.08 .11 .00 .01 .02 -.12 .16 
21 Production support unit .22 .42 -.11 .15 .01 -.10 -.04 .11 -.13 
N = 118. All correlations above ⎜.24⎜ are significant at p < .01, All correlations above ⎜.20⎜ 
are significant at p < .05 (2-tailed) 
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Summarizing; the data indicates that differences between organization 
units and between functions in levels of exploration and/ or exploitation are 
development to engage more in exploration activities as compared to managers in 
the other functional areas, the data indicates that managers in marketing and sales 
also engage significantly more in exploration. Regarding marketing and sales, the 
company launched a new company-wide publicity campaign in 2004 which may 
have force these managers to engage more in exploration activities than we 
initially expected. Between organizational units we found, as expected, managers 
in the production support unit and those in the standard products units to engage 
significantly more in exploitation activities as compared to managers in the 
innovative products units. With respect to exploration, we did not find differences 
between units. We expected, furthermore, top-level managers to engage more than 
 
Table 5.7 – (Cont.) 
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9 .14     
10 .04 .13     
11 .36 .04 .08    
12 31 -.02 -.09 .11   
13 -.01 -.25 .07 .27 -.12   
14 -.12 -.07 .21 -.03 -.17 -.17   
15 .12 .20 -.23 -.11 .23 -.38 -.85   
16 -.16 -.02 -.06 -.13 .09 -.11 -.13 .18   
17 .14 -.11 -.11 .02 .12 .08 -.09 .04 -.37   
18 .06 .10 .13 .12 -.17 .05 .19 -.21 -.75 -.34   
19 .13 -21 -.00 -.07 .16 .09 .16 -.19 -.09 .06 .05  
20 .00 .16 -.05 -.21 -.12 .,10 -.03 .08 .11 .03 -.13 -.64 
21 .15 .05 .07 .33 -.04 .02 -.14 .12 -.03 -.10 .10 -.39 -.46
 
largely as expected. Although we only expected managers in research & 
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middle-level and front-line managers in both exploration and exploitation 
activities. The data does not confirm this however. The data indicates furthermore 
that differences between organization units in terms of exploration and of 
exploitation are strongly related to front-line managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. In other words; front-line managers tend to specialize in 
either exploration or exploitation within distinct organization units, whereas top-
and middle-level managers have more consistent levels of exploration and 
exploitation across organization units. 
 
Table 5.7 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables 
as used in the study. The table shows that several of the predictor variables and 
several of the control variables significantly relate to each other. To examine the 
issue of multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) have been calculated in 
each of the regression equations. VIF factors range between 1.08 and 2.48, which 
is below the rule-of-thumb cut-off of 10 (Hair et al., 1998). 
 
Organizational Factors and Managers’ Exploration & Exploitation Activities 
The first part of this study’s hypotheses is about the direct impact of the 
organizational factors on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Table 
5.8 shows the hierarchical regression results for exploration; table 5.9 shows the 
results for exploitation. In both tables, model 1 is the baseline models containing 
the control variables. The coefficients as shown in model 2 pertain to the total 
effect of the organizational factors on exploration (table 5.8) and on exploitation 
(table 5.9), i.e. both their direct and indirect effects. To gain insight into the direct 
effects only of the organizational factors, we have to look at the full model; model 
5 of both tables. 
Among the control variables, model 5 shows that managers with a R&D 
function (β = .18, p < .05) significantly engage more in exploration activities than 
managers with a function labeled as ‘other’. Managers of the innovative products 
units engage significantly more in exploration activities (β = .19, p < .10) and less 
in exploitation activities (β = -.29, p < .05) as compared to managers of the 
production support unit. These regression analysis results are in line with the 
findings of table 5.6. Moreover, they indicate that among the control variables 
functional and organization unit effects explain most of the variance of managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities. 
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Regarding managers’ exploration activities, model 5 of table 5.8 shows 
that only rewards based on overall firm performance has a significant, and positive 
direct effect (β = .23, p < .05). Regarding the total effect of the organizational 
factors; i.e. both their direct and indirect effects, model 2 of table 5.8 shows that 
all three organizational factors as common features of coordination capabilities; 
participation in decision making (β = .18, p < .05), participation in cross-functional 
interfaces (β = .14, p < .10), and rewards based on overall firm performance (β = 
.35, p < .001), are positively and significantly related to exploration activities. 
With respect to organizational factors of systems capabilities; the coefficients for 
formalization of tasks and for use of I-T-systems to conduct tasks are both 
negative, but only the coefficient for use of I-T-systems to conduct tasks is 
significant (β = .12, p < .10). Finally, the coefficient for connectedness to other 
organization members is not significant, indicating that only tolerance for 
ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors (β = .20, p < .05) as an 
organizational factors of socialization capabilities affects managers’ exploration 
activities. All significant relationships are as hypothesized. 
Regarding managers’ exploitation activities, model 5 of table 5.9 shows 
that only formalization of tasks has a significant and positive direct effect (β = .32, 
p < .01). Regarding the total effect of the organizational factors, i.e. both their 
direct and indirect effects, model 2 of table 5.9 shows that, unexpectedly, none of 
the coefficients of the organizational factors associated with coordination 
capabilities are significantly related to exploitation. Both organizational factors as 
features of systems capabilities; formalization of tasks (β = .40, p < .001) and the 
use of IT-systems for conducting tasks (β = .17, p < .10) are positively and 
significantly related to exploitation activities. Finally, the coefficients for 
connectedness to other organization members and tolerance for ambiguity of a 
manager’s peers and/or superiors are not significant. So, unexpectedly, 
organizational factors of socialization capabilities have no effect on exploitation. 
All significant relationships are as hypothesized. 
 
Organizational Factors and Managers’ Knowledge Inflows 
The second part of this study’s hypotheses is about the impact of 
organizational factors on managers’ knowledge inflows. Table 5.10 shows the 
corresponding hierarchical regression results for top-down, bottom-up, and 
horizontal knowledge inflows. In all three series of regression analyses, models 1 
are the baseline models containing the control variables. Models 2 are the full
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models, which show that, among the control variables, only one coefficient is 
significant. More precisely, managers with an R&D function tend to have 
significantly less top-down knowledge inflows (β = -.17, p < .10) as compared to 
managers with functions as labeled ‘others’. 
Regarding managers’ top down- knowledge inflows, model 2a of table 
5.10 shows that rewards based on overall firm performance (β = .21, p < .05), 
formalization of tasks (β = .55, p < .001), and the use of IT-systems to conduct 
tasks (β = .29, p < .01) are all positively and significantly related to top-down 
knowledge inflows. The coefficients of the other organizational factors are not 
significant. Hence, only rewards based on overall firm performance as an 
organizational factor of coordination capabilities affect top-down knowledge 
inflows, both organizational factors associated with of systems capabilities affect 
top-down knowledge inflows, and none of the organizational factors of 
socialization capabilities affect top-down knowledge inflows. Regarding 
managers’ bottom-up knowledge inflows, model 2b of table 5.10 shows that two 
organizational factors as features of coordination capabilities are positively and 
significantly related to bottom-up knowledge inflows; participation in decision 
making (β = .25, p < .01) and rewards based on overall firm performance (β = .21, 
p < .10). None of the organizational factors pertaining to systems capabilities are 
significantly related to bottom-up knowledge inflows. Furthermore, only tolerance 
for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors (β = .16, p < .10) as an 
organizational factors as common feature of socialization capabilities is 
significantly related -positively- to bottom-up knowledge inflows. Regarding 
managers’ horizontal knowledge inflows, model 2c of table 5.10 shows that, as 
expected, all three organizational factors as common features of coordination 
capabilities are significantly and positively related to horizontal knowledge 
inflows; participation in decision making (β = .21, p < .01), participation in cross-
functional interfaces (β = .27, p < .001), and rewards based on overall firm 
performance (β = .27, p < .01). Regarding organizational factors of systems 
capabilities, formalization of tasks is not significantly related, whereas the use of 
IT-systems to conduct tasks is significantly and negatively related to horizontal 
knowledge inflows (β = -.15, p < .10). Finally, as expected, with respect to 
organizational factors as features of socialization capabilities; connectedness to 
other organization members (β = .20, p < .05) and tolerance for ambiguity of a 
manager’s peers and/or superiors (β =.26, p < .01) positively relate to horizontal 
knowledge inflows. All significant relationships are as hypothesized. 
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Knowledge Inflows and Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities 
The third part of this study’s hypotheses is about the impact of managers’ 
knowledge inflows on their exploration and exploitation activities. Model 5 of 
tables 5.8 and 5.9 show the corresponding hierarchical regression results for 
exploration (table 5.8) and exploitation (table 5.9). Table 5.8, model 5 shows that, 
regarding exploration activities, as expected, top-down knowledge inflows are not 
significantly related to managers’ exploration activities, whereas both bottom-up 
knowledge inflows (β = .22, p < .05) and horizontal knowledge inflows (β = .22, p 
< .05) are significantly and positively related to managers’ exploration activities. 
Table 5.9, model 5, shows that, regarding exploitation activities, as expected, top-
down knowledge inflows (β = .23, p < .05) are significantly and positively related 
to managers’ exploitation activities. As expected, bottom-up and horizontal 
knowledge inflows are not significantly related to managers’ exploitation 
activities. All significant relationships are as hypothesized. 
 
The Mediating Role of Knowledge Inflows 
We argued in the previous chapters that managers’ knowledge inflows act 
as mediators between the organizational factors and managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. In this section, we will assess mediation effects with help of 
this section’s regression analyses, i.e. those in tables 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10. Due to 
small sample size, we will not provide statistical tests for the mediation effects. 
However, in section 5.6, which is on the integrated data set, we will statistically 
test for the mediation effects. To assess mediation effects with regression analyses, 
the following regression equations should be estimated with several conditions to 
hold (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004): 
First, the independent variables (organizational factors) must affect the 
mediators (managers’ knowledge inflows). This refers to models 2 in table 5.10, 
which indicate that, (1) rewards based on overall firm performance, formalization 
of tasks, and use of IT-systems to conduct tasks affect top-down knowledge 
inflows, (2) that participation in decision making, rewards based on overall firm 
performance, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors 
affect bottom-up knowledge inflows, and (3) that all organizational factors, but 
formalization of tasks, affect horizontal knowledge inflows. All directionalities are 
as hypothesized. 
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Second, the independent variables (organizational factors) must be shown 
to affect the dependent variables (managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities). This refers to models 2 in tables 5.8 and 5.9, which show that all three 
organizational factors of coordination capabilities, the use of IT-systems to 
conduct tasks, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors 
significantly relate to exploration, whereas both organizational factors as common 
features of systems capabilities significantly relate to exploitation. All 
directionalities are as hypothesized. 
Third, the mediators (managers’ knowledge inflows) must affect the 
dependent variables (managers’ exploration and exploitation activities), with the 
independent variables controlled for. This refers to models 4 in tables 5.8 and 5.9, 
which show that managers’ bottom-up (β = .25, p < .01) and horizontal (β = .27, p 
< .05) knowledge inflows positively and significantly relate to managers’ 
exploration activities, and that top down knowledge inflows positively and 
significantly relate to manager’s exploitation activities (β = .29, p < .01). All 
directionalities are as hypothesized. 
If the previous three conditions all hold in the predicted directions, then, 
for mediation to exist, the effect of the organizational factors must be less in 
models 4 of tables 5.8 and 5.9 than in models 2 of tables 5.8 and 5.9; i.e. there 
should be a reduction of the size of the coefficients of organizational factors, and a 
reduction in significance level (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Taking the above 
mentioned conditions into consideration, and examining tables 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10 
teaches that5 top-down knowledge inflows mediate the relation between 
formalization of tasks and use of IT-systems to conduct tasks, and managers’ 
exploitation activities. Bottom-up knowledge inflows mediate the relation between 
participation in decision making, rewards based on overall firm performance, and 
tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors, and managers’ 
exploration activities. Horizontal knowledge inflows mediate the relation between 
all organization factors and managers’ exploration activities, but not for 
formalization of tasks, and connectedness to other organization members.  
 
                                                 
5 As models 3 and 5 in tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that top-down knowledge inflows not significantly 
relate to exploration, and that bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows not significantly relate to 
exploitation, it makes no sense to examine either mediation effects of top-down knowledge inflows 
regarding exploration, or mediation effects of bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows regarding 
exploitation. 
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5.4 – Deloitte Dataset 
 
Control Variables and Descriptives 
Table 5.11 shows managers’ mean levels of exploration and exploitation 
activities at different hierarchical levels and organization units. As explained in 
section 4.5.4, we only distinguish hierarchical levels and organizational units at 
Deloitte, and not also functional areas. We conducted t-tests to identify significant 
(p < .05; 1-tail) differences, such as the LDS (least-significant-difference) method, 
which compares the mean of each control variable’s group with the mean of each 
other group of the same control variable. Regarding hierarchical levels, managers 
of all levels significantly engage more in exploitation activities as compared to 
exploration activities. Moreover, top- and middle-level managers engage more in 
exploration activities than front-line managers. There is no significant exploration 
difference between top- and middle-level managers. With respect to exploitation 
activities, there are no significant differences between the three hierarchical levels.  
 
Table 5.11 – Deloitte: Control Variables’ Categories’ with Corresponding Means and 
Standard Deviationsa of Outcome Variables 
Control Variable Exploration activities Exploitation activities 
Hierarchical level      
• Top (N = 33) 4.49 (1.06) 4.94 (.79)  
• Middle (N = 76) 4.49 (1.01) 4.85 (.85)  
• Front (N = 115) 3.91 (1.23) 4.96 (.88)  
      
Unit      
• Audit (N = 95) 3.95 (1.13) 5.16 (.86)  
• Tax & Legal (N = 48) 4.29 (1.02) 4.90 (.71)  
• Consultancy (N = 34) 4.76 (1.27) 4.45 (.78)  
• Finance (N = 13) 4.51 (1.17) 4.34 (.75)  
• Central & Support (N = 34) 4.27 (1.12) 4.92 (.83)  
      
Total ( N = 224) 4.23 (1.16) 4.91 (.85)  
aStandard deviation in parentheses 
 
Regarding organization unit, managers in the audit, tax & legal division, 
and central & support unit engage more in exploitation activities as compared to 
exploration activities. There are no significant differences between exploration and 
exploitation in the other two divisions. Moreover, managers in the consultancy 
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division engage significantly more in exploration activities as compared to 
managers in the audit and tax & legal division and central & support unit. There 
are further no differences among divisions with respect to exploration. Finally, 
managers in the audit, tax & legal, and central & support unit engage more in 
exploitation activities as compared to managers in the consultancy and the finance 
division. There are further no differences between organization units with respect 
to exploitation. 
 
Figure 5.3 – Deloitte: Different Mean Valuesa for Exploration and Exploitation across 
Units, at Various Hierarchical Levels 
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
5,5
6
Top
Middle
Front
Hierarchical
level
Managers’ exploration act. (mean)
Consulting
(focus on exploration)
Audit
(focus on exploitation)  
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
5,5
6
Top
Middle
Front
Hierarchical
level
Managers’ exploitation act. (mean)
Consulting
(focus on exploration)
Audit
(focus on exploitation)  
aDotted lines: insignificant difference at hierarchical level between units; Straight lines: 
significant difference at hierarchical level between units (t-test, p < .05; 1-tail) 
 
A closer examination of the data (see also figure 5.3) shows furthermore 
that differences between organization units in terms of exploration and of 
exploitation are strongly related to front-line managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. Although variation analyses of the interaction effects 
between hierarchical level and organization unit on exploration and exploitation 
indicate that none of these effects is significant (p < .05 of F values interaction 
effects), t-tests (significant at p < .05; 1-tailed), conducted at all hierarchical 
levels, of differences between exploration activities of managers in different 
organization units, indicate that different levels of exploration between units are 
mainly due to front-line managers. For instance, front-line managers of the 
consulting division significantly engage more in exploration activities than front-
line managers of the audit division, whereas there are no significant differences at 
the top- and middle-level. Regarding exploitation, differences between units are 
due to both front-line and middle managers. For instance, both front-line and
146
 136 
Table 5.12 – Deloitte: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 mean St.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Exploration activities 4.23 1.16   
2 Exploitation activities 4.91 .85 -.35   
3 Top-down Kn. Inflows 3.35 1.14 .02 .19   
4 Bottom-up Kn. Inflows 3.81 1.56 .38 -.11 -.00   
5 Horizontal Kn. Inflows 4.14 1.03 .42 -.13 .17 .38   
6 Part. in decision making 3.52 1.65 .37 -.23 -.06 .27 .33   
7 Cross-unit interfaces 4.05 1.40 .19 .04 .32 .20 .30 .19  
8 Rewards overall perf. 4.25 1.46 .32 -.20 .24 .21 .35 .31 .25 
9 Formalization of tasks 3.47 1.54 -.33 .44 .19 -.23 -.10 -.23 .05 
10 Use of IT-systems 4.61 1.53 -.05 .14 .32 -.02 .04 -.00 .53 
11 Connectedness 4.06 1.42 .20 -.05 .03 .08 .22 .29 .14 
12 Tolerance Ambiguity 4.54 1.56 .36 -.17 .12 .34 .34 .34 .26 
13 Hierar. level top .17 .37 .10 .02 -.10 .13 .11 .08 .02 
14 Hierar. level middle .38 .49 .18 -.06 -.15 .14 .01 .13 .01 
15 Hierar. level front .45 .50 -.25 .05 .23 -.24 -.08 -.19 -.03 
16 Unit: Audit .42 .50 -.20 .25 .06 .03 -.01 -.14 .01 
17 Unit: Tax & Legal .21 .41 .03 -.01 -.01 .00 -.04 -.09 .09 
18 Unit: Consultancy .15 .36 .20 -.23 -.07 .03 .14 .19 -.12 
19 Unit: Finance .06 .23 .06 -.17 .05 .13 .04 .08 .01 
20 Unit: Central & Sup. .15 .36 .02 .01 -.04 -.16 -.10 .06 .01 
N = 224. All correlations above ⎜.17⎜ are significant at p < .01, All correlations above ⎜.13⎜ 
are significant at p < .05 (2-tailed) 
 
middle managers of the audit division significantly engage more in exploitation 
activities than front-line and middle managers at the consulting division. There are 
no such significant differences at the top-level. 
Summarizing; the data indicates that differences between organization 
units in levels of exploration and exploitation are as expected. Managers of the 
audit and tax divisions and the central & support unit focus on exploitation, 
managers of the consulting division focus on exploration. Furthermore, at Deloitte, 
we expected higher level managers to engage more than lower-level managers in 
exploration, whereas we expected lower-level managers to engage more than other 
managers in exploitation. The data confirms this regarding exploration; top- and 
middle managers engage more in exploration activities than front-line managers. 
There are, however, no significant differences in terms of exploitation activities 
between the three hierarchical levels. The data indicates furthermore that 
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Table 5.12 – (Cont.) 
 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9 -.12      
10 .18 .12     
11 .35 -.09 .00    
12 .46 -.19 .12 .22   
13 .12 -.04 -.08 .20 -.15   
14 .04 -.14 -.04 .01 -.08 -.35   
15 -.13 .17 .09 -.16 .19 -.40 -.72   
16 .04 .12 .06 .01 .02 -.02 .03 -.02   
17 -.18 -.09 -.07 -.04 .00 .00 .17 -.17 -.45   
18 .13 -.12 -.02 .08 -.12 .15 -.10 -.01 -.36 -.22   
19 .10 -.11 .01 -.15 -.16 -.01 -.04 .04 -.21 -.13 -.11  
20 -.05 .13 -.00 .05 .20 -.12 -.10 .19 -.36 -.22 -.18 -.11 
 
differences between organization units in terms of exploration and of exploitation 
are strongly related to front-line managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. 
In other words; front-line managers tend to specialize in either exploration or 
exploitation within distinct organization units, whereas top- and middle-level 
managers have more consistent levels of exploration and exploitation across 
organization units. 
Table 5.12 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables 
as used in the study. The table shows that several of the predictor variables and 
several of the control variables significantly relate to each other. To examine the 
issue of multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) have been calculated in 
each of the regression equations. VIF factors range between 1.21 and 2.42, which 
is below the rule-of-thumb cut-off of 10 (Hair et al., 1998). 
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Organizational Factors and Managers’ Exploration & Exploitation Activities 
The first part of this study’s hypotheses is about the direct impact of the 
organizational factors on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. 
Table5.13 shows the hierarchical regression results for exploration; table 5.14 
shows the results for exploitation. In both tables, model 1 is the baseline models 
containing the control variables. The coefficients as shown in model 2 pertain to 
the total effect of the organizational factors on exploration (table 5.13) and on 
exploitation (table 5.14), i.e. both their direct and indirect effects. To gain insight 
into the direct effects only of the organizational factors, we have to look at the full 
model; model 5 of both tables. 
Among the control variables, model 5 shows that middle-level managers 
engage significantly more in exploration activities (β = .16, p < .05) than front-line 
managers. Managers of the audit division engage significantly less in exploration 
activities (β = -.26, p < .01) as compared to managers of the central & support unit. 
These findings correspond to table 5.12, and give no further insight into its 
corresponding on control variables. Thus, among the control variables, both 
hierarchical level and organization unit effects explain variance of managers’ 
exploration activities. 
Regarding managers’ exploration activities, model 5 of table 5.13 shows 
that only formalization of tasks has a significant, and negative direct effect (β = -
.20, p < .01). Regarding the total effect of the organizational factors; i.e. both their 
direct and indirect effects, model 2 of table 5.13 shows that all three organizational 
factors as common features of coordination capabilities; participation in decision 
making (β = .12, p < .10), participation in cross-functional interfaces (β = .19, p < 
.01), and rewards based on overall firm performance (β = .14, p < .05), are 
positively and significantly related to exploration activities. The coefficients for 
formalization of tasks (β = -.21, p < .01), and for use of IT-systems to conduct 
tasks (β = -.15, p < .05), are negative, and significant. Hence, the data show 
significant negative effects of organizational factors associated with systems 
capabilities on exploration. Finally, the coefficient for connectedness to other 
organization members is not significant, indicating that only tolerance for 
ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors (β = .16, p < .05) as an 
organizational factors of socialization capabilities affects managers’ exploration 
activities. All significant relationships are as hypothesized. 
Regarding managers’ exploitation activities, model 5 of table 5.14 shows 
that rewards based on overall firm performance has a significant and negative 
direct effect (β = -.19, p < .05) and that formalization of tasks (β = .34, p < .001) 
has a significant and positive direct effect on managers’ exploitation activities. 
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Regarding the total effect of the organizational factors; i.e. both their direct and 
indirect effects, model 2 of table 5.14 shows that only rewards based on overall 
firm performance as an organizational factor associated with coordination 
capabilities is significantly, and negatively, related to exploitation. Both 
organizational factors as features of systems capabilities, formalization of tasks (β 
= .36, p < .001) and the use of IT-systems for conducting tasks (β = .13, p < .10) 
are positively related to exploitation activities. Finally, the coefficients for 
connectedness to other organization members and tolerance for ambiguity of a 
manager’s peers and/ or superiors are not significant. So, unexpectedly, 
organizational factors as common features of socialization capabilities have no 
effect on exploitation. All significant relationships are as hypothesized. 
 
Organizational Factors and Managers’ Knowledge Inflows 
The second part of this study’s hypotheses is about the impact of 
organizational factors on managers’ knowledge inflows. Table 5.15 shows the 
corresponding hierarchical regression results for top-down, bottom-up, and 
horizontal knowledge inflows. In all three series of regression analyses, models 1 
are the baseline models containing the control variables. Models 2 are the full 
models, which show that, among the control variables, coefficients pertaining to 
the hierarchical levels and vertical knowledge inflows are significant. More 
precisely, top- and middle-level managers tend to have less top-down knowledge 
inflows (β = -.20, p < .01; β = -.22, p < .01) and more bottom-up knowledge 
inflows (β = .12, p < .10; β = .13, p < .10) as compared to front-line managers. 
Regarding horizontal knowledge inflows, managers of the consultancy division 
have more (β = .15, p < .10) horizontal knowledge inflows as compared to 
managers of the central &support unit. 
Regarding managers’ top down- knowledge inflows, model 2a of table 
5.15 shows that participation in cross-functional interfaces (β = .18, p < .05) and 
rewards based on overall firm performance (β = .24, p < .01) as organizational 
factors of coordination capabilities are positively related to top-down knowledge 
inflows. Participation in decision making is not significantly related to top-down 
knowledge inflows. Both organizational factors of systems capabilities are 
positively related to top-down knowledge inflows; formalization of tasks (β = .16, 
p < .05) and use of IT-systems to conduct tasks (β = .13, p < .10). Unexpectedly, 
the organizational factors of socialization capabilities are not significantly related 
to top-down knowledge inflows. All significant relationships are as hypothesized.
150
 
14
0
T
ab
le
 5
.1
3 
– 
D
el
oi
t t e
:  R
es
ul
ts
 o
f 
H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l  R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
A
na
ly
se
sa
:  I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l  F
ac
to
rs
 a
nd
 M
an
ag
er
s’
 
K
n o
w
le
d g
e  
In
fl
o w
s  
o n
 M
a n
a g
e r
s ’
 E
x p
lo
ra
tio
n  
A
c t
iv
iti
e s
 
 
E
x p
lo
r a
ti
o n
 A
c t
iv
it
ie
s  
C
o n
tr
o l
 V
a r
ia
b l
e s
 
M
o d
e l
 1
 
M
o d
e l
 2
 
M
o d
e l
 3
 
M
o d
e l
 4
a  
M
o d
e l
 4
b  
M
o d
e l
 5
 
H
ie
ra
rc
h i
c a
l l
e v
e l
: t
o p
 
.1
8
*  
.0
7
 
.1
1
†  
.0
5
 
.0
7
 
.0
6
 
H
ie
ra
rc
h i
c a
l l
e v
e l
: m
id
d l
e  
.2
7
* *
*  
.1
6
*  
.2
1
* *
 
.1
3
*  
.1
7
* *
 
.1
6
*  
U
ni
t: 
A
ud
it 
-.
20
* 
-.
21
* 
-.
27
**
 
-.
24
**
 
-.
24
**
 
-.
26
**
 
U
ni
t: 
T
ax
 &
 L
eg
al
 
-.
08
 
-.
11
 
-.
11
 
-.
11
 
-.
12
 
-.
13
 
U
ni
t: 
C
on
su
lta
nc
y 
.1
1
 
.0
3
 
.0
3
 
.0
2
 
-.
01
 
-.
02
 
U
ni
t: 
Fi
na
nc
e 
.0
3
 
-.
06
 
-.
04
 
-.
08
 
-.
07
 
-.
09
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
rg
. F
ac
to
rs
 o
f 
C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
C
ap
s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pa
rt
. i
n 
de
ci
si
on
 m
ak
in
g 
 
.1
2
†  
 
.0
9
 
.0
8
 
.0
7
 
Pa
rt
. i
n 
cr
os
s-
fu
nc
tio
na
l i
nt
er
fa
ce
s 
 
.1
9
**
 
 
.1
5
* 
.1
1
 
.0
9
 
R
ew
ar
ds
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
ov
er
al
l f
i r
m
 p
er
fo
rm
. 
 
.1
4
* 
 
.1
3
†  
.0
9
 
.0
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
rg
. F
ac
to
rs
 o
f 
Sy
st
em
s 
C
ap
ab
ili
ti
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n 
of
 ta
sk
s 
 
-.
21
**
 
 
-.
18
**
 
-.
21
**
* 
-.
20
**
 
U
se
 o
f 
IT
-s
ys
te
m
s 
to
 c
on
du
ct
 ta
sk
s 
 
-.
15
* 
 
-.
12
†  
-.
11
 
-.
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
rg
. F
ac
to
rs
 o
f 
So
ci
al
iz
at
io
n 
C
ap
s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
on
ne
ct
ed
ne
ss
 to
 o
th
er
 o
rg
. m
em
be
rs
 
 
.0
1
 
 
.0
2
 
-.
00
 
.0
1
 
T
ol
er
an
ce
 f
or
 a
m
bi
gu
ity
 
 
.1
6
* 
 
.1
3
†  
.1
3
†  
.1
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
In
fl
ow
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
op
-d
ow
n 
 
 
.0
4
 
 
 
.0
5
 
B
ot
to
m
-u
p 
 
 
.2
4
**
* 
.2
1
**
 
 
.1
6
* 
H
or
iz
on
ta
l 
 
 
.3
0
**
* 
 
.2
6
**
* 
.2
2
**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 
.1
3
 
.3
3
 
.3
2
 
.3
7
 
.3
8
 
.5
2
 
A
dj
us
te
d 
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 
.1
0
 
.2
9
 
.2
9
 
.3
3
 
.3
4
 
.4
5
 
F 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t o
f 
fi
t 
5.
26
**
* 
9.
33
**
* 
20
.6
**
* 
11
.0
**
 
16
.8
**
* 
7.
98
**
* 
a S
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d 
re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s;
 N
 =
 2
24
; †
 p
 <
 .1
0;
 *
 p
 <
 .0
5;
 *
* 
p 
< 
.0
1;
 *
**
 p
 <
 .0
01
151
 
14
1
T
ab
le
 5
.1
4 
– 
D
el
oi
t t e
:  R
es
ul
ts
 o
f 
H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l  R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
A
na
ly
se
sa
:  I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l  F
ac
to
rs
 a
nd
 
M
a n
a g
e r
s ’
 K
n o
w
le
d g
e  
In
fl
o w
s  
o n
 M
a n
a g
e r
s ’
 E
x p
lo
ita
tio
n  
A
c t
iv
iti
e s
 
 
E
x p
lo
it
a t
io
n  
A
c t
iv
it
ie
s  
C
o n
tr
o l
 V
a r
ia
b l
e s
 
M
o d
e l
 1
 
M
o d
e l
 2
 
M
o d
e l
 3
 
M
o d
e l
 4
 
M
o d
e l
 5
 
H
ie
ra
rc
h i
c a
l l
e v
e l
: t
o p
 
.0
2
 
.0
8
 
.0
8
 
.1
2
†  
.1
1
 
H
ie
ra
rc
h i
c a
l l
e v
e l
: m
id
d l
e  
-.
0 9
 
.0
1
 
-.
0 2
 
.0
5
 
.0
4
 
U
ni
t: 
A
ud
it 
.1
5
 
.1
6
†  
.1
4
 
.1
4
 
.1
4
 
U
ni
t: 
T
ax
 &
 L
eg
al
 
.0
1
 
.0
4
 
-.
01
 
.0
2
 
.0
2
 
U
ni
t: 
C
on
su
lta
nc
y 
-.
21
* 
-.
11
 
-.
18
* 
-.
12
 
-.
11
 
U
ni
t: 
Fi
na
nc
e 
-.
16
* 
-.
07
 
-.
16
* 
-.
08
 
-.
09
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
rg
. F
ac
to
rs
 o
f 
C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
C
ap
s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pa
rt
. i
n 
de
ci
si
on
 m
ak
in
g 
 
-.
06
 
 
-.
04
 
-.
04
 
Pa
rt
. i
n 
cr
os
s-
fu
nc
tio
na
l i
nt
er
fa
ce
s 
 
-.
03
 
 
-.
05
 
-.
05
 
R
ew
ar
ds
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
ov
er
al
l f
ir
m
 p
er
fo
rm
. 
 
-.
15
* 
 
-.
17
* 
-.
19
* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
rg
. F
ac
to
rs
 o
f 
Sy
st
em
s 
C
ap
ab
ili
ti
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n 
of
 ta
sk
s 
 
.3
6
**
* 
 
.3
4
**
* 
.3
4
**
* 
U
se
 o
f 
IT
-s
ys
te
m
s 
to
 c
on
du
ct
 ta
sk
s 
 
.1
3
†  
 
.1
1
 
.1
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
rg
. F
ac
to
rs
 o
f 
So
ci
al
iz
at
io
n 
C
ap
s.
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
on
ne
ct
ed
ne
ss
 to
 o
th
er
 o
rg
. m
em
be
rs
 
 
.0
4
 
 
.0
4
 
.0
5
 
T
ol
er
an
ce
 f
or
 a
m
bi
gu
ity
 
 
-.
01
 
 
-.
02
 
-.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
In
fl
ow
s 
 
 
 
 
 
T
op
-d
ow
n 
 
 
.2
1
**
 
.1
6
* 
.1
7
* 
B
ot
to
m
-u
p 
 
 
-.
05
 
 
.0
5
 
H
or
iz
on
ta
l 
 
 
-.
11
 
 
-.
05
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 
.1
2
 
.3
0
 
.1
7
 
.3
2
 
.3
2
 
A
dj
us
te
d 
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 
.0
9
 
.2
6
 
.1
3
 
.2
7
 
.2
7
 
F 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t o
f 
fi
t 
4.
76
**
* 
6.
92
**
* 
4.
29
**
 
6.
09
* 
2.
30
†  
a S
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d 
re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s;
 N
 =
 2
44
; †
 p
 <
 .1
0;
 *
 p
 <
 .0
5;
 *
* 
p 
< 
.0
1;
 *
**
 p
 <
 .0
01
 
152
 
14
2
T
ab
le
 5
.1
5 
– 
D
el
oi
t t e
:  R
es
ul
ts
 o
f 
H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l  R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
A
na
ly
si
sa
:  I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
O
rg
.  F
ac
to
rs
 o
n 
M
an
ag
er
s’
 K
no
w
le
dg
e 
In
fl
ow
s 
 
T
o p
-D
o w
n  
K
n o
w
le
d g
e  
I n
fl
o w
s  
 
B
o t
to
m
-U
p  
K
n o
w
le
d g
e  
I n
fl
o w
s  
 
H
o r
iz
o n
ta
l K
n o
w
le
d g
e  
I n
fl
o w
s  
C
o n
tr
o l
 V
a r
ia
b l
e s
 
M
o d
e l
 1
a  
M
o d
e l
 2
a  
 
M
o d
e l
 1
b  
M
o d
e l
 2
b  
 
M
o d
e l
 1
c  
M
o d
e l
 2
c  
H
ie
ra
rc
h i
c a
l l
e v
e l
: t
o p
 
-.
1 9
*  
-.
2 0
* *
 
 
.1
9  
* *
 
.1
2
†  
 
.1
0
 
-.
0 1
 
H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l l
ev
el
: m
id
dl
e 
-.
24
**
 
-.
22
**
 
 
.2
1 
**
 
.1
3
†  
 
.0
5
 
-.
04
 
U
ni
t: 
A
ud
it 
.1
4
 
.1
0
 
 
.1
5 
 
.1
3
 
 
.0
9
 
.1
1
 
U
ni
t: 
T
ax
 &
 L
eg
al
 
.1
1
 
.1
4
 
 
.0
8 
 
.0
4
 
 
.0
4
 
.0
6
 
U
ni
t: 
C
on
su
lta
nc
y 
.0
2
 
.0
4
 
 
.1
1 
 
.0
5
 
 
.1
8
* 
.1
5
†  
U
ni
t: 
Fi
na
nc
e 
.0
8
 
.0
7
 
 
.1
9 
* 
.1
1
 
 
.0
9
 
.0
4
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
O
rg
. F
ac
to
rs
 a
s 
c.
f.
 C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
C
ap
s.
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Pa
rt
. i
n 
de
ci
si
on
 m
ak
in
g 
 
-.
09
 
 
  
.1
3
†  
 
 
.1
6
* 
Pa
rt
. i
n 
cr
os
s-
fu
nc
tio
na
l i
nt
er
fa
ce
s 
 
.1
8
* 
 
  
.2
0
* 
 
 
.2
9
**
* 
R
ew
ar
ds
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
ov
er
al
l f
ir
m
 p
er
fo
rm
. 
 
.2
4
**
 
 
  
.0
4
 
 
 
.1
7
* 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
O
rg
. F
ac
to
rs
 a
s 
c.
f.
 S
ys
te
m
s 
C
ap
ab
ili
ti
es
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n 
of
 ta
sk
s 
 
.1
6
* 
 
  
-.
13
* 
 
 
.0
1
 
U
se
 o
f 
IT
-s
ys
te
m
s 
to
 c
on
du
ct
 ta
sk
s 
 
.1
3
†  
 
  
-.
13
†  
 
 
-.
16
* 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
O
rg
. F
ac
to
rs
 a
s 
c.
f.
 S
oc
ia
liz
at
io
n 
C
ap
s.
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
C
on
ne
ct
ed
ne
ss
 to
 o
th
er
 o
rg
. m
em
be
rs
 
 
.0
1
 
 
  
-.
06
 
 
 
.1
2
†  
T
ol
er
an
ce
 f
or
 a
m
bi
gu
ity
 
 
.0
4
 
 
  
.1
8
* 
 
 
.1
3
†  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 
.0
7
 
.2
6
 
 
.0
9 
 
.2
3
 
 
.0
4
 
.2
6
 
A
dj
us
te
d 
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 
.0
4
 
.2
1
 
 
.0
6 
 
.1
8
 
 
.0
1
 
.2
1
 
F 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t o
f 
fi
t 
2.
52
* 
7.
67
**
* 
 
3.
47
 *
* 
5.
30
**
* 
 
1.
41
 
9.
00
**
* 
a S
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d 
re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s;
 N
 =
 2
24
; †
 p
 <
 .1
0;
 *
 p
 <
 .0
5;
 *
* 
p 
< 
.0
1;
 *
**
 p
 <
 .0
01
 
153
  143 
Regarding managers’ bottom-up knowledge inflows, model 2b of table 
5.15 shows that two organizational factors as features of coordination capabilities 
are positively related to bottom-up knowledge inflows; participation in decision 
making (β = .13, p < .10) and participation in cross-functional interfaces (β = .20,p 
< .05). Rewards based on overall firm performance have no significant 
relationship. Both of the organizational factors pertaining to systems capabilities 
are significantly and negatively related to bottom-up knowledge inflows; 
formalization of tasks (β = -.13, p < .05) and use of IT-systems to conduct tasks (β 
= -.13, p < .10). Furthermore, only tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers 
and/ or superiors (β = .18, p < .05) as a common feature of socialization 
capabilities is significantly related -positively- to bottom-up knowledge inflows. 
All significant relationships are as hypothesized. 
Regarding managers’ horizontal knowledge inflows, model 2c of table 
5.15 shows that, as expected, all three organizational factors as common features 
of coordination capabilities are significantly and positively related to horizontal 
knowledge inflows; participation in decision making (β = .16, p < .05), 
participation in cross-functional interfaces (β = .29, p < .001), and rewards based 
on overall firm performance (β = .17, p < .05). Regarding organizational factors 
related to systems capabilities, only the use of IT-systems to conduct tasks (β = -
.16, p < .05) is significantly and negatively related to horizontal knowledge 
inflows. Finally, as expected, connectedness to other organization members (β = 
.12, p <.10) and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors 
inflows (β = .13, p <.10) as organizational factors as common feature of 
socialization capabilities are positively and significantly related to horizontal 
knowledge inflows. All significant relationships are as hypothesized.  
 
Knowledge Inflows and Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities 
The third part of this study’s hypotheses is about the impact of managers’ 
knowledge inflows on their exploration and exploitation activities. Model 5 of 
tables 5.13 and 5.14 show the corresponding hierarchical regression results. Table 
5.13, model 5 shows that, regarding exploration activities, as expected, top-down 
knowledge inflows are not significantly related to managers’ exploration activities, 
whereas both bottom-up knowledge inflows (β = .16, p < .05) and horizontal 
knowledge inflows (β = .22, p < .01) are significantly and positively related to 
managers’ exploration activities. Table 5.14, model 5, shows that, regarding 
exploitation activities, as expected, top-down knowledge inflows (β = .17, p < .05) 
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are significantly and positively related to managers’ exploitation activities. As 
expected, bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows are not significantly 
related to managers’ exploitation activities. All significant relationships are as 
hypothesized. 
 
The Mediating Role of Knowledge Inflows 
We argued in the previous chapters that managers’ knowledge inflows act 
as mediators between the organizational factors and managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. In this section, we will assess mediation effects with help of 
this section’s regression analyses, i.e. those in tables 5.13, 5.14, and 5.15. Due to 
small sample size, we will not provide statistical tests for the mediation effects. 
However, in section 5.6, which is on the integrated data set, we will statistically 
test for the mediation effects. To assess mediation effects with regression analyses, 
the following regression equations should be estimated with several conditions to 
hold (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004): 
First, the independent variables (organizational factors) must affect the 
mediators (managers’ knowledge inflows). This refers to models 2 in table 5.15, 
which indicate that, (1) participation in cross functional interfaces, rewards based 
on overall firm performance, formalization of tasks, and use of IT-systems to 
conduct tasks affect top-down knowledge inflows, (2) that all organizational 
factors, but rewards based on overall firm performance and connectedness to other 
organization members affect bottom-up knowledge inflows, and (3) that all 
organizational factors, but formalization of tasks and connectedness to other 
organization members affect horizontal knowledge inflows. All directionalities are 
as hypothesized. 
Second, the independent variables (organizational factors) must be shown 
to affect the dependent variables (managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities). This refers to models 2 in tables 5.13 and 5.14, which show that all 
organizational factors, but connectedness to other organization members 
significantly relate to exploration, whereas both organizational factors as features 
of systems capabilities, and rewards based on overall firm performance 
significantly relate to exploitation. All directionalities are as hypothesized. 
Third, the mediators (managers’ knowledge inflows) must affect the 
dependent variables (managers’ exploration and exploitation activities), with the 
independent variables controlled for. This refers to models 4 in tables 5.13 and 
5.14, which show that managers’ bottom-up (β = .21, p < .01) and horizontal (β = 
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.26, p < .001) knowledge inflows positively and significantly relate to managers’ 
exploration activities, and that top down knowledge inflows positively and 
significantly relate to manager’s exploitation activities (β = .16, p < .05). All 
directionalities are as hypothesized. 
If the previous three conditions all hold in the predicted directions, then, 
for mediation to exist, the effect of the organizational factors must be less in 
models 4 of tables 5.13 and 5.14 than in models 2 of tables 5.13 and 5.14; i.e. there 
should be a reduction of the size of the coefficients of organizational factors, and a 
reduction in significance level (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Taking the above 
mentioned conditions into consideration, and examining tables 5.13, 5.14, and 
5.15 teaches that6 top-down knowledge inflows mediate the relation between the 
use of IT-systems to conduct tasks and managers’ exploitation activities. Bottom-
up knowledge inflows mediate the relation between participation in decision 
making, participation in cross-functional interfaces, the use of IT-systems to 
conduct tasks, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors 
and managers’ exploration activities. Horizontal knowledge inflows mediate the 
relation between participation in decision making, participation in cross-functional 
interfaces, rewards based on overall firm performance, the use of IT-systems to 
conduct tasks, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors 
and managers’ exploration activities.  
 
 
5.5 – Comparing Results across Datasets 
 
A comparison of the results across the three datasets teaches that the results are 
quite consistent. Regarding the control variables, within all three companies, front-
line managers tend to specialize in either exploration or exploitation within distinct 
organization units, whereas top- and middle-level managers have more consistent  
and relatively high levels of exploration and exploitation across organization units. 
Moreover, differences with respect to managers’ exploration and exploitation 
                                                 
6 As models 2 and 5 in tables 5.13 and 5.14 show that top-down knowledge inflows not significantly 
relate to exploration, and that bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows not significantly relate to 
exploitation, it makes no sense to examine either mediation effects of top-down knowledge inflows 
regarding exploration, or mediation effects of bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows regarding 
exploitation. 
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activities between functions and between organization units within the companies 
are as expected (see chapter 4, section 4.5.4 for a discussion on control variables). 
With respect to the total impact, i.e. both direct and indirect, of 
organizational factors on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, all 
three datasets show that the three organizational factors as common features of 
coordination capabilities positively and significantly relate to exploration, whereas 
their effect on exploitation is far less. Only at Rabobank did participation in 
decision making negatively and significantly relate to exploitation, and only at 
Deloitte, rewards based on overall firm performance negatively and significantly 
relate to exploitation. Regarding the two organizational factors as common 
features of systems capabilities in the three datasets; the use of IT-systems to 
conduct tasks negatively and significantly relates to exploration. Only at Deloitte 
does formalization of tasks also negatively and significantly relate to exploration. 
Moreover, within all three companies, both organizational factors as common 
features of systems capabilities positively and significantly relate to exploitation. 
Finally, organizational factors as common features of socialization capabilities 
appear to have a rather limited influence; all three datasets indicate that only 
tolerance for ambiguity of a manger’s peers and/ or superiors has a positive effect 
on exploration.   
 Regarding the effect of organizational factors on managers’ knowledge 
inflows; we found within each dataset the same 12 significant relationships. 
Additionally, at Deloitte, four significant relationships were found. Roughly 
speaking, the organizational factors of coordination capabilities positively relate to 
bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows, organizational factors of systems 
capabilities positively relate to top-down knowledge inflows, connectedness to 
other organization members as a common feature of socialization capabilities 
positively relates to horizontal knowledge inflows, whereas tolerance for 
ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors positively relates to bottom-up 
and horizontal knowledge inflows.  
With respect to the impact of managers’ knowledge inflows on their 
exploration and exploitation activities, the data pertaining to all three companies 
indicate that top-down knowledge inflows positively and significantly relate to 
exploitation activities, whereas bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows 
positively and significantly relate to exploration activities. Not surprisingly, we 
finally found consistent effects across the three companies regarding the mediating 
role of knowledge inflows.  
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5.6 – Analysis of Integrated Dataset 
 
As the findings between the three datasets appear to be largely consistent, we 
merge the three datasets into one integrated dataset and subsequently analyze this 
combined data. We test the hypotheses based on this integrated dataset. The reason 
to analyze the combined dataset is twofold; first it will facilitate our discussion of 
the results without loosing insights gained by the separate datasets as they 
appeared to be largely consistent. Hence, we base our discussion of this study’s 
findings in chapter 6 mainly on the results as brought forward in this section 5.6. 
Second, the combined dataset allows us to do structural equation modeling to 
assess the goodness of fit of our model, and compare it with competing models. 
 
Control Variables and Descriptives 
Table 5.16 shows managers’ mean levels of exploration and exploitation 
activities at different hierarchical levels, functions, and organization units. We 
conducted t-tests to identify significant (p < .05; 1-tail) differences, such as the 
LDS (least-significant-difference) method, which compares the mean of each 
control variable’s group with the mean of each other group of the same control 
variable. Chapter 6 discusses implications of the findings regarding the control 
variables. 
Regarding hierarchical levels, top-level managers do not have significant 
differences between exploration and exploitation; i.e. they conduct both activities 
to the same extent. Middle- and front-line managers engage more in exploitation 
activities as compared to exploration activities. A comparison across hierarchical 
levels shows that top- and middle-level managers engage significantly more in 
exploration activities than front-line managers. However (see also figure 5.4) , this 
difference with respect to exploration activities is most prevalent in units which 
focus on exploitation activities, such as Rabobank’s retail unit, Philips’ production 
support unit, and Deloitte’s audit and tax & legal divisions. In units focusing on 
exploration activities, such as Philips’ innovative products units and Deloitte’s 
consulting and financial advisory divisions, top-, middle-, and frontline managers 
tend to engage to the same extent in exploration activities. There are no significant 
differences between levels with respect to exploitation activities. Moreover, as 
also illustrated by figure 5.4, front-line managers specialize in either exploration or 
exploitation depending on the focus of their unit (t-test of differences between 
units significant at p < .05, 2-tailed), whereas top- and middle- level managers 
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have not significant differences across units in terms of exploration or 
exploitation. The regression analyses with respect to exploitation (table 5.19), 
indicate that, while controlling for function and unit effect, top- and middle-level 
managers also engage significantly more in exploitation activities than front-line 
managers. 
 
Table 5.16 – Integrated Data (Rabobank and Philips and Deloitte): Control Variables’ 
Categories with Corresponding Means and Standard Deviationsa of Outcome Variables 
Control Variable Exploration activities Exploitation activities 
Hierarchical level      
• Top (N = 57) 4.80 (1.00) 4.98 (.77)  
• Middle (N = 142) 4.70 (.96) 5.03 (.85)  
• Front (N = 320) 4.26 (1.31) 4.98 (.96)  
      
Function      
• ‘R&D’ (N = 241) 4.70 (1.06) 4.87 (.85)  
• ‘M & S’ (N = 161) 4.16 (1.33) 5.07 (1.01)  
• ‘operations’ (N = 117) 4.33 (1.20) 5.14 (.85)  
      
Organization Unit      
• Retail (Rabobank) (N = 65) 3.97 (1.29) 5.13 (1.09)  
• Whole-sale (Rabobank) (N = 63) 4.20 (1.17) 5.07 (.96)  
• Operations (Rabobank) (N = 49) 4.65 (1.04) 4.63 (.93)  
• Innovative products (Philips) (N = 41) 5.44 (.80) 4.93 (.87)  
• Standard products (Philips) (N = 51) 5.13 (1.05) 5.29 (.74)  
• Production support (Philips) (N = 26) 5.02 (.91) 5.42 (.71)  
• Audit + tax & legal (Deloitte) (N = 143) 4.07 (1.10) 5.07 (.82)  
• Consultancy + finance (Deloitte) (N = 47) 4.69 (1.23) 4.42 (.76)  
• Central & support (Deloitte) (N = 34) 4.20 (1.14) 4.88 (.85)  
      
Total ( N = 519) 4.45 (1.20) 4.99 (.91)  
aStandard deviation in parentheses 
 
Regarding functions, for all three functional areas applies that managers 
engage significantly more in exploitation activities than in exploration activities. 
As expected, across functions, managers with research and development type of 
functions conduct significantly more exploration activities and significantly less 
exploitation activities than other managers. 
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Figure 5.4 – Integrated Data (Rabobank and Philips and Deloitte): Different Mean Valuesa 
for Exploration and Exploitation across Units, at Various Hierarchical Levels 
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aDotted lines: insignificant difference at hierarchical level between units; Straight lines: 
significant difference at hierarchical level between units (t-test, p < .05; 2-tail). Units 
focusing on exploration in figure include Philips’ innovative products units and Deloitte’s 
Consulting and Financial Advisory divisions. Units focusing on exploitation in figure 
include Rabobank’s retail unit, Philips’ production support unit, and Deloitte’s Audit and 
Tax & Legal divisions. 
   
 Regarding organizational units, as expected, managers of Philips’ 
innovative products units and those of Deloitte’s consultancy and financial 
advisory divisions conduct more exploration activities as compared to exploitation 
activities. Managers of Rabobank’s retail and whole sale units, of Philips’ 
production support unit, and of Deloitte’s audit and tax & legal divisions engage 
more in exploitation as compared to exploration. Managers of the other units, i.e. 
Rabobank’s operations unit and Philips’ standard products units, conduct both 
exploration and exploitation to the same extent.  
Table 5.17 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables 
as used in this study. About three quarters of the hypothesized relationships 
between variables show significant correlations in table 5.17. They are 
furthermore in the direction, i.e. positive or negative, as hypothesized, proving a 
kind of preliminary confirmation of our conceptual model. The table shows 
furthermore that several of the predictor variables significantly relate to each 
other, this is also the case for several of the control variables. To examine the issue 
of multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIF) have been calculated in each 
of the regression equations. VIF factors of the study’s constructs range between
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1.22 and 1.78, which is below the rule-of-thumb cut-off of 10 (Hair et al., 1998), 
hence, multicollinearity issues seem not to be a problem.  
T-tests (p < .05; two tailed) indicate that the mean level of managers’ 
exploration activities (4.45) is significantly lower than the mean level of 
exploitation activities (5.00). Furthermore, the mean level of top-down knowledge 
inflows (3.88) is significantly lower than horizontal (4.10) knowledge inflows, 
which in turn is significantly lower than bottom-up (4.37) knowledge inflows. The 
fact that the level of top-down knowledge inflows is that low could indicate that, 
as intended, we did not measure with the top-down knowledge inflow scale the 
taking of commands or orders, as in that case, the extent of top-down ‘knowledge’ 
inflows would probably have been larger. 
Finally, the correlations as shown in table 5.17 of the relationships 
between the knowledge inflow scales and between the organizational factors give 
some interesting insights; first, the three knowledge inflow scales, i.e. the top-
down, bottom-up, and horizontal knowledge inflow scale, all significantly and 
positively relate to each other. This is a common finding in studies measuring 
various knowledge inflow directionalities (Gupta & Govindaraja, 2000; Schulz, 
2001; 2003), indicating that the three types of knowledge inflows ‘are distinct, 
albeit related, variables not only conceptually (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991), but 
also empirically’ (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000: 484). The positive correlations 
indicate furthermore that the various types of knowledge inflows are not mutually 
exclusive. Second, organizational factors as common features of coordination 
capabilities all significantly and positively relate to each other. This is also the 
case for the two organizational factors as common features of systems capabilities 
and the two organizational factors as common features of socialization 
capabilities. Third, organizational factors as common features of systems 
capabilities tend neither to significantly relate to organization factors associated 
with coordination capabilities, nor with those associated with socialization 
capabilities. Organizational factors as common features of coordination 
capabilities significantly and positively relate to organizational factors as common 
features of and socialization capabilities. Implications of these findings are 
discussed in the concluding chapter. 
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Organizational Factors and Managers’ Exploration & Exploitation Activities 
The first part of this study’s hypotheses is about the direct impact of the 
organizational factors on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Table 
5.18 shows the hierarchical regression results for exploration; table 5.19 shows the 
results for exploitation. In both tables, model 1 is the baseline models containing 
the control variables. The coefficients as shown in model 2 pertain to the total 
effect of the organizational factors on exploration (table 5.18) and on exploitation 
(table 5.19), i.e. both their direct and indirect effects. To gain insight into the direct 
effects only of the organizational factors, we have to look at the full model; model 
5 of both tables. 
Regarding the control variables, hierarchical level, functional, and unit 
effects on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities are significantly 
present in all models. We already learned from sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 that, 
within all three companies, front-line managers tend to specialize in either 
exploration or exploitation within distinct organization units, whereas top- and 
middle-level managers have more consistent levels of exploration and exploitation 
across organization units. Model 5 of tables 5.18 and 5.19 show furthermore that 
top-level managers tend to engage significantly more in exploitation activities than 
front-line managers, and that middle-level managers tend to engage significantly 
more in both exploration and exploitation activities than front-line managers. 
Furthermore, managers with a research and development function conduct 
significantly more exploration activities than managers with an operations 
function. Finally, managers at Rabobank’s retail unit and whole sale unit, and 
managers at Deloitte’s audit, tax & legal units have significantly lower levels of 
exploration activities than those at the reference group, i.e. Deloitte’s central & 
support unit, whereas managers at Philips’ innovative products units have 
significantly higher levels of exploration. Managers at Rabobank’s operations unit 
and those at Deloitte’s consulting and finance units have lower levels of 
exploitation activities than managers at Deloitte’s central & support unit, whereas 
managers at Philips’ production support unit have higher levels of exploitation. 
Concluding, the data confirms that hierarchical level, functional, and unit effects 
influence managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Moreover, differences 
with respect to managers’ exploration and exploitation activities between 
hierarchical levels, functions, and organization units within the companies are 
largely as expected (see chapter 4, section 4.5.4 for a discussion on control 
variables). 
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Regarding managers’ exploration activities, model 5 of table 5.18 shows 
the direct effects of the organizational factors. That is the effect of the 
organizational factors on managers’ exploration activities while controlling for the 
effect of managers’ knowledge inflows on their exploration activities. Model 5 
shows that, as expected, all three organizational factors of coordination 
capabilities are positively, significantly, and directly related to exploration 
activities; participation in decision making (β = .10, p < .05), participation in 
cross-functional interfaces (β = .08, p < .05), and rewards based on overall firm 
performance (β = .09, p < .05). Hence, hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a are supported. 
Furthermore, as expected, both organizational factors of systems capabilities are 
negatively, significantly, and directly related to exploration activities; 
formalization of tasks (β = -.10, p < .01) and the use of IT-systems to conduct 
tasks (β = -.11, p < .01), indicating that hypotheses 4a and 5a are supported. 
Finally, the coefficient for connectedness to other organization members is not 
significant; hypothesis 6a not supported. Only tolerance for ambiguity of a 
manager’s peers and/ or superiors (β = .11, p < .01) as an organizational factor of 
socialization capabilities affects, positively and directly, managers’ exploration 
activities; hypothesis 7a is supported. 
Regarding managers’ exploitation activities, model 5 of table 5.19 shows 
the direct effects of the organizational factors. That is the effect of the 
organizational factors on managers’ exploitation activities while controlling for the 
effect of managers’ knowledge inflows on their exploitation activities. Model 5 
shows that two coefficients of the organizational factors associated with 
coordination capabilities are significantly and negatively related to exploitation; 
participation in decision making (β = -.10, p < .10) and rewards based on overall 
firm performance (β = .10, p < .10), hence, hypotheses 1b and 3b are supported 
whereas hypothesis 2b is not supported. Both organizational factors of systems 
capabilities; formalization of tasks (β = .29, p < .001) and the use of IT-systems 
for conducting tasks (β = .07, p < .10) are, as expected, positively, significantly, 
and directly related to exploitation activities; hypotheses 4b and 5b are supported. 
Finally, the coefficients for connectedness to other organization members and 
tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors are not significant. 
So, unexpectedly, organizational factors of socialization capabilities have no direct 
effect on managers’ exploitation activities; hypotheses 6b and 7b are not 
confirmed. 
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 Organizational Factors and Managers’ Knowledge Inflows 
 The second part of this study’s hypotheses is about the impact of 
organizational factors on managers’ knowledge inflows. Table 5.20 shows the 
corresponding hierarchical regression results for top-down, bottom-up, and 
horizontal knowledge inflows. In all three series of regression analyses, models 1 
are the baseline models containing the control variables. Models 2 are the full 
models, which show that, among the control variables, hierarchical level effects 
can be found regarding bottom-up knowledge inflows; top- and middle-level 
managers have more bottom-up knowledge inflows than frontline managers. 
Significant functional effects can only be found regarding top-down knowledge 
inflows; R&D managers and marketing and sales managers significantly have less 
top-down knowledge inflows than operations managers. Significant unit effects 
are mainly present for top-down and bottom-up knowledge inflows. Managers at 
Rabobank’s and Philips’ units significantly have more top-down and bottom-up 
knowledge inflows than managers at Deloitte’s central & support unit. Managers 
at Rabobank’s whole sale unit tend to have less horizontal knowledge inflows than 
managers Deloitte’s central & support unit. 
 Regarding managers’ top down- knowledge inflows, model 2a of table 
5.20 shows that two organizational factors of coordination capabilities are 
positively and significantly related to top-down knowledge inflows; participation 
in cross-functional interfaces (β = .09, p < .05) and rewards based on overall firm 
performance (β = .19, p < .001); hypothesis 8a is not confirmed; hypotheses 9a 
and 10a are confirmed. Both organizational factors of systems capabilities are, as 
expected, positively and significantly related to top-down knowledge inflows; 
formalization of tasks (β = .20, p < .001), and the use of IT-systems to conduct 
tasks (β = .17, p < .001); hypotheses 11 and 12a are confirmed. Finally, the data 
does not confirm the expected influence of organizational factors of socialization 
capabilities on top-down knowledge inflows; whereas the coefficient of 
connectedness to other organization members is not significant, the coefficient of 
tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors is significant, but 
positive (β = .11, p < .05), hence tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ 
or superiors positively, in stead of negatively, relates to a manager’s top-down 
knowledge inflows; hypotheses 13a and 14a are not confirmed.  
Regarding managers’ bottom-up knowledge inflows, model 2b of table 
5.20 shows that, as expected, all three organizational factors of coordination 
capabilities are significantly and positively related to bottom-up knowledge 
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inflows; participation in decision making (β = .20, p < .001), participation in cross-
functional interfaces (β = .12, p < .01), and rewards based on overall firm 
performance (β = .13, p < .01). Unexpectedly, none of the organizational factors 
pertaining to systems capabilities are significantly related to bottom-up knowledge 
inflows. Furthermore, only tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or 
superiors (β = .18, p < .001) as an organizational factor of socialization capabilities 
is significantly, and as expected positively, related to bottom-up knowledge 
inflows. Hypotheses 8b, 9b, 10b, and 14b are confirmed; hypotheses 11b, 12b, and 
13b are not. 
Regarding managers’ horizontal knowledge inflows, model 2c of table 
5.20 shows that, as expected, all three organizational factors of coordination 
capabilities are significantly and positively related to horizontal knowledge 
inflows; participation in decision making (β = .18, p < .001), participation in cross-
functional interfaces (β = .22, p < .001), and rewards based on overall firm 
performance (β = .20, p < .001); hypotheses 8c, 9c, and 10c are confirmed. 
Regarding organizational factors associated with systems capabilities, the 
coefficient for formalization of tasks is not significant; hypothesis 11c is not 
confirmed. Hence, only the use of IT-systems to conduct tasks (β = -.11, p < .01) 
is negatively related to horizontal knowledge inflows; hypothesis 12c is 
confirmed. Finally, as expected, with respect to organizational of socialization 
capabilities; connectedness to other organization members (β = .09, p < .05) and 
tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors (β = .19, p < .001) 
positively and significantly relate to horizontal knowledge inflows; hypotheses 13c 
and 14c are confirmed. 
 
Knowledge Inflows and Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities 
The third part of this study’s hypotheses is about the impact of managers’ 
knowledge inflows on their exploration and exploitation activities. Tables 5.18 and 
5.19 show the corresponding regression analyses. On the impact of managers’ 
knowledge inflows on their exploration activities, table 5.18, model 5, shows that, 
as expected, top-down knowledge inflows are not significantly related to 
managers’ exploration activities, whereas both bottom-up knowledge inflows (β = 
.18, p < .001) and horizontal knowledge inflows (β = .22, p < .001) are 
significantly and positively related to managers’ exploration activities; hypotheses 
16 and 17 are confirmed. Table 5.19, model 2, shows that, regarding exploitation 
activities,  also as expected,  top-down knowledge inflows  (β = .24, p < .001)  are 
169
  
15
9
T
ab
le
 5
.2
0 
– 
In
te
gr
at
ed
 D
at
a 
(R
ab
ob
an
k 
an
d 
Ph
i l i
ps
 a
nd
 D
el
oi
t t e
):
 R
es
ul
ts
 o
f 
H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l  R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
A
na
ly
se
sa
:  I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
O
rg
a n
iz
a t
io
n a
l F
a c
to
rs
 o
n  
M
a n
a g
e r
s ’
 K
n o
w
le
d g
e  
In
fl
o w
s  
 
T
o p
-D
o w
n  
K
n o
w
l. 
I n
fl
o w
s  
B
o t
to
m
-U
p  
K
n o
w
l. 
I n
fl
o w
s  
H
o r
iz
o n
ta
l K
n o
w
l. 
I n
fl
o w
s  
C
o n
tr
o l
 V
a r
ia
b l
e s
 
M
o d
e l
 1
a  
M
o d
e l
 2
a  
 
M
o d
e l
 1
b  
M
o d
e l
 2
b  
 
M
o d
e l
 1
c  
M
o d
e l
 2
c  
H
ie
ra
rc
h i
c a
l l
e v
e l
: t
o p
 
.0
5
 
.0
3
 
 
.1
3  
* *
 
.0
8
†  
 
.1
4
* *
 
.0
3
 
H
ie
ra
rc
h i
c a
l l
e v
e l
: m
id
d l
e  
.0
6
 
.0
4
 
 
.1
2  
*  
.0
7
†  
 
.0
6
 
.0
0
 
Fu
nc
tio
n:
 ‘
R
 &
 D
’ 
-.
22
**
* 
-.
23
**
* 
 
.0
5 
 
-.
01
 
 
.0
6
 
.0
2
 
Fu
nc
tio
n:
 ‘
M
 &
 S
’ 
 
-.
08
 
-.
11
†  
 
.0
1 
 
-.
03
 
 
.0
3
 
-.
03
 
U
ni
t: 
re
ta
il 
(R
ab
ob
an
k)
 
.3
6
**
* 
.3
4
**
* 
 
.2
6 
**
* 
.2
4
**
* 
 
-.
06
 
-.
08
 
U
ni
t: 
w
ho
le
-s
al
e 
(R
ab
ob
an
k)
 
.4
0
**
* 
.3
9
**
* 
 
.2
2 
**
 
.1
9
**
 
 
-.
08
 
-.
15
* 
U
ni
t: 
op
er
at
io
ns
 (
R
ab
ob
an
k)
 
.4
5
**
* 
.4
2
**
* 
 
.2
2 
**
 
.1
5
* 
 
.0
3
 
-.
08
 
U
ni
t: 
in
no
va
tiv
e 
pr
od
uc
ts
 (
Ph
ili
ps
) 
.1
2
* 
.1
1
* 
 
.3
4 
**
* 
.2
6
**
* 
 
.1
1
†  
.0
4
 
U
ni
t: 
st
an
da
rd
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
(P
hi
lip
s)
 
.1
6
* 
.1
2
* 
 
.3
6 
**
* 
.2
8
**
* 
 
.1
3
* 
.0
3
 
U
ni
t: 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
su
pp
or
t (
Ph
ili
ps
) 
.1
1
* 
.0
7
 
 
.2
3 
**
* 
.1
7
**
 
 
.0
8
 
-.
01
 
U
ni
t: 
A
ud
it,
 T
ax
, L
eg
al
 (
D
el
oi
tte
) 
.1
0
 
.1
1
 
 
.1
1 
 
.1
2
 
 
.0
4
 
.0
7
 
U
ni
t: 
C
on
s.
, F
in
an
ce
 (
D
el
oi
tte
) 
.0
5
 
.0
5
 
 
.1
2 
†  
.0
6
 
 
.1
1
 
.0
7
 
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l F
ac
to
rs
 o
f 
C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n 
C
ap
ab
ili
ti
es
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
 
.0
0
 
 
  
.2
0
**
* 
 
 
.1
8
**
* 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 c
ro
ss
-f
un
ct
io
na
l i
nt
er
fa
ce
s 
 
.0
9
* 
 
  
.1
2
**
 
 
 
.2
2
**
* 
R
ew
ar
ds
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
ov
er
al
l f
ir
m
 p
er
fo
rm
. 
 
.1
9
**
* 
 
  
.1
3
**
 
 
 
.2
0
**
* 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l F
ac
to
rs
 o
f 
Sy
st
em
s 
C
ap
ab
ili
ti
es
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Fo
rm
al
iz
at
io
n 
of
 ta
sk
s 
 
.2
0
**
* 
 
  
-.
05
 
 
 
.0
4
 
U
se
 o
f 
IT
-s
ys
te
m
s 
to
 c
on
du
ct
 ta
sk
s 
 
.1
7
**
* 
 
  
-.
03
 
 
 
-.
11
**
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l F
ac
to
rs
 o
f 
So
ci
al
iz
at
io
n 
C
ap
ab
ili
ti
es
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
C
on
ne
ct
ed
ne
ss
 to
 o
th
er
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
m
em
be
rs
 
 
.0
2
 
 
  
-.
03
 
 
 
.0
9
* 
T
ol
er
an
ce
 f
or
 a
m
bi
gu
ity
 o
f 
m
gr
.’
s 
pe
er
s/
 s
up
er
io
rs
 
 
.1
1
**
 
 
  
.1
8
**
* 
 
 
.1
9
**
* 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 
.2
3
 
.3
9
 
 
.1
6 
 
.3
3
 
 
.0
8
 
.3
8
 
A
dj
us
te
d 
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
 
.2
1
 
.3
7
 
 
.1
4 
 
.3
0
 
 
.0
6
 
.3
6
 
F 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t o
f 
fi
t 
12
.4
**
* 
19
.5
**
* 
 
7.
95
 *
**
 
17
.8
**
* 
 
3.
85
**
* 
34
.5
**
* 
a S
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d 
re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s;
 N
 =
 5
19
; †
 p
 <
 .1
0;
 *
 p
 <
 .0
5;
 *
* 
p 
< 
.0
1;
 *
**
 p
 <
 .0
01
170
 160 
significantly and positively related to managers’ exploitation activities; hypothesis 
15 is confirmed. Furthermore as expected, bottom-up and horizontal knowledge 
inflows are not significantly related to managers’ exploitation activities. 
 
The Mediating Role of Knowledge Inflows 
Finally, this study argues that managers’ knowledge inflows act as 
mediators between the organizational factors and managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities, or, in other words, that the organizational factors indirectly 
effect managers’ exploration and exploitation activities through their influence on 
managers’ knowledge inflows. See table 5.21 for an overview of these indirect 
effects. In this section, we will assess these mediation effects of knowledge 
inflows, or, in other words, the indirect effects of the organizational factors, with 
help of this section’s regression analyses, i.e. those in tables 5.18, 5.19, and 5.20. 
We will also provide statistical tests for the mediation effects. To assess mediation 
effects with regression analyses, the following regression equations should be 
estimated with several conditions to hold (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004): 
First, the independent variables (organizational factors) must affect the 
mediators (managers’ knowledge inflows). This refers to models 2 in table 5.20, 
which indicate that, (1) participation in cross functional interfaces, rewards based 
on overall firm performance, formalization of tasks, the use of IT-systems to 
conduct tasks, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors 
affect top-down knowledge inflows, (2) that participation in decision making, 
participation in cross functional interfaces, rewards based on overall firm 
performance, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors 
affect bottom-up knowledge inflows, and (3) that all organizational factors, but 
formalization of tasks, affect horizontal knowledge inflows. All, but one (the 
relation between tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors 
and top-down knowledge inflows), directionalities are as hypothesized. 
Second, the independent variables (organizational factors) must be shown 
to affect the dependent variables (managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities). This refers to models 2 in tables 5.18 and 5.19, which show that all 
organizational factors, but one (formalization of tasks) significantly relate to 
exploration. Four organizational factors significantly relate to exploitation; 
participation in decision making and rewards based on overall firm performance as 
organizational factors of coordination capabilities, and both common features of 
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systems capabilities, i.e. formalization of tasks and use of IT-systems to conduct 
tasks. All directionalities are as hypothesized. 
Third, the mediators (managers’ knowledge inflows) must affect the 
dependent variables (managers’ exploration and exploitation activities), with the 
independent variables controlled for. This refers to models 4 in tables 5.18 and 
5.19, which show that managers’ bottom-up (β = .22, p < .001) and horizontal (β = 
.26, p < .001) knowledge inflows positively and significantly relate to managers’ 
exploration activities, and that top down knowledge inflows positively and 
significantly relate to manager’s exploitation activities (β = .25, p < .001). All 
directionalities are as hypothesized. 
If the previous three conditions all hold in the predicted directions, then, 
for mediation to exist, the effect of the organizational factors must be less in 
models 4 of tables 5.18 and 5,19 than in models 2 of tables 5.18 and 5.19 (Baron 
& Kenny, 1986)7. Perfect mediation holds if the organizational factors have no 
effect when the knowledge inflows are controlled for. As expected, this is not the 
case as show models 4 in tables 5.18 and 5.19; the organizational factors in models 
4 have coefficients larger than zero. It matters in that case to examine if these 
coefficients are smaller than in models 3. A reduction of the size of the 
coefficients of organizational factors, but not to zero, and a reduction in 
significance level, indicates that the knowledge inflows mediate the relation 
between these organizational factors and managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities, and that either the organizational factors also directly affect exploration 
and exploitation activities, or the operation of multiple mediating factors (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). 
Taking the above mentioned conditions into consideration, and examining 
tables 5.18, 5.19, and 5.20 shows that top-down knowledge inflows mediate the 
relation between and the use of IT-systems to conduct tasks and managers’ 
exploitation activities. Bottom-up knowledge inflows mediate the relation between 
participation in decision making, participation in cross-functional interfaces, 
rewards based on overall firm performance, and tolerance for ambiguity of a 
manager’s peers and/or superiors, and managers’ exploration activities. Horizontal  
                                                 
7 As models 3 and 5 in tables 5.17 and 5.18 show that top-down knowledge inflows not significantly 
relate to exploration, and that bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows not significantly relate to 
exploitation, it makes no sense to examine either mediation effects of top-down knowledge inflows 
regarding exploration, or mediation effects of bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows regarding 
exploitation. 
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knowledge inflows mediate the relation between all organizational factors and 
managers’ exploration activities, but not for formalization of tasks and 
connectedness to other organization members.  
 Following Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004), we also conducted statistical 
significance tests for mediation; i.e. we conducted significance tests for the 
indirect effects of the organizational factors on managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities via managers’ knowledge inflows; see table 5.21. These 
tests indicate that the mediating roles as identified above are significant (absolute 
Z-values of indirect effects > 1.96 are significant at p > .05). Moreover, three other 
significant indirect effects are identified; first, top-down knowledge inflows 
significantly mediate the relation between rewards based on overall firm 
performance and managers’ exploitation activities. Whereas rewards based on 
overall firm performance have a direct negative effect on exploitation (β = -.10, p 
< .10; see model 5 of table 5.19), they have a positive indirect effect on 
exploitation (β = .05, p < .001; see table 5.21) via their positive effect on 
managers’ top-down knowledge inflows. Second, top-down knowledge inflows 
significantly mediate the relation between formalization of managers’ tasks and 
managers’ exploitation activities. Although the significance level of the coefficient 
of formalization of tasks did not reduce when the top-down knowledge inflow 
scale was entered into the regression equation,  its size decreased (compare models 
2 and 4 of table 5.19), resulting into a significant indirect effect on exploitation via 
top-down knowledge inflows (β = .05, p < .001; see table 5.21). Third, top-down 
knowledge inflows significantly mediate the relation between tolerance for 
ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors and this manager’s exploitation 
activities. Whereas tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/or superiors 
has a direct negative effect on exploitation (β = -.03, not significant; see model 5 
of table 5.19), it has a positive indirect effect on exploitation (β = .03, p < .05; see 
table 5.21) via its positive effect on managers’ top-down knowledge inflows. 
 
Structural Equation Modeling: Goodness of Fit Assessment and Comparison with 
Competing Models 
We conducted structural equation modeling, using EQS, to assess the 
goodness of fit of our model, and compare it with competing models. Structural 
equation modeling was not appropriate for the separate datasets, as this method for 
analyzing path models requires a minimum sample size of about 200, although for 
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more complex models, a sample size of at least about 500 is recommended (Byrne, 
1994; Kline, 1998). Our integrated dataset has a sample size of 519.  
Regarding the mediating role of managers’ knowledge inflows, we argued 
based on studies pertaining to the knowledge literature (e.g. Grant, 1996; Kogut & 
Zander, 1996) that knowledge inflows of a manager mediate the relationship 
between organizational factors as common features of combinative capabilities 
and this manager’s exploration activities and exploitation activities. We did, 
however, not expect ‘perfect mediation’ (cf. Baron & Kenney, 1986: 1177) to 
hold, i.e. based on current studies which examine the role of organizational factors 
(e.g. Adler et al., 1999; Benner and Tushman, 2002; 2003; Ghemawat & Ricart I 
Costa, 1993; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005a; McGrath, 2001; 
Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000), we expect the organizational 
factors to have also a direct impact on managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities besides their indirect effect via managers’ knowledge inflows. 
 
Table 5.22 – Integrated Data (Rabobank and Philips and Deloitte): Comparison of 
Structural Equation Modelsa 
  Model and Structure χ2 df ∆χ2 NFI CFI RMSEA 
1 This study’s 
model 
OF Æ KIF Æ E + E 
and OF Æ E + E 97.12 20  .93 .94 .086 
2 Perfect mediation OF Æ KIF Æ E + E 246.38 34 149.26 .81 .83 .110 
3 No mediation OF + KIF Æ E + E 593.47 41 496.35 .54 .55 .161 
aOF = organizational factors as common features of combinative capabilities (seven 
variables); KIF = managers’ top-down, bottom-up, and horizontal knowledge inflows 
(three variables); E + E = managers’ exploration activities and managers’ exploitation 
activities (two variables).  
 
To assess the extent to which the data provides support to our conceptual 
model as compared to competing models, we tested one nested model and one 
alternative model against the model of this study. As table 5.22 model 1 shows, fit 
indexes of our model show a good fit (χ220df = 97.12; NFI = .93; CFI = .94; 
RMSEA = .086). This model contains paths from the organizational factors to the 
knowledge inflows, from the knowledge inflows to exploration and exploitation 
activities, and from the organizational factors to exploration and exploitation 
activities. In the nested model, model 2 in table 5.22, knowledge inflows fully 
mediate the relationship between organizational factors and managers’ exploration 
and exploitation activities, i.e. there are no direct relationships specified from the 
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organizational factors to exploration and exploitation activities. In the alternative 
model, model 3 in table 5.22, knowledge inflows do not mediate, i.e. knowledge 
inflows and organizational factors only directly relate to managers’ exploration 
and exploitation activities. As table 5.22 shows, the chi-square of model 1 is 
significantly better than the chi-squares of models 2 and 3. Moreover, models 2 
and 3 do not fit the data well. In all three models, the three organizational factors 
as common features of coordination capabilities were allowed to relate to each 
other. The same applies for the two organizational factors as common features of 
systems capabilities and the two organization factors as common features of 
socialization capabilities. 
In summary, the results shown in table 5.22 support not only the 
proposition that managers’ knowledge inflows mediate the relationship between 
organizational factors and managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, but 
indicate moreover that direct relationships exist as well between the organizational 
factors and exploration and exploitation.  
Finally, we estimated parameters of the paths in structural equation model 
1, i.e. the model corresponding to our hypotheses, with their accompanying t-
values and R-squares. As expected (Byrne, 1994; Kline, 1998), this structural 
equation analysis does not provide additional or different insights as compared to 
the regression analyses as already conducted in this section; it provides the same 
parameters, significance levels, and R-squares as reported in model 5 of tables 
5.18 and 5.19, and models 2 of table 5.20. Therefore, we will limit our discussion 
on this study’s findings to the findings reported from the regression analyses 
(tables 5.18, 5.19. and 5.20).  
 
 
5.7 – Conclusion 
 
We analyzed the quantitative data in this chapter. The results from the first three 
sections, pertaining to the data collected at successively Rabobank, Philips, and 
Deloitte, are consistent. This made us decide to merge the data and to subsequently 
analyze this combined dataset. About three quarters of the hypothesized 
relationships are supported by the data. The other relationships are not supported 
because the associated regression coefficients are not significant. There is one 
exception; the coefficient of the relationship between tolerance for ambiguity of a 
manager’s peers and/ or superiors and top-down knowledge inflows is significant 
176
 166 
(hypothesis 14a), but the relationships appears to be reversed as from predicted, 
i.e. positive in stead of negative. Results with respect to the control variables were 
largely as expected, i.e. as discussed in section 4.5.4. The data supported 
furthermore the argument that managers’ knowledge inflows mediate the 
relationship between organizational factors and managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. This mediating role appears to apply, however, with respect 
to certain, and not all, organizational factors. Structural equation modeling 
indicated that our model, i.e. the model in which organizational factors both 
directly and indirectly affect managers’ exploration and exploitation activities and, 
hence, managers’ knowledge inflows mediate the relationships between 
organizational factors and managers exploration and exploitation activities, has a 
good fit to the data. Moreover, our model has a significant better fit than the 
competing model in which the organizational factors have no direct effect on 
exploration and exploitation, i.e. the model in which the knowledge inflows 
perfectly mediate, and the model in which knowledge inflows not mediate at all. 
The next chapter will elaborately discuss the empirical findings. 
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CHAPTER 6 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
6.1 – Introduction 
 
Firms face difficulties to manage concurrently exploration and exploitation, 
because of tensions between the two (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991). 
Previous research illustrates how various organizational factors impact upon firm 
or unit level exploration and exploitation processes or outcomes (e.g. Adler et al., 
1999; Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gibson 
& Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al, 2005a; Leana & Barry, 2000; Levinthal & 
March, 1993; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000). There is, however, a 
lack of understanding about exploration and exploitation at the manager level of 
analysis; the literature review indicated as a valuable subject of investigation, 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, and, to understand how these 
activities come about, to investigate the impact of organizational factors and 
managers’ knowledge acquisition activities. Accordingly, the purpose of this study 
was to enhance conceptually and empirically validated understanding about how 
organizational factors and managers’ knowledge inflows influence managers’ 
exploration and exploitation activities. We specified organizational factors as 
common features of combinative capabilities (c.f. De Boer et al., 1999; Jansen et 
al., 2005b; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999), and managers’ top-down, bottom-up, and 
horizontal knowledge inflows (cf. e.g. Floyd & Lane, 2000; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Schulz, 2003) as antecedents of managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities. 
 To achieve this study’s purpose, we first developed, based on the 
literature, a conceptual model and corresponding hypotheses indicating the causal 
relationships between the constructs. The conceptual model indicates that the 
organizational factors not only directly impact upon managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities, but indirectly as well, i.e. through their impact on managers 
knowledge inflows. In other words, we argue, based on studies on combinative 
capabilities and the knowledge literature (e.g. Grant, 1996; Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Schulz, 2003; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999) that 
knowledge inflows mediate the relationship between organizational factors and 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Subsequently, we tested the 
hypotheses for managers of large multi-unit knowledge-intense firms operating in 
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dynamic environments, controlling for hierarchical level, function, and 
organization unit. We used qualitative data to support the development of the 
conceptual model, hypotheses, and survey, and to help interpret the quantitative 
results.  
In this final chapter we discuss the empirical findings, illustrate theoretical 
and managerial implications of the study, discuss its limitations, and identify some 
interesting directions for future research. 
 
6.2 – Discussion of Findings 
 
Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 show this study’s hypotheses and the corresponding 
empirical findings. Moreover, table 6.1 shows the mediating role of managers’ 
knowledge inflows with respect to exploration; table 6.2 with respect to 
exploitation. The main research question of this study is ‘How do organizational 
factors and knowledge inflows of managers influence managers’ exploration 
activities and exploitation activities?’ Structural equation modeling indicated that 
our model, i.e. the model in which organizational factors both directly and 
indirectly affect managers’ exploration and exploitation activities and, hence, 
managers’ knowledge inflows mediate the relationships between organizational 
factors and managers exploration and exploitation activities, has a good fit to the 
data. Moreover, our model has a significant better fit than the competing model in 
which the organizational factors have no direct effect on exploration and 
exploitation, i.e. the model in which knowledge inflows perfectly mediate, and a 
significant better fit than the model in which knowledge inflows not mediate at all. 
 
The Role of Organizational Factors 
We distinguish between direct, indirect, and total effects of organizational factors 
on manager’s exploration (see table 6.1) and exploitation (see table 6.2) activities. 
The direct effect of an organizational factor is the influence it has on exploration 
and/ or exploitation while controlling for its influence via knowledge inflows. 
Hypotheses 1 through 7 (a and b versions) refer to these direct effects. The indirect 
effect of an organizational factor is the influence it has on exploration and/ or 
exploitation via its impact on managers’ knowledge inflows. Indirect effects can 
be assessed by examining the influence of the organizational factors on managers’ 
knowledge inflows (see table 6.3 and hypotheses 8 through 14; a, b, and c 
versions), and the influence of managers’ knowledge inflows on their exploration 
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and exploitation activities (see table 6.4 and hypotheses 15 through 17). The total 
effect of an organizational factor on exploration and/ or exploitation equals the 
sum of its direct and indirect effects.  
Regarding direct effects on exploration (see table 6.1); participation in 
decision making, participation in cross-functional interfaces, rewards based on 
overall firm performance, and tolerance for ambiguity of managers’ peers and/ or 
superiors have direct positive impact. Formalization of tasks and use of IT-systems 
to conduct tasks, have direct negative impact on managers’ exploration activities. 
The relations are as hypothesized and the effects are of the same magnitude; 
absolute values of the standardized coefficients range between .08 and .11.   
Regarding indirect effects on exploration (see table 6.1); participation in 
decision making, participation in cross-functional interfaces, rewards based on 
overall firm performance, and tolerance for ambiguity of managers’ peers and/ or 
superiors, have indirect positive impact through their positive impact on bottom-up 
and horizontal knowledge inflows. Use of IT-systems to conduct tasks has indirect 
negative impact on managers’ exploration activities through its negative impact on 
horizontal knowledge inflows. The coefficients, which indicate the size of these 
indirect effects, range between .02 and .05. 
Regarding direct effects on exploitation (see table 6.2); participation in 
decision making and rewards based on overall firm performance, have direct 
negative impact. Formalization of tasks and use of IT-systems to conduct tasks, 
have direct positive impact on managers’ exploitation activities. The relations are 
as hypothesized. The impact of formalization of tasks (standardized coefficient of 
.29) is larger than the impact of the other organizational factors; absolute values of 
standardized coefficients of the other organizational factors range between .07 and 
.10.   
Indirect effects on exploitation (see table 6.2) only take place through top-
down knowledge inflows; rewards based on overall firm performance, 
formalization of managers’ tasks, use of IT-systems to conduct tasks, and 
tolerance for ambiguity of managers’ peers and/ or superiors have indirect positive 
effect on managers’ exploitation activities. We did not expect a positive indirect 
effect of tolerance for ambiguity of managers’ peers and/ or superiors; we 
expected negative effect instead. The reason for positive effect to come about is 
that tolerance for ambiguity of managers’ peers and/ or superiors influences the 
extent to which managers acquire top-down knowledge positively in stead of 
negatively. The effects of rewards based on overall firm performance and
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tolerance for ambiguity of managers’ peers and/ or superiors are remarkable; their 
positive and significant indirect effect on exploitation via top-down knowledge 
inflows is cancelled out by their negative direct effect on exploitation resulting in a 
non-significant total effect on exploitation. 
Regarding the effect of organizational factors on managers’ knowledge 
inflows (see table 6.3), the three organizational factors of coordination capabilities 
have most effect; they positively influence all three types of knowledge inflows. 
Organizational factors of systems capabilities have least effect; both of them 
positively influence only top-down knowledge inflows. One of these factors, 
managers’ use of IT-systems to conduct tasks, also negatively impacts upon 
horizontal knowledge inflows. Finally, regarding organizational factors of 
socialization capabilities, managers’ connectedness to other organization members 
positively influences managers’ horizontal knowledge inflows. Tolerance for 
ambiguity of managers’ peers and/ or superiors positively influences all three 
kinds of manager’s knowledge inflows. 
Summarizing, organizational factors as common features of coordination 
capabilities have positive direct and indirect effect on managers’ exploration 
activities. They have negative direct effect on exploitation activities. 
Organizational factors as common features of systems capabilities have negative 
direct and indirect effect on managers’ exploration activities and positive direct 
and indirect effect on managers’ exploitation activities. Finally, regarding 
organizational factors as common features of socialization capabilities, only 
tolerance for ambiguity has effect; positive direct and indirect effect on managers’ 
exploration activities and positive indirect effect on exploitation. The relationships 
as found in the data are merely as hypothesized. However, not all of them 
appeared to be significant; especially the impact of connectedness to other 
organization members appears to be rather limited. 
 
The Role of Managers’ Knowledge Inflows 
 Regarding the impact of managers’ knowledge inflows on their 
exploration and exploitation activities (see table 6.4), the empirical findings 
illustrate, as expected, that top-down knowledge inflows of a manager positively 
impact upon this manager’s exploitation activities, while they do not relate to a 
manager’s exploration activities. Furthermore, as expected, bottom-up and 
horizontal knowledge inflows of a manager positively impact upon this manager’s 
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exploration activities, while they do not relate to a manager’s exploitation 
activities. 
Regarding the mediating role of managers’ knowledge inflows, we argued, 
based on studies pertaining to the knowledge literature and studies on combinative 
capabilities (e.g. Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Jansen et al., 2005b; Van 
Den Bosch et al., 1999), that knowledge inflows of a manager mediate the 
relationship between organizational factors and this manager’s exploration 
activities and exploitation activities. As expected, we did not find ‘perfect 
mediation’ (cf. Baron & Kenney, 1986: 1177). Instead, as expected based on 
current studies which examine the impact of organizational factors on exploration 
and exploitation (e.g. Adler et al., 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; 
Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 
2005a; McGrath, 2001; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000), we 
empirically found the organizational factors to also have direct impact on 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, besides their indirect effect via 
managers’ knowledge inflows. Structural equation modeling indicated that the 
data supports our arguments. The corresponding structural model, i.e. the model 
which contains paths from the organizational factors to the knowledge inflows, 
from the knowledge inflows to exploration and exploitation activities, and from 
the organizational factors to exploration and exploitation activities, has a good fit 
to the data. Moreover, it has a significant better fit than the competing model in 
which knowledge inflows perfectly mediate, and the model in which knowledge 
inflows not mediate at all (see table 5.22; section 5.6). 
We used several regression analyses to gain further insight into how 
managers’ knowledge inflows mediate the relationship between organizational 
factors and managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 
show the empirical findings; significant indirect effects of the organizational 
factors denote knowledge inflows to significantly mediate the relationship between 
the corresponding organizational factor and exploration (table 6.1) and/ or 
exploitation (table 6.2). The findings indicate that specific knowledge inflow 
directionalities, i.e. top-down, bottom-up, and horizontal, exert a mediating role 
with respect to certain organizational factors, and not with respect to all 
organizational factors. More precisely, the findings indicate that managers’ top-
down knowledge inflows mediate the relationship between rewards based on 
overall firm performance, formalization of managers’ tasks, managers’ use of IT-
systems, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors, and 
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managers’ exploitation activities. Managers’ bottom-up and horizontal knowledge 
inflows mediate the relationship between managers’ participation in decision 
making, participation in cross-functional interfaces, rewards based on overall firm 
performance, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or superiors, 
and managers’ exploration activities. Additionally, managers’ horizontal 
knowledge inflows also mediate the relationship between use of IT-systems and 
managers’ exploration activities. 
Summarizing, the empirical findings illustrate that managers’ bottom-up 
and horizontal knowledge inflows positively impact upon their exploration 
activities, whereas top-down knowledge inflows positively impact upon 
exploitation activities. The mediating role of knowledge inflows with respect to 
exploration takes place via bottom-up and horizontal knowledge inflows which 
particularly mediate the effect of organizational factors associated with 
coordination capabilities and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or 
superiors. With respect to exploitation, the mediating role of knowledge inflows 
takes place via top-down knowledge inflows, which particularly mediate the effect 
of organizational factors associated with systems capabilities, rewards based on 
overall firm performance, and tolerance for ambiguity of a manager’s peers and/ or 
superiors.  
 
Control Variables 
Regarding the control variables we found hierarchical level, functional, 
and organization unit effects on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities 
largely as expected. For instance, managers in research and development type of 
functions (see section 4.5.4 for classifications) engage more in exploration 
activities as compared to managers of other functional areas. Managers of units 
with more dynamic business environments conduct more exploration activities as 
compared to mangers of other units, whereas managers in units with relatively 
stable environments engage more in exploitation activities.  
Regarding hierarchical level, findings indicate that both top-level and 
middle-level managers tend to engage significantly more in both exploration and 
exploitation activities than front-line managers. However, the difference with 
respect to exploration activities is most prevalent in units which focus on 
exploitation activities, such as Rabobank’s retail unit, Philips’ production support 
unit, and Deloitte’s audit and tax & legal divisions. In units focusing on 
exploration activities, such as Philips’ innovative products units and Deloitte’s 
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consulting and financial advisory divisions, top-, middle-, and frontline managers 
tend to engage to the same extent in exploration activities. Furthermore, the 
differences between levels with respect to exploitation activities only appeared 
through the regression analyses; i.e. when controlling for the other control 
variables. The findings indicate furthermore that differences between organization 
units in terms of exploration and of exploitation are strongly related to front-line 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. In other words; front-line 
managers tend to specialize in either exploration or exploitation within distinct 
organization units, whereas top- and middle-level managers have more consistent 
(and relatively high) levels of exploration and exploitation across organization 
units. Impactions will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
6.3 – Implications 
 
Due to the importance for firms in dynamic environments to explore and exploit 
and difficulties they face doing so, notions on exploration and exploitation are a 
recurring underlying theme in various management literatures. Consequently, 
several studies on organizational design, organizational learning, innovation, and 
strategy research (e.g. Adler et al., 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; 
Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al, 
2005a; Levinthal & March, 1993; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000), 
illustrate how various organizational factors impact upon firm or unit level 
exploration and exploitation processes or outcomes. Notwithstanding these 
valuable contributions, both researchers and managers still struggle to understand 
how firms may manage and organize exploration and exploitation and how they 
may combine the two (cf. Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). This study contributes to current literature and 
management practice, having several implications, by increasing conceptually and 
empirically validated understanding about how organizational factors and intra-
organizational knowledge inflows of managers influence managers’ exploration 
activities and exploitation activities. 
  
By investigating exploration and exploitation at the manager level of 
analysis, this study delivers a general contribution to current studies on 
exploration and exploitation which lack understanding about exploration and 
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exploitation at the individual level of analysis (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; 
Floyd & Lane, 2000; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 2004; Levinthal & 
March, 1993; March, 1991; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Based on the literature 
and in-depth interviews we conceptualized managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities. We also deliver a contribution by having conducted several steps to 
develop corresponding survey items as appropriate scale were not yet available in 
the literature. Reliability and validity analyses of the items and two summated 
scales indicate that they are reliable and unidimensional, and posses good 
convergent and discriminant validity. 
Regarding the relationship between exploration and exploitation, March 
(1991: 72) argues that a trade-off exists between exploration and exploitation at 
several levels. Recently, studies show that exploration and exploitation are not 
mutually exclusive at the firm-level (He & Wong, 2004) or business unit-level 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). With respect to the relationship between 
exploration and exploitation at the level of the manager level, this study’s findings 
support the proposition that exploration and exploitation are not mutually 
exclusive at the manager level of analysis as well. Whereas some managers engage 
more in exploration activities as compared to exploitation activities, or the other 
way around, other managers have high levels of both exploration and exploitation. 
Examining the relation between exploration and exploitation at the three 
hierarchical levels, for instance, shows that the two only significantly negatively 
relate to each other at the lowest hierarchical level, i.e. front line managers. This 
study’s data indicates that front-line managers tend to specialize in either 
exploration or exploitation within distinct organization units, whereas top- and 
middle-level managers have more consistent and relatively higher levels of both 
exploration and exploitation across organization units. The results of the 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (table 4.2) also empirically indicate 
that exploration and exploitation are two separate dimensions and not the extremes 
of one continuum.  
 
This study particularly contributes to research which illustrates how 
organizational factors impact upon exploration and exploitation and the relation 
between these two (e.g. Adler et al., 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; 
Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 
2005a; Leana & Barry, 2000; McGrath, 2001; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; 
Sheremata, 2000), by investigating conceptually and empirically how 
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organizational factors influence managers’ exploration activities and exploitation 
activities. Notwithstanding existing studies, authors indicate that current literature 
and management practice could still benefit from increased understanding how 
organizational factors affect exploration and exploitation and the relationship 
between these two (cf. Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). Existing studies suggest a variety of organizational 
factors and quite differ among each other with respect to specific organizational 
factors they consider (see Appendix A). Hence, we may not only deliver an 
empirical contribution, but also a conceptual one by proving a theoretical 
argument, based on studies on combinative capabilities, about what factors to 
include in an analysis about the impact of organizational factors on exploration 
and exploitation. 
The findings (see table 6.1) of this study imply that merely increasing, 
within an organization or unit, participation in decision making, participation in 
cross-functional interfaces, rewards based on overall firm performance, and 
tolerance for ambiguity of organization members, and (consequently) stimulating 
horizontal and bottom-up flows of knowledge, would increasingly trigger 
managers’ exploration activities without stimulating, or even inhibiting, their 
exploitation activities. This would eventually lead to ‘exploration driving out 
exploitation’ (cf. Levinthal & March, 1993). Furthermore, the findings (see table 
6.2) of this study imply that merely increasing, within an organization or unit, 
formalization of managers’ tasks, and managers’ use of IT-systems to conduct 
tasks, and (consequently) stimulating top-down flows of knowledge, would 
increasingly trigger managers’ exploitation activities without stimulating, or even 
inhibiting, their exploration activities. This would eventually lead to ‘exploitation 
driving out exploration (cf. Levinthal & March, 1993). 
 Regarding combining exploration and exploitation at the manager level 
and the role of organizational factors, studies on organization design argue that 
combining various contradictory elements such as for instance centripetal and 
centrifugal forces (Sheremata, 2000), routine and non-routine tasks (Adler et al., 
1999), and hard and soft processes or systems (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) 
would encourage managers to conduct both exploration and exploitation related 
activities. As Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004, p. 210) point out, such a combination 
of organizational factors should enable managers ‘to make their own judgments 
about how to divide their time between conflicting demands for alignment and 
adaptability’. Or, as Sheremata (2000: 401-2) argues, centrifugal and centripetal 
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forces must coexist to balance exploration and exploitation; there even may be a 
positive interaction effect between the two. Jansen et al. (2005a) also argue, and 
empirically demonstrate at the unit level of analysis, that the interaction between 
seemingly contradictory organizational factors increases a unit’s ability to pursue 
exploratory and exploitative innovations simultaneously.    
 Two main arguments against combining, within the same unit, 
organizational factors which stimulate exploration with those factors which 
stimulate exploitation may be found in the literature. First, combining such 
organizational factors seems impossible, if not, then at least very difficult to 
realize (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; 2003; Duncan, 1976; Ghemawat & Costa, 
1993; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). Second, combining contradictory 
organizational factors may “neutralize” or “cancel out” their effect (Christensen & 
Bower, 1996). For instance, the positive effect of decentralization on exploration 
may be canceled out by the negative effect of formalization on exploration, and 
the positive effect of formalization on exploitation may be neutralized by the 
negative effect of decentralization on exploitation. Related to this, Volberda 
(1998: 61) quotes Weick (1979: 220), who argues that ‘The crucial point is that, in 
effecting the compromise solution, important adaptive responses have been 
selected against and nonadaptive, moderate responses have been preserved’.  
Concluding, different views exist in the literature about the possibility and 
desirability of combining, within the same unit, organizational factors conducive 
to exploration with organizational factors conducive to exploitation, and about the 
effect of combinations of factors on combining exploration and exploitation. 
Although it was not this study’s research question (see chapter 1) to investigate 
how combinations of organizational factors impact upon managers’ combination 
of both exploration and exploitation, the findings of this study may deliver a 
contribution to this issue. 
First, regarding the possibility of combining organizational factors which 
positively relate to managers’ exploration activities with those which positively 
relate to managers’ exploitation activities, this study’s findings suggests that these 
organizational factors not exclude each other; Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
show no significant negative relationships between any pair of organizational 
factors (see table 5.2). The same applies for pairs of the three kinds of knowledge 
inflows. Second, regarding the effect of combinations of organizational factors on 
managers’ combination of exploration and exploitation activities, comparing tables 
6.1 and 6.2 shows that the positive effect of organizational factors on exploration 
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is larger than their negative effect on exploitation. Similarly, the positive effect of 
formalization on exploitation is larger than its negative effect on exploration. The 
same applies for the three kinds of knowledge inflows. As a result from this, the 
findings indicate that combinations of any of the four organizational factors which 
positively relate to exploration with any of the two factors which positively relate 
to exploitation, positively relate to managers’ combination of both exploration and 
exploitation activities. The same applies for combinations of knowledge inflows. 
Moreover, post hoc analyses of the empirical data indicates significant positive 
interaction effects between several combinations of organizational factors on 
managers’ combination of both exploration and exploitation activities. 
Concluding, this study’s findings contribute to ‘contextual ambidexterity’ 
(cf. Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) literatures which argue that combining various 
contradictory elements at lower levels of analysis than the firm level is possible, 
and that these combinations trigger exploration and exploitation simultaneously 
(e.g. Adler et al., 1999; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; 
Sheremata, 2000). Our findings indicates that, at the manager level of analysis, 
organizational factors conducive to exploration (see table 6.1) and organizational 
factors conducive to exploitation (see table 6.2) not exclude each other (see table 
5.2) and that combinations of these factors positively relate to managers’ 
combination of both exploration and exploitation activities. The same applies for 
combinations of top-down and bottom-up knowledge inflows, and top-down and 
horizontal knowledge inflows. 
 
The study also delivers a particular contribution to studies on combinative 
capabilities and intra-organizational knowledge flows (Grant, 1996; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Schulz, 2001; 2003; Szulanski, 1996; 
Van Den Bosch et al., 1999). Studies on combinative capabilities (Grant, 1996; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999) suggest that the raison d’être 
of firms is ‘the sharing and transfer of the knowledge of individuals and groups 
within organizations’ (Kogut & Zander, 1992: 383), triggered by organizational 
factors, to enable exploration and exploitation activities in the firm. This study 
illustrates this line of reasoning; hypotheses and empirical findings show that 
knowledge flows within the firm mediate the relationship between organizational 
factors and managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. Hence, this research 
contributes to studies pertaining to the dynamic capabilities literature, especially to 
those on combinative capabilities,  by conceptually and empirically illustrating the 
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importance of ‘the sharing and transfer’ of knowledge (cf. Kogut & Zander, 1992) 
within a firm for stimulating managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. In 
other words, the effect of organizational factors on managers’ exploration and 
exploitation activities will be limited if the sharing and transfer of knowledge 
within a firm is impeded. 
Furthermore, whereas studies on intra-organizational knowledge flows 
tend to focus on illustrating how organizational factors impact upon knowledge 
flows within the firm (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 1996), this study 
delivers a contribution by investigating and showing the consequences of such 
knowledge flows in terms of managers’ exploration and exploitation activities as 
well. 
 
We may also contribute to the literature and management practice 
regarding the issue of how firms may manage and organize to combine 
exploration and exploitation (e.g. Duncan, 1976; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
Jansen et al., 2005; Levinthal & March, 1993; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). The 
findings of this study illustrate how the configuration of organizational factors and 
knowledge flows within an organization or unit may enable or inhibit managers to 
respond to particular ways by which a firm may combine exploration and 
exploitation. On the basis of Jansen (2005) and Volberda (1998), we distinguished 
three main organizational responses for combining exploration and exploitation; 
spatial separation, temporal separation and synthesis, as each of these ways place 
different demands on managers’ exploration activities and exploitation activities. 
The essence of spatial separation is simultaneously developing explorative 
and exploitative modes in different places in the organization. Spatial separation 
can occur by level, function, and/ or location (Volberda, 1998). An example of 
separation of level and location can be found in firms characterized by structural 
ambidexterity. According to proponents of structural ambidexterity (e.g. Benner & 
Tushman, 2003; Duncan, 1976; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), top- or corporate-
level managers should engage in both exploration and exploitation activities, 
whereas business unit managers should focus on either exploration or exploitation 
activities, depending on the focus of their business unit which is either explorative 
or exploitative. Studies on technological innovation and strategic renewal indicate 
that firms may deal with tensions between exploration and exploitation by 
temporally separating the two (Audia et al., 2000; Shepard, 1967; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986). This implies for managers at all levels and units that they shift 
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their focus over time from pursuing incremental innovations or stability to 
pursuing radical innovations or strategic renewal, or vice versa. Our findings 
illustrate that for managers in places or time periods focused on exploitation, top-
down knowledge inflows, formalization of tasks, and using IT-systems to conduct 
tasks, would be of particular value. These managers are not helped by participation 
in decision making and rewards based on overall firm performance, as these 
negatively relate to managers’ exploitation activities; see table 6.2. Our findings 
illustrate furthermore that for managers in places or time periods focused on 
exploration, bottom-up and/ or horizontal knowledge inflows, participation in 
decision making, participation in cross-functional teams, rewards based on overall 
firm performance, and tolerance for ambiguity of peers and/ or superiors would be 
of particular value. These managers are not helped by formalization of tasks and 
using IT-systems to conduct tasks; see table 6.1.  
The results pertaining to the control variables illustrate, at least to some 
extent, spatial separation of exploration and exploitation on the basis of 
hierarchical level, function, and unit. Regarding hierarchical level and 
organization unit, studies advocating structural ambidexterity (e.g. Benner & 
Tushman, 2003; Duncan, 1976; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004) indicate that 
managers pertaining to a certain unit should focus on either exploration activities 
or on exploitation activities, depending on the focus of their unit and that top-level 
managers should engage in both exploration and exploitation activities. Our data 
shows that front-line managers tend to specialize in either exploration or 
exploitation within distinct organization units. However, not only top-, but also 
middle-managers have more consistent and high levels of exploration and 
exploitation across organization units. 
The third identified organizational response for pursuing both exploration 
and exploitation is by synthesizing them; that is by creating organizational units in 
which the tensions between exploration and exploitation are reconciled (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004). Such organizational units combine various contradictory 
elements (cf. Adler et al., 1999; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Sheremata, 2000) 
which should encourage managers at all levels, functions, and units to conduct 
both exploration and exploitation related activities. The discussion earlier in this 
section on the impact of organizational factors and knowledge inflows on 
managers’ combination of both exploration and exploitation activities indicated 
that organizational factors conducive to exploration, i.e. participation in decision 
making, participation in cross-functional interfaces, rewards based on overall firm 
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performance, and tolerance for ambiguity of peers and/ or superiors, and 
organizational factors conducive to exploitation, i.e. formalization of tasks, and 
using IT-systems to conduct tasks, not seem to exclude each other. Moreover, the 
data indicates that combinations of factors conducive to exploration with factors 
conducive to exploitation, positively relate to managers’ combination of both 
exploration and exploitation activities. The same applies for combinations of top-
down and bottom-up knowledge inflows, and top-down and horizontal knowledge 
inflows. Hence, these study’s findings would suggest that combining these 
“contradictory” organizational factors would create organizational units in which 
the tensions between managers’ exploration and exploitation activities are 
reconciled. 
  
Finally, the study may deliver a contribution to strategy process research 
(e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; 
Van Cauwenberg & Cool, 1982). Various ‘organizational models’ (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1993: 44) can be distinguished in the literature on strategy process 
research in terms of the interaction between the levels of a firm’s management 
structure, i.e. top-, middle-, and front-line managers, and in terms of the activities 
associated with each of these levels. 
Regarding the interactions between hierarchical levels; the exchange of 
knowledge between managers constitutes an important aspect of these interactions 
(Floyd & Lane, 2000). This study may deliver a contribution, as quantitative 
research is lagging behind in the literature on strategy process research regarding 
the exchange of knowledge between managers across hierarchical levels and 
associated activities in terms of exploration and exploitation. In the literature on 
strategy process research, bottom-up knowledge flows are generally associated 
with exploratory processes such as competence definition processes (Floyd & 
Lane, 2000), or with autonomous strategic initiatives (Burgelman, 1983a; 1983b). 
Using quantitative data, this study confirms that bottom-up knowledge flows relate 
to exploration-related activities of managers. In the literature on strategy process 
research, top-down knowledge flows are generally associated with exploitative 
processes such as competence deployment processes (Floyd & Lane, 2000), or 
induced strategic behavior (Burgelman, 1983a; 1983b). This study shows confirms 
that top-down knowledge flows relate to exploitation related activities of 
managers. Moreover, whereas studies on strategy process research tend to focus on 
knowledge flows and interactions between managers across hierarchical levels, 
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this paper illustrates the importance of horizontal knowledge flows as well, 
especially in terms of stimulating managers’ exploration activities, or, in 
combination with top-down knowledge flows, stimulating both exploration and 
exploitation activities. 
 Regarding the locus of exploration and exploitation activities at different 
hierarchical levels, various views exist. Traditionally, i.e. in Chandler’s (1962) 
model (cf. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993), exploration activities such as searching for 
opportunities, building capabilities, and creating new strategic intent are assumed 
to take place at top management level, whereas the exploitation of such 
opportunities, capabilities and strategy are assumed to take place at lower levels in 
the organization. This perspective was supported by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) 
and Stalk et al. (1992), who argue that the development of adequate capabilities 
depends on the strategic intent (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989) of the CEO or corporate 
management, based on superior industry foresight (cf. Volberda, 1998). Our data 
shows that with respect to exploration activities indeed differences exist across 
hierarchical levels. However, not only top-, but also middle-level managers 
conduct significantly more exploration activities than front-line managers. This 
may correspond to other literatures in the field of strategy process research which 
suggest the importance of middle managers’ exploration activities such as 
stimulating and conducting behavior and strategic initiatives which diverge from 
existing and official expectations and strategy (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983a), 
experimenting with new approaches (Chakravarthy, 1982), and facilitating 
organizational adaptation (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). 
  Moreover, our data indicates that the separation of exploration activities 
across hierarchical levels is more present in units which focus on exploitation, 
such as in Rabobank’s retail unit, Philips’ production support unit, and Deloitte’s 
audit and tax & legal divisions. These units operate in less dynamic environments. 
In units operating in more dynamic environments, such as in Philips’ innovative 
products units and Deloitte’s consulting and financial advisory divisions, top-, 
middle-, and frontline managers tend to engage to the same extent in relatively 
high levels of exploration activities. This may illustrate that, as for instance argued 
by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1993: 24), the traditional model as proposed by Chandler 
(1962) may not hold for firms or units operating in dynamic environments. 
Therefore, building on Bower’s work (1970), studies on corporate 
entrepreneurship (e.g. Burgelman, 1983a) and strategic renewal (e.g. Floyd & 
Lane, 2000) suggest, in contrast to the administrative management perspective, 
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that perhaps the most effective process of exploring new capabilities is through 
originating, developing, and promoting strategic initiatives from front-line 
managers (Burgelman, 1983a; Kimberly, 1979; Quinn, 1985). Correspondingly, 
our study illustrates that bottom-up flows of knowledge are beneficial for 
exploration activities. Moreover, in line with these literatures, our study would 
suggests that top managers may stimulate lower level manager to explore by 
impacting upon structural contextual characteristics (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 
1991) or by challenging the status quo of the firm (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1993); i.e. 
by impacting upon the organizational factors. 
 
 
6.4 – Limitations and Future Research 
 
This study has limitations, suggesting several issues for future research. First, the 
study involves cross-sectional data highlighting issues of causal reciprocity. To 
address the issue of causal reciprocity, future studies could explore organizational 
factors, knowledge flows and exploration and exploitation activities of managers 
with longitudinal data. Discussions with other researchers learned that uncertainty 
with respect to causal directions especially exists with respect to the relationships 
between knowledge flows and exploration and exploitation activities. That is, 
confusion may exist whether knowledge flows affect the types of activities 
someone works on, or that the choice of activities affects the type of knowledge 
flows to come about. We recognized this potential confusion and addressed this 
issue in the study by focusing on knowledge inflows only, and by indicating that 
both the knowledge donor and the knowledge recipient may be the initiator of such 
knowledge inflows. Further insight into the direction of causality between 
knowledge flows and exploration and exploitation activities could be created by 
examining knowledge outflows. That is with respect to our study, future research 
could examine how a manager’s exploration and/ or exploitation activities impact 
upon the level and directionalities of knowledge outflows of this manager. At the 
organization unit, Schulz (2001), for instance, shows that a unit’s exploration and/ 
or exploitation activities impact upon the extent and kind of knowledge outflows 
of this unit (Cf. Schulz, 2001). Summarizing, we would argue that a manager’s 
knowledge inflows impact upon this manager’s exploration and exploitation 
activities, whereas these activities may influence the manager’s knowledge 
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outflows. Consequently, reciprocal causal relationships may exist between 
knowledge flows and this manager’s exploration and exploitation activities.  
Second, using single informant data highlights issues of common method 
bias. Regarding the issue of common method bias we performed Harman’s one-
factor test on items included in the regression models. If common method bias 
were a serious problem in the study, we would expect a single factor to emerge to 
account for most of the covariance in the dependent and independent variables 
(Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). We did not find such a single factor. The issue of 
common method bias could be addressed in future studies by measuring 
exploration, exploitation at the managerial level of analysis using objective 
measures. 
 Third, we limited this study’s focus by examining the impact of 
organizational factors and managers’ intra-organizational knowledge inflows on 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities. An interesting extension of our 
research would be investigating the impact of external knowledge inflows, i.e. 
knowledge a manager acquires, which resides out of the firm. At the firm and unit 
level, studies on innovation and absorptive capacity indicate the positive impact of 
the acquisition of new external knowledge on exploration related processes or 
outcomes such as, for instance, new product introductions (Katila & Ahuja, 2002), 
the creation of new knowledge through recombining the acquired knowledge with 
existing knowledge (Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001), new product development 
(Stock et al., 2001), and exploratory and exploitative innovations (Jansen et al., 
2005b). 
A fourth interesting line of research is that which examines the impact of 
managers’ characteristics, such as personality traits and a manager’s current 
knowledge and experience, on managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, 
and knowledge acquisition activities. Current knowledge and experience, reflected 
in for instance education and job tenure, may not only affect a manager’s ability to 
recognize the value of knowledge to be acquired, but also the ability to assimilate 
and apply it (cf. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Smith, 2005) in explorative and/ or 
exploitative ways. Personality traits such as risk aversion and conscientiousness on 
performance may increase a manager’s preference for exploitation activities, 
whereas openness to experience may increase a manager’s preference for 
exploration (Judge et al., 1999). 
Fifth, this study indicates that a need for managers to conduct high levels 
of both exploration and exploitation activities leads to the question about how to 
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combine organizational factors that are conducive to managers’ exploration 
activities with organizational factors that positively influence exploitation 
activities. Although some authors argue that such organization design elements 
may be combined (Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004), the 
most conventional view in studies on organization design seems to be that 
organizational design elements that stimulate exploration are incommensurable 
with those stimulating exploitation (Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Sheremata, 
2000). Consequently, future studies may investigate combined or interaction 
effects of organizational factors on both exploration and exploitation, to further 
our conceptual and empirical insight into how combinations of organizational 
factors concurrently increase or decrease managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005a).   
Sixth, several studies in management fields, such as organizational 
learning (Crossan et al., 1999; Vera & Crossan, 2004), strategy research 
(Burgelman, 1983b, 1991; Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996; Rosenbloom, 2000; 
Trispsas & Gavetti, 2000) and technological innovation (Duncan, 1976; 
Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996) indicate that firm or 
unit level exploration and exploitation to a large extent originate in the exploration 
and exploitation activities of their managers. This made us assume that 
understanding how to influence managers’ exploration and exploitation activities 
benefits our understanding about how to build exploration and exploitation within 
a business-unit or firm. However, the relevance of this study’s findings could be 
further increased by examine the impact of managers’ exploration and exploitation 
activities and the ratio between these two on, for instance, unit- or organization-
level performance, on incremental and radical innovations or on strategic renewal 
(Lyles & Easterby-Smith, 2003). 
Finally, although a contribution of this study is the development of scales 
which assess a manager’s level of exploration and exploitation activities, and 
validity and reliability analyses indicated that the scales were appropriately 
constructed, linking objective exploration and exploitation measures to the scales 
as used in this study could increase insight into the scales’ validity. 
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6.5 – Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we discussed the findings, implications, limitations and directions 
for future research emanating from our inquiry into how organizational factors and 
intra-organizational knowledge inflows of managers influence managers’ 
exploration activities and exploitation activities. This investigation delivers 
interesting insights for both the literature and management practice and indicates 
some valuable roads for future research. The study furthers understanding of 
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities and into how these activities may 
be influenced. This benefits the understanding about how to build both exploration 
and exploitation within a firm, which will contribute to the firm’s competitive 
advantage. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
Introductie 
Om succesvol te zijn en te blijven worden ondernemingen in een dynamische 
omgeving geconfronteerd met de uitdaging om zowel te innoveren, veranderen, en 
flexibel te zijn (exploreren), als voort te bouwen op bestaande zekerheden en 
efficiëntie te verhogen (exploiteren) (March, 1991). Onderzoekers en managers 
worstelen echter met de vraag hoe te exploreren, hoe te exploiteren, en vooral hoe 
deze twee te combineren binnen een bedrijf (Levinthal & March, 1993). Studies geven 
dan ook aan dat de bestaande managementliteratuur en de managementpraktijk baat 
hebben bij een beter begrip, dat zowel conceptueel als empirisch onderbouwd is, van 
hoe diverse organisatie-elementen exploratie, exploitatie, en de relatie tussen deze 
twee, beïnvloeden (Adler et al., 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996; Sheremata, 2000). Om een bijdrage te 
leveren aan een beter begrip hiervan, stelt dit onderzoek zich als doel om inzicht te 
verschaffen, ten eerste, in exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten van managers van grote 
ondernemingen die in een dynamische omgeving opereren, en, ten tweede, in hoe 
organisatie-elementen deze activiteiten beïnvloeden. Hiertoe conceptualiseren en 
operationaliseren we managers’ exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten en onderzoeken 
we de invloed op managers’ exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten van (1) 
organisatiefactoren en van (2) de acquisitie van kennis door managers, die zich in de 
organisatie bevindt. 
  Veranderingen op het gebied van technologieën, concurrentie, regulering, en 
klantbehoeften dwingen managers van ondernemingen die onderzocht zijn in deze 
studie om exploratie activiteiten te verrichten. De essentie van deze exploratie 
activiteiten is het creëren van variëteit in ervaringen (Bontis et al., 2002; Holmqvist, 
2004; Levinthal & March, 1993; McGrath, 2001) dat gerelateerd is aan verbreding van 
de bestaande kennis van een manager (Cf. Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Levinthal & March, 
1993; Sidhu et al., 2004). Voorbeelden van exploratie activiteiten van deze managers 
zijn zoeken naar nieuwe kansen in bestaande, nieuwe, of opkomende markten, 
experimenteren met bijvoorbeeld nieuwe technologieën, distributiekanalen of 
organisatievormen, het ontwikkelen van nieuwe processen, producten, of 
productcombinaties, en het herzien van bestaande opvattingen, beslissingen, en 
strategieën (Banker et al., 2005; Flier et al., 2001; Greenwood et al., 2005; Henisz & 
Macher, 2004; Sarvay, 1999). Andere ontwikkelingen in de omgeving van 
onderzochte ondernemingen, zoals het toenemende belang van efficiëntie en 
schaalgrootte, voortdurende kostenreductie, en forsere concurrentie gericht op de korte 
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termijn, dwingen managers om exploitatie activiteiten te verrichten. De essentie van 
deze exploitatie activiteiten is het vergoten van de betrouwbaarheid in bestaande 
ervaringen (Bontis et al., 2002; Holmqvist, 2004; Levinthal and March, 1993) dat 
gerelateerd is aan verdieping van de bestaande kennis van een manager (Cf. Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993). Voorbeelden van exploitatie activiteiten van 
managers zijn het bedienen van bestaande (interne) klanten met bestaande diensten of 
producten, het uitbreiden, consolideren, of afstoten van bestaande activiteiten, het 
nastreven van geformuleerde korte termijn doelstellingen, zich specialiseren in, 
bijvoorbeeld, specifieke technologieën, productgroepen, of marktsegmenten, en het 
verbeteren en standaardiseren van bedrijfsprocessen.  
 
Onderzoeksaanpak 
In deze studie worden een kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve onderzoeksaanpak 
gecombineerd (Creswell, 1994). De nadruk ligt op het verzamelen en analyseren van 
kwantitatieve data middels een vragenlijst omdat we voornamelijk geïnteresseerd zijn 
in welke en hoe factoren een uitkomst beïnvloeden en omdat we willen generaliseren 
naar een populatie, namelijk managers van grote ondernemingen die in een 
dynamische omgeving opereren (Creswell, 2003; Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Jankowicz, 
1995). De kwalitatieve data, verzameld aan de hand van diepte interviews en 
bedrijfsdocumenten, dient ter ondersteuning. De kwalitatieve data is in het begin van 
de studie gebruikt om beter inzicht te krijgen in de centrale begrippen van de studie 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994), hun onderlinge relaties (Eisenhardt, 1989), en diende ter 
ondersteuning van het ontwikkelen van de managers’ exploratie en exploitatie 
activiteiten schalen (Jick, 1979). Vervolgens is kwantitatieve data verzameld en 
geanalyseerd om de hypothesen te testen en bij te dragen aan de generaliseerbaarheid 
van de resultaten (Creswell, 1994). Ten slotte is kwalitatieve data gebruikt als hulp om 
de kwantitatieve resultaten te interpreteren (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
 De volgende onderzoeksactiviteiten zijn verricht: ten eerste verrichtten we 
literatuuronderzoek (zie onder ‘theorie’). Aan de hand van de literatuurstudie zijn het 
onderzoeksprobleem, de doelstelling, en de onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd, als ook 
het conceptuele onderzoeksmodel dat de centrale variabelen van de studie weergeeft. 
Tevens diende de literatuurstudie ertoe om inzicht te krijgen in de belangrijkste 
relaties tussen de variabelen. Ten tweede zijn bedrijfsdocumenten bestudeerd en 
diepte-interviews gehouden met managers van verschillende hiërarchische lagen, 
functies, en organisatie-eenheden binnen Rabobank, Philips, en Deloitte (zie onder 
‘empirie’). Het doel hiervan was om vanuit de praktijk de relevantie van het 
onderzoeksprobleem, doelstelling, en onderzoeksvragen vast te stellen, om accurater 
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de centrale begrippen van de studie te kunnen beschrijven, en om vanuit het 
perspectief van managers de relevantie te bepalen van het wel of juist niet meenemen 
van bepaalde variabelen in deze studie. Ten derde werden, op basis van de literatuur, 
de hypothesen ontwikkeld. De gehouden interviews dienden ook om beter inzicht te 
krijgen in de causale relaties tussen de variabelen. Ten vierde, nadat de hypothesen 
ontwikkeld waren, werd de vragenlijst gemaakt. Hiertoe werden relevante bestaande 
schalen uit de literatuur gebruikt. Omdat deze nog niet bestonden, ontwikkelden we 
zelf meetschalen voor managers’ exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten aan de hand van 
conceptualisaties in de literatuur. Interviews werden gehouden om de betrouwbaarheid 
en validiteit van deze twee schalen te vergoten. De items van de schalen werden 
verder verbeterd aan de hand van data verkregen door een pilot vragenlijst. Dit 
resulteerde in de uiteindelijke versie van de vragenlijst. Ten vijfde verzamelden we 
binnen elk van de drie bedrijven kwantitatieve data aan de hand van deze vragenlijst 
en werd deze data vervolgens geanalyseerd. Ten slotte hebben we de kwantitatieve 
bevindingen geëvalueerd aan de hand van de literatuur en feedbacksessies met 
managers. In ieder van de bedrijven waar onderzoek is verricht zijn feedbacksessies 
gehouden met managers om de empirische bevindingen van het onderzoek beter te 
kunnen begrijpen, en om meer inzicht te krijgen in de implicaties voor de praktijk. 
 
Theorie 
Het doel van het literatuuronderzoek is deze studie te relateren aan reeds bestaand 
verwant onderzoek. Dienovereenkomstig wordt in het theoretische gedeelte de studie 
gepositioneerd. De centrale variabelen van de studie worden geconceptualiseerd en 
voor ieder van de variabelen wordt het belang aangetoond om deze te bestuderen. Ten 
slotte wordt een conceptueel onderzoeksmodel ontwikkeld met bijbehorende 
hypothesen die de causale relaties tussen de variabelen weergeven. Het 
literatuuronderzoek richt zich op managementstudies waarin, op verschillende maar 
gerelateerde wijzen, sprake is van exploratie en exploitatie; namelijk studies op het 
gebied van leren in organisaties (bijvoorbeeld Crossan & Berdrow, 2003; Holmqvist, 
2004; Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991), innovatie (bijvoorbeeld Benner & 
Tushman, 2002; 2003; Duncan, 1976; Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005), strategie 
(bijvoorbeeld Burgelman, 1991; 2002; Floyd & Lane, 2000; McGrath, 2001), 
organisatieontwerp (bijvoorbeeld Adler et al., 1999; Jansen et al., 2005b; Rivkin & 
Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000), en kennis en dynamische vaardigheden 
(bijvoorbeeld Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Jansen et al., 
2005b; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996).  
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 Het literatuuronderzoek toont aan dat, hoewel de meeste studies aangeven dat 
het belangrijk is om te begrijpen hoe exploratie en exploitatie gestimuleerd kunnen 
worden binnen bedrijven, systematisch onderzoek hierover, theorie ontwikkeling, en 
vooral empirisch onderzoek achterblijft (Sihdu et al., 2004). Specifieker, de huidige 
literatuur is gediend bij onderzoek dat conceptueel verantwoord aangeeft hoe 
organisatie-elementen van invloed zijn op exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten binnen 
bedrijven en op de relatie tussen deze twee, en dat vervolgens ook empirische validatie 
geeft (Cf. Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman & 
O’Reilly, 1996). Tevens blijkt uit het literatuuronderzoek dat studies die exploratie en 
exploitatie activiteiten op het analyseniveau van managers onderzoeken nagenoeg 
afwezig zijn. Dit is tamelijk verbazingwekkend omdat studies op het gebied van leren 
binnen organisaties (Crossan et al., 1999; Vera & Crossan, 2004), strategie 
(Burgelman, 1983a; 1991; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1996; 
Rosenbloom, 2000; Trispsas & Gavetti, 2000), en innovatie (Duncan, 1976; 
Subramaniam & Youndt, 2005; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), aangeven dat exploratie 
en exploitatie op het niveau van bedrijven of bedrijfseenheden grotendeels ontstaan uit 
exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten van managers. De hoofdrede dat deze studie zich 
richt op exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten van managers is dan ook de aanname, 
gebaseerd op de huidige literatuur, dat het gebrek aan inzicht met betrekking tot 
exploratie en exploitatie op het niveau van bedrijfseenheden of bedrijven verminderd 
kan worden door te begrijpen hoe managers’ exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten 
beïnvloed kunnen worden. 
 Om meer inzicht te creëren, onderzoekt deze studie hoe de acquisitie van 
kennis, die zich binnen de organisatie bevindt, door een manager van invloed is op de 
exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten van deze manager. Studies, vooral die op het 
gebied van innovatie, tonen aan dat de acquisitie van kennis door bedrijven of 
bedrijfseenheden een belangrijke verklarende variabele is voor exploratie en 
exploitatie activiteiten binnen het bedrijf of de bedrijfseenheid (Benner & Tushman, 
2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Nerkar, 2003; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Met 
betrekking tot managers illustreren voornamelijk conceptuele studies en casestudies 
studies de relevantie om de acquisitie van kennis in de organisatie door managers, als 
een belangrijke determinant te beschouwen voor hun exploratie en/ of exploitatie 
activiteiten (bijvoorbeeld Burgelman, 1983b; 1991; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Grant, 1996; 
Ghemawat & Ricart I Costa, 1993; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 
2003; Sanchez et al., 1996). De aanname dat kennisacquisitie exploratie en exploitatie 
beïnvloedt is echter veelal impliciet in deze studies; theoretische en empirische 
onderbouwing met betrekking tot de relatie tussen managers’ intra-organisationele 
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kennisacquisitie en exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten ontbreken dan ook. Op basis 
van Gupta en Govindarajan (2000), Schulz (2001) en Tsai (2001) wordt in deze studie 
de acquisitie van kennis door een manager geconceptualiseerd en geoperationaliseerd 
in termen van kennisinstromen van een manager. Aan de hand van Schulz’ en Gupta 
en Govindarajans definitie van kennisinstromen definiëren we kennisinstromen van 
een manager als het ‘totale volume’ (Schulz, 2001: 662) van impliciete en expliciete 
kennis met betrekking tot verschillende gebieden zoals technologieën, producten, 
processen, strategieën, en markten, dat een manager vergaart of ontvangt per 
tijdseenheid, van andere personen of bedrijfseenheden in dezelfde organisatie. Deze 
brede notie van kennisinstromen maakt het mogelijk om managers te bestuderen die 
behoren tot verschillende hiërarchische lagen, functies, en bedrijfseenheden. Het is 
niet onze bedoeling om in het onderzoek de acquisitie van operationele of financiële 
data mee te nemen, noch het ontvangen van orders. Conceptuele studies en casestudies 
op het gebied van strategie processen illustreren dat exploratie en exploitatie 
activiteiten van managers beïnvloed worden door verticale kennisinstromen 
(Burgelman, 1983b; 1991; Floyd & Lane, 2000; Van Cauwenberg & Cool, 1982). 
Hierbij maken we in navolging van deze studies een onderscheid tussen ‘top-down’ 
kennis instromen’, dat is kennis die een manager ontvangt van personen of 
bedrijfseenheden van hogere hiërarchische lagen, en ‘bottom-up’ kennis instromen, 
dat is kennis die een manager ontvangt van personen of bedrijfseenheden behorende 
tot lagere hiërarchische lagen. Ander studies wijzen op het belang van horizontale 
kennisstromen binnen een organisatie (bijvoorbeeld Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; 
Nonaka, 1994; Schulz, 2001; 2003; Tsai, 2001). Horizontale kennisinstromen van een 
manager volgen niet de traditionele lijnen van de hiërarchie, ze worden geassocieerd 
met kennis die komt van mensen of bedrijfseenheden die zich op hetzelfde 
hiërarchische niveau bevinden als de kennisontvanger. In deze studie bekijken we 
conceptueel en empirisch de invloed van ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ en horizontale 
kennisinstromen van managers op hun exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten. 
 Naast de rol van kennisinstromen van een manager onderzoekt deze studie 
wat de rol is van organisatiefactoren, zodat meer inzicht verkregen wordt in hoe 
managers’ exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten gemanaged kunnen worden (Cf. 
Duncan, 1976; Gibson & Birkinshaw, Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003). De literatuur, 
vooral studies op het gebied van organisatieontwerp, draagt in dit kader een breed 
scala van factoren aan. Om theoretisch gefundeerd te bepalen welke factoren in deze 
studie mee te nemen, onderzoekt deze studie, op basis van Jansen et al. (2005b) en 
Van Den Bosch et al., (1999), de invloed van organisatiefactoren die 
gemeenschappelijke kenmerken vormen van de ‘combinative capabilities’ van een 
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bedrijf. ‘Combinative capabilities’ refereren naar de vaardigheden van een bedrijf om 
nieuwe kansen te exploreren en bestaande zekerheden te exploiteren terwijl ze de 
integratie (Grant, 1996), uitwisseling (Jansen et al., 2005b), of transfer (Kogut & 
Zander, 1992) van kennis binnen een bedrijf benadrukken. Er wordt aan de hand van 
een drietal van zulke vaardigheden; coördinatie, systeem, en socialisatievaardigheden 
(Jansen et al., 2005b; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999), een aantal organisatiefactoren 
geïdentificeerd in de literatuur die op het analyseniveau van de manager bestudeerd 
kunnen worden. Links in figuur 1 zijn de onderzochte organisatiefactoren 
weergegeven. 
  
Figuur 1 – Conceptueel Onderzoeksmodel 
Coördinatievaardigheden
• Managers’ participatie in beslissingen nemen
• Mgrs’ participatie in crossfunctionele teams
• Mgrs’ beloningen gebaseerd op bedrijfsdoelen
Systeemvaardigheden
• Formalisatie van managers’ taken
• Managers’ gebruik van IT-systemen
om taken uit te voeren
Socialisatievaardigheden
• Managers’ verbondenheid met andere
organisatieleden
• Tolerantie voor ambiguïteit van
managers’ gelijken of superieuren
Onafhankelijke Variabelen:
Organisatiefactoren als Gemeenschappelijke 
Kenmerken van ‘Combinative Capabilities’
Mediërende Variabelen:
Acquisitie van Kennis
• ‘Top-Down’
kennisinstromen
van managers
• ‘Bottom-Up’
kennisinstromen
van managers
• Horizontale
kennisinstromen
van managers
• Managers’
exploratie
activiteiten
• Managers’
exploitatie
activiteiten
Uitkomst Variabelen:
Exploratie en 
Exploitatie Act.
 
 
Uit de literatuurstudie blijkt dat het niet alleen relevant is om te onderzoeken 
wat de directe invloed is van organisatiefactoren op managers’ exploratie en 
exploitatie activiteiten, maar wat de indirecte invloed is. Dat is, het is relevant om te 
onderzoeken hoe, en in welke mate, managers’ kennisinstromen de relatie tussen 
organisatiefactoren en exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten mediëren. Niet alleen 
studies op het gebied van ‘combinative capabilities’ (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 
1992) onderschrijven deze gedachte, ook studies op het gebied van kennisstromen of 
kennisuitwisseling binnen bedrijven geven aan dat kennisstromen niet exogeen zijn, 
maar gestimuleerd of gehinderd worden door organisatiefactoren (Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 1996). Deze studie ontwikkelt en test dan ook 
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hypothesen met betrekking tot (1) de directe invloed van organisatiefactoren op 
managers’ exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten, (2) de invloed van organisatiefactoren 
op kennisinstromen van managers, en (3) de invloed van kennisinstromen van 
managers op hun exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten. Figuur 1 toont de variabelen 
van deze studie en de bovengenoemde relaties. 
 
Empirie en belangrijkste bevindingen 
Het empirisch onderzoek van de studie vond plaats in drie ‘multi-unit’ ondernemingen 
die opereren in een dynamische omgeving; vijf lokale banken van de Rabobank 
Groep, actief in de financiële sector; Philips’ semi-conductor divisie, actief in de semi-
conductor industrie; en Deloitte Nederland, actief in de accountancy & advies sector. 
Zoals aangegeven in de introductie van deze samenvatting maken verschillende 
ontwikkelingen in de omgeving van deze bedrijven dat ze een geschikte context 
vormen om managers’ exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten te onderzoeken. Binnen 
ieder bedrijf is data verzameld aan de hand van diepte-interviews, bedrijfsdocumenten 
en dezelfde vragenlijst. De vragenlijst is binnen ieder bedrijf voorgelegd aan een 
sample van managers van verschillende hiërarchische lagen, functies, en organisatie-
eenheden; 237 managers binnen Rabobank, 255 binnen Philips, en 653 binnen 
Deloitte. Dit resulteerde in respectievelijk 177, 118, en 224 bruikbare ingevulde 
vragenlijsten. Om te testen of er sprake is van non-response bias in de datasets zijn de 
respondenten vergeleken met de niet-respondenten. De verdeling van de respondenten 
in ieder bedrijf over de hiërarchische lagen, functies, en bedrijfseenheden komt 
overeen met de werkelijke verdeling van alle managers binnen het desbetreffende 
bedrijf. Verder vergeleken we in iedere dataset vroege en late respondenten in termen 
van modelvariabelen; ook hierin bleken geen significante verschillen te zitten. Hieruit 
concluderen we dat non-response bias geen probleem is. Uitgebreide betrouwbaarheid 
en validiteit analyses van de items en schalen van de vragenlijst tonen aan dat ze 
betrouwbaarheid zijn, uni-dimensioneel, en goede convergerende en discriminerende 
validiteit bezitten. 
 Nadat de data per bedrijf geanalyseerd waren, bleek dat de bevindingen per 
bedrijf sterk overeenkomen. Daarom hebben we de drie datasets geïntegreerd en 
vervolgens geanalyseerd aan de hand van regressieanalyses. De resultaten tonen aan 
dat, controlerend voor hiërarchisch niveau, functie, bedrijf, en bedrijfseenheid, 
‘bottom-up’ en horizontale kennisinstromen van managers positief gerelateerd zijn aan 
hun exploratie activiteiten, terwijl ‘top-down’ kennisinstromen positief gerelateerd 
zijn aan exploitatie activiteiten. Verder blijkt dat ‘bottom-up’ en horizontale 
kennisinstromen voornamelijk de relatie tussen organisatiefactoren die geassocieerd 
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zijn met coördinatievaardigheden en managers’ exploratie activiteiten gedeeltelijk 
mediëren. ‘Top-down’ kennisinstromen mediëren gedeeltelijk de relatie tussen 
organisatiefactoren die geassocieerd zijn met systeemvaardigheden en managers’ 
exploitatie activiteiten. Structural equation modelling bevestigt dat het model waarin 
de kennisinstromen een gedeeltelijk mediërende rol vervullen een goede fit met de 
data heeft die bovendien beter is dan het model waarin de kennisinstromen geen 
mediërende rol vervullen en het model waarin ze een volledig mediërende rol 
vervullen. Met betrekking tot de organisatiefactoren illustreren de resultaten dat 
organisatiefactoren die geassocieerd zijn met coördinatievaardigheden (zie figuur 1) 
een direct en indirect (via ‘bottom-up’ en horizontale kennisinstromen) positief effect 
op exploratie activiteiten hebben. Twee van deze factoren, namelijk managers’ 
participatie in beslissingen nemen en managers’ beloningen gebaseerd op 
bedrijfsdoelen hebben ook een (klein) direct negatief effect op managers’ exploitatie 
activiteiten. Organisatiefactoren die geassocieerd zijn met systeemvaardigheden (zie 
figuur 1) hebben een direct negatief effect op managers’ exploratie activiteiten en een 
direct en indirect (via ‘top-down’ kennisinstromen) positief effect op exploitatie 
activiteiten. Ten slotte, van de organisatiefactoren geassocieerd met 
socialisatievaardigheden blijkt managers’ verbondenheid met andere organisatieleden 
geen enkel effect te hebben op exploratie of exploitatie activiteiten. De andere factor, 
tolerantie voor ambiguïteit van een manager’s omgeving heeft een direct en indirect 
(door de positieve relatie met ‘bottom-up’ en horizontale kennisinstromen) positief 
effect op exploratie activiteiten en een indirect positief effect (door de positieve relatie 
met ‘top-down’ kennisinstromen) op exploitatie activiteiten. Hiermee bevestigt de data 
ongeveer tweederde van de hypothesen. Met betrekking tot de meeste andere 
hypothesen zijn de veronderstelde relaties wel aanwezig in de data, maar niet 
significant.  
 De effecten van de controle variabelen blijken grotendeels als verwacht. 
Managers in R&D gerelateerde functies richten zich meer op exploratie activiteiten 
dan ander managers, terwijl managers in productie gerelateerde functies zich meer op 
exploitatie activiteiten richten. Managers in bedrijfseenheden waar meer 
veranderingen in de omgeving plaats vinden verrichten meer exploratie activiteiten en 
minder exploitatie activiteiten dan managers van bedrijfseenheden die in een stabielere 
omgeving opereren. Verder toont de data dat zowel top- als midden managers meer 
exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten verrichten dan ‘front-line’ managers. Verder blijkt 
dat het vooral ‘front-line’ managers zijn die zich binnen bedrijfseenheden 
specialiseren in exploratie of exploitatie activiteiten afhankelijk van de gerichtheid van 
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de bedrijfseenheid, terwijl top- en midden managers meer consistente niveaus van 
exploratie en exploitatie hebben over de verschillende bedrijfseenheden heen. 
 
Bijdragen 
Uit de literatuur en managementpraktijk blijkt dat er een gebrek is aan inzicht 
in hoe organisatie-elementen managers’ exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten 
beïnvloeden. Dit onderzoek levert een conceptuele en empirische bijdrage aan de 
literatuur en de managementpraktijk. 
March (1991) stelt dat een afweging bestaat tussen exploratie en exploitatie 
op verschillende analyse niveaus. Recent hebben studies aangetoond dat deze twee 
elkaar niet wederzijds uitsluiten op bedrijfsniveau (He & Wong, 2004) of 
bedrijfseenheid niveau (Gibson & Birkinshaw; Jansen et al., 2005a). De resultaten van 
deze studie tonen aan dat exploratie en exploitatie elkaar ook niet wederzijds uitsluiten 
op het analyse niveau van de manager. Top- en midden managers hebben bijvoorbeeld 
een relatief hoge mate van zowel exploratie en exploitatie. De correlatie coëfficiënt 
tussen exploratie en exploitatie van top- en midden managers is dan ook niet negatief. 
De resultaten van de exploratieve en confirmatieve factoranalyses tonen ook empirisch 
aan dat exploratie en exploitatie twee verschillende dimensies zijn en niet de extremen 
van één en hetzelfde continuüm. 
 Het onderzoek levert ook een bijdrage aan studies die zich bezighouden met 
de vraag welke en hoe organisatiefactoren van invloed zijn op exploratie en exploitatie 
(bijvoorbeeld Adler et al. 1999; Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 
2004; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Sheremata, 2000). Deze studie levert een bijdrage 
door vanuit de kennis en dynamische vaardigheden literatuur een theoretisch 
gefundeerd argument aan te voeren met betrekking tot welke organisatiefactoren te 
bestuderen. Bovendien levert de studie een bijdrage door conceptueel en empirisch het 
effect van de factoren op zowel exploratie als op exploitatie te bestuderen; zie onder 
‘empirie en belangrijkste bevindingen’ welke en hoe organisatiefactoren van invloed 
zijn op exploratie en op exploitatie. Bovendien toont de studie, naast de rol van 
organisatiefactoren, het belang en effect aan van kennisstromen binnen een bedrijf op 
managers’ exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten. Hierdoor schept deze studie een 
integraler beeld dan afzonderlijke studies tot nu toe doen. Sommige van de bestaande 
studies richten zich immers slechts op enkele of één specifieke organisatiefactor 
(Benner & Tushman, 2003; McGrath, 2001; March, 1991), andere richten zich slechts 
op exploratie (McGrath, 2001; Sidhu et al., 2004) of op exploitatie (Hansen et al., 
2002) aspecten, of zijn conceptueel van aard (Adler et al. 1999; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 
2003; Sheremata, 2000).  
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Het onderzoek levert een bijdrage aan studies op het gebied van ‘combinative 
capabilities’ en studies op het gebied van kennis uitwisselen binnen organisaties. Een 
belangrijk argument in conceptuele studies zoals die van Kogut en Zander (1992) en 
Grant (1996) is, dat de centrale rol van een bedrijf het transfereren van kennis binnen 
de organisatiecontext is, teneinde exploratieve en exploitatieve aanpassingen te 
bewerkstelligen. Het conceptueel model en de empirische bevindingen van deze studie 
onderstrepen dit argument; de studie toont de centrale rol van kennisstromen binnen 
een bedrijf voor managers’ exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten en toont de rol van de 
organisatiecontext. Managers’ intra-organisationele kennisinstromen blijken 
belangrijke determinanten te zijn van hun exploratie en exploitatie activiteiten. Ze 
mediëren echter niet geheel maar gedeeltelijk de invloed van organisatiefactoren. De 
organisatiefactoren beïnvloeden dus niet alleen managers’ exploratie en exploitatie 
activiteiten indirect door hun invloed op managers’ kennisinstromen, maar ook direct. 
Verder; bestaande studies op het gebied van kennisstromen binnen een bedrijf richten 
zich vooral op de vraag welke en hoe factoren van invloed zijn op zulke 
kennisstromen (bijvoorbeeld Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 1996). Deze 
studie levert een bijdrage door ook de invloed, of uitkomst van zulke kennisstromen 
aan te tonen. 
Ten slotte levert dit onderzoek een bijdrage aan de vraag van zowel 
wetenschappers (Duncan, 1976; Levinthal & Mach, 1993) en managers hoe een bedrijf 
exploratie en exploitatie kan combineren door aan te geven hoe de configuratie van 
organisatiefactoren en kennisstromen managers in staat stelt te beantwoorden aan de 
manieren waarop een bedrijf exploratie en exploitatie kan combineren. Aan de hand 
van Jansen (2005) en Volberda (1998) onderscheidden we in de literatuur drie 
hoofdmanieren waarop een bedrijf om kan gaan met spanningen tussen exploratie en 
exploitatie; scheiden qua locatie, scheiden in tijd, en combineren op dezelfde plaats en 
tijd. Scheiden qua locatie heeft als gevolg dat managers, behorende tot een bepaalde 
hiërarchische laag (Burgelman, 1983a; 1983b; Floyd & Lane, 2000), functie (De 
Leede et al., 2002), of organisatie-eenheid (Benner & Tushman, 2003; O’Reilly & 
Tushman, 2004) zich of moeten richten op exploratie activiteiten, of op exploitatie 
activiteiten, afhankelijk van de gerichtheid van de desbetreffende hiërarchische laag, 
functie, of organisatie-eenheid. Scheiden in tijd heeft als gevolg dat managers, 
naarmate de tijd verstrijkt, hun aandacht moeten verleggen van het verrichten van 
exploratie activiteiten naar het verrichten van exploitatie activiteiten of omgekeerd 
(Cheng & Van de Ven, 1996; Duncan, 1976; Garcia et al., 2003; Nooteboom, 2000; 
Winter & Szulanski, 2001). Deze studie toont aan dat managers op plaatsen binnen 
organisaties of in tijdsperioden, gericht op exploratie, gebaat zijn bij ‘bottom-up’ en/of 
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horizontale kennisinstromen, participatie in beslissingen nemen, participatie in 
crossfunctionele teams, beloningen gebaseerd op bedrijfsdoelen, en tolerantie voor 
ambiguïteit. Ze zijn niet gebaat bij formalisatie van taken en gebruik van IT-systemen. 
Echter, managers op plaatsen binnen organisaties, of tijdsperioden, gericht op 
exploitatie zijn gebaat bij ‘top-down’ kennisinstromen, formalisatie van taken en 
gebruik maken van ICT-systemen om hun taken te verrichten. Ze zijn niet gebaat bij 
participatie in beslissingen nemen en beloningen gebaseerd op bedrijfsdoelen. 
Het combineren van exploratie en exploitatie op dezelfde plaats en dezelfde 
tijd, de derde manier waarop bedrijven om kunnen gaan met de noodzaak om zowel te 
exploreren als te exploiteren, houdt in dat managers van alle hiërarchische lagen, 
functies en organisatie-eenheden zich zowel moeten richten op exploratie activiteiten 
als op exploitatie activiteiten. Dit kan bereikt worden volgens sommige onderzoekers 
door (schijnbaar) ‘tegenstrijdige’ organisatie-elementen te combineren (Adler et al., 
1999; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Nonaka & Toyama, 2002; Sheremata, 2000). Met 
betrekking tot kennisstromen suggereert deze studie dat voor managers binnen een 
bedrijf dat streeft naar het gelijktijdig en op dezelfde plaats combineren van exploratie 
en exploitatie, een combinatie van ‘top-down’ en ‘bottom-up’, of een combinatie van 
‘top-down’ en horizontale kennisinstromen van waarde is. Deze drie soorten 
kennisinstromen, lijken niet ‘tegenstrijdig’ te zijn; elk van de drie is positief, maar niet 
negatief, gerelateerd aan exploratie of exploitatie. Bovendien geeft de data aan dat de 
drie soorten kennisinstromen elkaar niet uitsluiten op het analyse niveau van de 
manager; volgens de correlatiematrix zijn ze alle drie positief en significant aan elkaar 
gerelateerd. Hetzelfde geldt voor de organisatiefactoren; factoren die exploratie 
bevorderen zijn niet significant negatief gerelateerd aan factoren die exploitatie 
bevorderen. De bevindingen tonen zelfs aan dat combinaties van organisatiefactoren 
die exploratie bevorderen met factoren die exploitatie bevorderen, positief gerelateerd 
zijn aan managers’ combinatie van exploratie en exploitatie vaardigheden. 
Dit onderzoek toont enkele interessante resultaten, zowel voor de literatuur en 
management praktijk, maar kent ook beperkingen die kansen voor toekomstig 
onderzoek bieden. Deze studie geeft inzicht in managers’ exploratie en exploitatie 
activiteiten en in hoe deze activiteiten beïnvloed kunnen worden. Dit bevordert inzicht 
in de vraag hoe een bedrijf zowel kan exploreren als exploiteren, dat een positieve 
bijdrage zal leveren aan het concurrentievoordeel van een bedrijf. 
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APPENDIX B – Survey Items 
 
Managers’ exploration activities 
To what extent did you, last year, engage in work related activities that can be 
characterized as follows: 
• Searching for new possibilities with respect to products/ services, processes or 
markets 
• Evaluating diverse options with respect to products/ services, processes or markets 
• Focusing on strong renewal of products/ services or processes 
• Activities of which the associated yields or costs are currently unclear 
• Activities requiring much adaptability from your side 
• Activities requiring you to learn new skills 
• Activities that are not (yet) clearly existing company policy 
 
Managers’ exploitation activities 
To what extent did you, last year, engage in work related activities that can be 
characterized as follows: 
• Activities of which a lot of experience has been accumulated by yourself 
• Activities which you carry out as if it were routine 
• Activities which serve existing (internal) customers with existing services/ products 
• Activities of which it is clear to you how to conduct them 
• Activities primarily focused on achieving short-term goals 
• Activities which you can properly conduct by using your present skills 
• Activities which clearly fit into existing company policy 
 
Managers’ top-down Knowledge Inflows (based on Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; 
Schulz, 2001) 
To what extent did you, last year, receive or gather knowledge from: 
• your direct supervisor 
• one more hierarchical level up than your direct supervisor 
• two more hierarchical levels up than your direct supervisor 
 
Managers’ bottom-up Knowledge Inflows (based on Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; 
Schulz, 2001) 
To what extent did you, last year, receive or gather knowledge from: 
• your direct assistants 
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Managers’ horizontal Knowledge Inflows (based on Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; 
Schulz, 2001) 
To what extent did you, last year, receive or gather knowledge from: 
Rabobank • peer managers within your business unit (for members of the board of 
directors refer to: ‘other members of the board of directors’) 
• other business units 
• other local banks of the Rabobank Group 
 
Philips • peer teams within your own organizational unit 
• teams in other organizational units within your own division 
• teams in other divisions’ units 
 
Deloitte • peer managers within your department 
• other departments within your division 
• other divisions of Deloitte Nederland 
 
Participation in decision making (Hage & Aiken, 1967; Dewar et al., 1980) 
• I participate in decisions on implementing new processes or products/ services 
• I participate in decisions on adopting new policies 
• I participate in decisions on hiring new colleagues 
• I participate in decisions on the promotion of colleagues 
 
Participation in cross-functional interfaces (Nadler & Tushman, 1987; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000) 
• I coordinate work across organizational units 
• I work in temporary cross-unit task forces 
• I work in permanent cross-unit teams 
 
Rewards based on overall firm performance (Lawler, 1986) 
• Rewards I receive are strongly linked to the performance of the organization as a 
whole 
• I receive rewards primarily on individual achievements as opposed to organization-
wide accomplishments ® 
• Rewards I receive are based on an organizational plan as opposed to an individual 
plan 
 
Formalization of tasks (Desphande & Zaltman, 1982) 
• Whatever situation arises, I have procedures to follow in dealing with it 
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• I have to follow strict operational procedures at all times 
• Rules occupy a central place in my work related activities 
• There is a written job description for going about my tasks 
 
Use of IT-systems to conduct tasks (Davis, 1989; Sanders, 1984) 
IT-systems here exclude email and web-based discussion forums 
• I very frequently use IT-systems to get my job done 
• IT-systems do not assist me at all in performing my job ® 
• I have become very dependent on IT-systems in conducting my tasks 
 
Connectedness to other organization members (Jaworski & Kohli, 1993) 
• There are many opportunities for me to talk to individuals from all kinds of different 
organizational units 
• I very frequently have contact with people, regardless of rank or position 
• The personal network I have throughout the organization, can be called ‘extensive’ 
• I feel very comfortable calling others, regardless of rank , position, or organizational 
unit, when the need arises 
 
Tolerance for ambiguity of manager’s peers and/ or superiors (Volberda, 1998) 
• The attitude in my working environment is very negative when I have deviant 
opinions or new ideas ® 
• My direct supervisors strongly encourage me to think ‘out of the box’  
• Differing opinions or new ideas I have, have a great chance to succeed in my working 
environment  
• I am very careful about questioning existing assumptions we have here ® 
 
All items are measured on a 7-point scale with 1 = ‘to a very small extent’, or 
‘strongly disagree’, to 7 = ‘to a very large extent’, or ‘strongly agree’ 
® means reversed coded item 
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APPENDIX C – Specification of Interviews 
 
Company: Rabobank 
Date of 
Interview 
Hier. Level 
Respondent 
Function of 
Respondent 
Local Bank Unit 
15 11 2002 Top Back office 1 Operations 
21 01 2003 Middle Front office 1 Whole sale 
21 01 2003 Front Front office 1 Whole sale 
21 01 2003 Front Front office 1 Retail 
23 01 2003 Top Back office 1 Operations 
23 01 2003 Front Back office 1 Operations 
23 01 2003 Front Front office 1 Retail 
30 01 2003 Middle Front office 1 Whole sale 
30 01 2003 Middle Front office 1 Whole sale 
26 06 2003* Top 
Front 
Back office 
Back office 
1 Operations 
Operations 
27 02 2004 Top Back office 2 Operations 
27 02 2004 Front Back office 2 Operations 
27 02 2004 Front Back office 2 Operations 
06 05 2004* Top 
Middle 
Middle 
Back office 
Front office 
Front office 
2 Operations 
Retail 
Retail 
28 02 2004 Top Back office 3 Operations 
28 02 2004 Middle Back office 3 Operations 
28 02 2004 Front Back office 3 Operations 
06 05 2004* Top 
Middle 
Back office 
Back office 
3 Operations 
Operations 
14 07 2004 Top Back office 4 Operations 
14 07 2004 Middle Back office 4 Retail 
14 07 2004 Front Front office 4 Retail 
05 10 2004* Middle Back office 4 Retail 
25 11 2004 Top Front office 5 Whole sale 
25 11 2004 Front Front office 5 Whole sale 
25 11 2004 Front Front office 5 Whole sale 
25 11 2004 Middle Back office 5 Whole sale 
13 09 2005* Top Front office 5 Whole sale 
10 07 2002 Middle 
Middle 
 Headquarters 
Rabo Nederland
E-Commerce 
10 05 2004* Middle 
Middle 
 Headquarters 
Rabo Nederland
E-Commerce 
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Appendix C – Cont. 
 
Company: Philips 
Date of 
Interview 
Hier. Level of 
Respondent 
Function of Respondent Unit 
31 03 2004 Top Head of Human Resources Headquarters 
21 04 2004 Top CEO Division Headquarters 
19 04 2004 Top Vice CEO Division and CEO 
Automotive Unit 
Automotive 
22 04 2004 Middle Innovation Headquarters 
15 04 2004 Middle Quality assurance and Reliability Automotive 
13 04 2004 Middle Supply Chain Headquarters 
20 04 2004 Front Finance Headquarters 
22 04 2004 Front Quality Headquarters 
15 04 2004 Middle Design & Innovation Automotive 
09 04 2004 Middle Market segment manager Automotive 
07 04 2004 Middle Business Development and 
Strategic Marketing 
Automotive 
12 10 
2004* 
Top 
Top 
CEO Division  
Head of HRM 
Headquarters 
Headquarters 
 
Company: Deloitte 
Date of 
Interview 
Hier. Level 
Respondent 
Function of Respondent Unit 
09 06 2004 Top CKO Central & Support 
20 12 2004 Top CKO Central & Support 
30 12 2004 Middle Manager Information Research Consultancy 
30 12 2004 Front Senior consultant Accountancy 
30 12 2004 Front Senior consultant Consultancy 
27 09 2005* Top CKO Central & Support 
 
* Interview refers to a feedback session. During a feedback session with managers, 
we presented, using a PowerPoint presentation, the empirical results of the study 
as conducted at their company. During this presentation, managers discussed with 
us the interpretation of the results and managerial implications. 
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Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation Activities
The Influence of Organizational Factors and Knowledge Inflows
In order to be successful over time, firms in a dynamic environment
are challenged to explore new possibilities to achieve congruence with
the changing business environment, and to exploit old certainties to
secure efficiency benefits. However, both researchers and managers
struggle to understand how firms may manage and organize exploration
and exploitation. This study delivers a contribution by investigating
managers’ exploration and exploitation activities, and by developing
and testing hypotheses on the influence of organizational factors
and managers’ knowledge inflows on managers’ exploration and
exploitation activities. Results indicate that organizational factors
not only directly influence managers’ exploration and exploitation
activities, but also indirectly through their influence on managers’
knowledge inflows; i.e. knowledge inflows mediate the relationship
between organizational factors and exploration and exploitation at
the manager level. We contribute to current literature on exploration
and exploitation and to management practice by focusing on the
manager level of analysis. We add the importance of knowledge flow
configurations to the literature on organizational factors’ influence
on exploration and exploitation. Furthermore, we illustrate which,
and how, configurations of organizational factors enable or inhibit
managers to explore, to exploit, or to combine both.
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research undertaken by ERIM is focussed on the management of the
firm in its environment, its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its
business processes in their interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From
a variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM commu-
nity is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront
of creating new business knowledge.
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